| dc.creator (作者) | Chang,Juin-Jen ; Lai,Ching-Chong; Yang,C.C. | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2000-03 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 6-一月-2009 15:23:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 6-一月-2009 15:23:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 6-一月-2009 15:23:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/22322 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This article revisits the Bowles-Garoupa model with regard to corruption and crime. We interpret additional costs inflicted on a caught corrupt fficer as psychological costs, and we incorporate social norms into these psychological costs. In he Bowles-Garoupa model, the deterrent effect of raising fines on crime is weakened but is not perverse in the presence of corruption. Here, due to the `snowballing` character of social norms, raising fines could be counterproductive in deterring crimes if the status quo corruption is widespread. As a corollary, the optimality of the maximal fine suggested by Becker need not be true even if corruption is harmless. | - |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | International Review of Law and Economics,20(1),35-51 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Casual corruption;Crime; Enforcement;Social norms | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Casual Police Corruption and the Economics of Crime: Further Results | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
