| dc.creator (作者) | 翁仁甫;楊建成 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Ueng,Zen-Fu ;Yang,C.C. | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2005-02 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 6-Jan-2009 15:24:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 6-Jan-2009 15:24:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 6-Jan-2009 15:24:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/22331 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | A crucial idea in Laffont and Tirole (1993) is the extraction of costly information rent through production distortion. In this paper we augment the Laffont-Tirole model with time delay, highlighting the possibility of further rent extraction through consumption distortion due to the delayed implementation of a public project. This consumption distortion through delay in essence relaxes the incentive constraint in the presence of asymmetric information. We show that a positive but finite delay can be optimal in regulation, and provide a condition differentiating welfare-improving delays from welfare-worsening ones. This condition generalizes the shutdown condition of an inefficient firm in the Laffont-Tirole model. | - |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Economics,184(1),1-26 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | time delay;rent extraction;regulation | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Time delay and the extraction of Information Rent in Regulation | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
