| dc.creator (作者) | 何靜嫺 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2002-04 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-Jan-2009 12:19:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 9-Jan-2009 12:19:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 9-Jan-2009 12:19:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/23295 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | We analyze the formation andstability of coalitions for a situation where finitely many individuals form different coalitions and their payoffs depend on the consequence of a noncooperative game with different coalitions， and examine the moving path of individuals among various coalitions. Our main finding is to show that there exists at least one evolutionarily stable coalition equilibrium in fnπ . When addressing the evolving path of coalitions， we conclude that in the case of symmetric strategies and symmetric population shares， if each coalition`s population share is too small， the equilibrium requires a reduction of the number of coalitions， but if each coalition share is too large， the equilibrium requires an increase of the number of coalitions. Furthermore， when ui(.)s are symmetric but x is asymmetric， then (i) the highest payoffs are oscillatory across time still stability happens. (ii)In the evolutionarily stable structure， each group share the same population and the coalition numbers is hence IDt(x， 1ft)I. | - |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Nonlinear Dynamics Psychology and Life Sciences,6(2),160-170 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | coalition structure, evolutionarily stable, folk theorem | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Evolutionarily Stable Coalition Structure | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
