| dc.creator (作者) | 何靜嫺 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Ho, Shirley J. | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2007-12 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-Jan-2009 12:19:09 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 9-Jan-2009 12:19:09 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 9-Jan-2009 12:19:09 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/23296 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic analysis of military intelligence by using the approach in contract theory to understand when a spy will be hired by a country, why a spy will defect, and how the enemy can use a double agent to fight back. Most importantly, we will provide four solutions to this defection problem in a spy contract using related discussions in the economic literature. | - |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Peace and Defence Economics,18(6),485-493 | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | An Economic Analysis of Military Intelligence | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1080/10242690701197571 | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242690701197571 | en_US |
