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題名 公司特性、公司治理與高管股票薪酬績效關聯性之研究
作者 楊翔傑
貢獻者 梁嘉紋
楊翔傑
關鍵詞 高階主管薪酬
股票薪酬與績效敏感性
公司特性
公司治理
日期 2008
上傳時間 11-Sep-2009 17:31:09 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究參考Sloan (1993)之研究方法,以交乘項之方式研究公司特性與公司治理如何影響高階主管股票薪酬對於會計及市場績效之關聯程度。其中,公司特性包括公司成長機會、公司規模、公司風險與負債比例;而公司治理主要包括董事會特性與高階主管權力兩大構面。
     研究結果發現,當公司具有高度成長機會時,會計、市場兩績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著降低。此一實證結果顯示,當公司未來具有高度成長機會時,以當期會計或市場績效指標無法充分反映經理人之投資決策經濟效果。
     在公司規模方面,本研究發現公司規模愈大,會計績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著降低,但與市場績效之關聯程度則未有顯著改變。此一實證結果顯示,當公司規模愈大時,在人力資源供給有限之情況下,需要人才之能力愈高,為了留住有能力之高階主管,公司必須支付更高之基本薪酬,而降低其與績效之關聯程度。
     在公司風險方面,本研究發現公司風險愈高,會計績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著提高,但與市場績效之關聯程度則會顯著降低。此一實證結果顯示,當公司風險愈高時,市場績效所包含之雜訊愈多,愈無法充分顯示高階主管的努力程度,故薪酬契約會降低高階主管股票薪酬與市場績效的關聯程度,加強會計績效所佔之比重。
     在負債比率方面,本研究發現公司負債比率愈高,會計績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著提高,但與市場績效之關聯程度則未有顯著的變化。此一實證結果顯示,當公司債務投資人比重愈高,薪酬契約之訂定會加強高階主管薪酬與會計績效之關聯程度,也表示債務投資人較重視財務報表上之績效指標或者財務比率,以彰顯公司之償債能力。
     在董事會規模方面,發現董事會規模愈大,高階主管股票薪酬與會計績效之關聯性會顯著降低,但與市場績效則無顯著關係。此一結果顯示,當董事會人數愈多時,董事會決策能力愈差,愈難整合所有董事之意見去訂定有效之薪酬契約以提升績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯性。
     在經理人董事席次比例方面,發現經理人董事席次比例愈高,高階主管股票薪酬與會計績效之關聯性會顯著降低,但與市場績效則無顯著關係。此一結果顯示,當經理人同時具有董事身分,且比重愈大時,愈有可能透過自身之影響力為自某取較高的股票薪酬,降低其與會計績效之敏感程度。
     在其他變數方面,獨立董事席次比率、席次控制權與盈餘分配權偏離倍數、董事長是否兼任總經理及經理人持股比率中,並未發現高階主管股票薪酬與會計、市場兩績效之關聯性會受到此四個變數之影響。
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
96353001
97
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096353001
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 梁嘉紋zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 楊翔傑zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 楊翔傑zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2008en_US
dc.date.accessioned 11-Sep-2009 17:31:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Sep-2009 17:31:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Sep-2009 17:31:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0096353001en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/30242-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 96353001zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 97zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究參考Sloan (1993)之研究方法,以交乘項之方式研究公司特性與公司治理如何影響高階主管股票薪酬對於會計及市場績效之關聯程度。其中,公司特性包括公司成長機會、公司規模、公司風險與負債比例;而公司治理主要包括董事會特性與高階主管權力兩大構面。
     研究結果發現,當公司具有高度成長機會時,會計、市場兩績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著降低。此一實證結果顯示,當公司未來具有高度成長機會時,以當期會計或市場績效指標無法充分反映經理人之投資決策經濟效果。
     在公司規模方面,本研究發現公司規模愈大,會計績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著降低,但與市場績效之關聯程度則未有顯著改變。此一實證結果顯示,當公司規模愈大時,在人力資源供給有限之情況下,需要人才之能力愈高,為了留住有能力之高階主管,公司必須支付更高之基本薪酬,而降低其與績效之關聯程度。
     在公司風險方面,本研究發現公司風險愈高,會計績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著提高,但與市場績效之關聯程度則會顯著降低。此一實證結果顯示,當公司風險愈高時,市場績效所包含之雜訊愈多,愈無法充分顯示高階主管的努力程度,故薪酬契約會降低高階主管股票薪酬與市場績效的關聯程度,加強會計績效所佔之比重。
     在負債比率方面,本研究發現公司負債比率愈高,會計績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著提高,但與市場績效之關聯程度則未有顯著的變化。此一實證結果顯示,當公司債務投資人比重愈高,薪酬契約之訂定會加強高階主管薪酬與會計績效之關聯程度,也表示債務投資人較重視財務報表上之績效指標或者財務比率,以彰顯公司之償債能力。
     在董事會規模方面,發現董事會規模愈大,高階主管股票薪酬與會計績效之關聯性會顯著降低,但與市場績效則無顯著關係。此一結果顯示,當董事會人數愈多時,董事會決策能力愈差,愈難整合所有董事之意見去訂定有效之薪酬契約以提升績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯性。
     在經理人董事席次比例方面,發現經理人董事席次比例愈高,高階主管股票薪酬與會計績效之關聯性會顯著降低,但與市場績效則無顯著關係。此一結果顯示,當經理人同時具有董事身分,且比重愈大時,愈有可能透過自身之影響力為自某取較高的股票薪酬,降低其與會計績效之敏感程度。
     在其他變數方面,獨立董事席次比率、席次控制權與盈餘分配權偏離倍數、董事長是否兼任總經理及經理人持股比率中,並未發現高階主管股票薪酬與會計、市場兩績效之關聯性會受到此四個變數之影響。
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dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
     第一節 研究動機與目的 1
     第二節 研究問題與研究架構 4
     第二章 文獻探討 5
     第一節 代理理論 5
     第二節 薪酬制度 8
     第三節 我國員工分紅配股制度與高階主管分紅股票揭露方式 10
     第四節 高階主管薪酬之決定因素 11
     第五節 高階主管股票薪酬與公司績效關聯程度之影響因素 18
     第三章 研究方法 23
     第一節 研究假說 23
     第二節 變數衡量 27
     第三節 研究模型 30
     第四節 資料來源與處理 36
     第四章 實證結果 38
     第一節 敘述性統計分析 38
     第二節 相關性分析 41
     第三節 多元迴歸分析 43
     第四節 敏感性分析 51
     第五章 結論與建議 57
     第一節 研究結論 57
     第二節 研究限制與未來建議 59
     參考文獻 60
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dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096353001en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 高階主管薪酬zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股票薪酬與績效敏感性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司特性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 公司特性、公司治理與高管股票薪酬績效關聯性之研究zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
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