| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳錦烽 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 葉柏廷 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | YEH,PO-TING | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 葉柏廷 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | YEH,PO-TING | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2005 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 11-Sep-2009 17:40:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 11-Sep-2009 17:40:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 11-Sep-2009 17:40:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0933530341 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=31579 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 會計研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 93353034 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 94 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本研究之主要目的在於探討公司自由現金流量與其過度投資之關聯性，並設法瞭解內外部機制是否有助於減緩公司過度投資之代理問題。此外，本研究亦探究公司自由現金流量與債務控制之關聯性，以及債務控制與公司之其他監督機制間之關聯性。本研究發現，公司自由現金流量愈大時，愈可能有過度投資之現象，且此種現象較集中於自由現金流量為正之公司。此外，相較於高成長公司，低成長公司自由現金流量之代理問題較為嚴重，更傾向於過度投資。而在減緩代理問題之機制上，管理階層及機構投資人之持股並無法有效減緩代理成本，或抑制公司過度投資之現象，但或許可藉由債務控制減緩過度投資之問題。再者，本研究推論過度投資之公司可能會傾向於提前適用資產減損之會計處理，以認列其投資損失。最後，公司代理問題愈嚴重時，並不一定會藉由債務控制方式減緩過度投資。而在降低代理成本的作用上，管理者持股、機構投資人持股與債務控制之間具有明顯的互補關係。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The main purpose of this study is to examine the association between a firm’s free cash flows and its overinvestment. In addition, I also examine the interrelationships between free cash flow, managerial ownership, institutional investors, and debt .The empirical results suggest that overinvestment is concentrated in firms with higher levels of free cash flows and lower opportunities for growth. Further tests find that a firm’s managerial ownership, institutional investors’ ownership may not effectively mitigate its overinvestment. However, debt appears to control overinvestment. Besides, I infer that firms with overinvestment may choose to adopt the accounting standards for asset impairment earlier to recognize their investment losses. Finally, I find evidence that firms may not be using debt control to mitigate their overinvestment, and a firm’s managerial ownership, institutional investors’ ownership and debt may serve as substitutes in controlling its agency costs. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論.........................................1\r\n\r\n第一節 研究動機與目的.................................1\r\n第二節 研究問題......................................4\r\n第三節 論文架構......................................5\r\n\r\n第二章 文獻探討......................................6\r\n\r\n第一節 代理理論.....................................6\r\n第二節 自由現金流量理論..............................11\r\n第三節 股權結構.....................................16\r\n\r\n第三章 研究方法......................................24\r\n\r\n第一節 研究假說......................................24\r\n第二節 研究變數......................................27\r\n第三節 樣本選取......................................34\r\n第四節 分析方法......................................35\r\n\r\n第四章 實證結果與分析................................37\r\n\r\n第一節 投資支出及投資預測模型..........................37\r\n第二節 敘述性統計分析.................................39\r\n第三節 實證結果......................................46\r\n\r\n第五章 結論與建議....................................59\r\n\r\n第一節 結論.........................................59\r\n第二節 研究限制......................................61\r\n第三節 後續研究建議..................................62\r\n\r\n參考文獻............................................63\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n \r\n圖目錄\r\n圖3-1 本研究觀念性架........................................23\r\n\r\n\r\n表目錄\r\n\r\n表4-1 各類投資支出之敘述性統計量............................38\r\n表4-2 投資預測模型迴歸分析.................................38\r\n表4-3 自由現金流量構成要素之敘述性統計量.....................40\r\n表4-4 財務槓桿、自由現金流量與過度投資之關聯性：敘述性統計量....41\r\n表4-5 財務槓桿、自由現金流量與過度投資之關聯性：依自由現金流量分組之敘述性統計量...............................................42\r\n表4-6 財務槓桿、自由現金流量與過度投資之關聯性：相關係數分析....43\r\n表4-7 財務槓桿與自由現金流量、股權結構之關聯性：敘述性統計量....44\r\n表4-8 財務槓桿與自由現金流量、股權結構之關聯性：相關係數分析....45\r\n表4-9 財務槓桿、自由現金流量與過度投資之關聯性：整體樣本迴歸分析.47 \r\n表4-10財務槓桿、自由現金流量與過度投資之關聯性：依自由現金流量分組之迴歸分析..................................................49\r\n表4-11財務槓桿、自由現金流量與過度投資之關聯性：依公司成長機會分組之迴歸分析..................................................51\r\n表4-12 CFaip與過度投資之關聯性：整體樣本迴歸分析..............52\r\n表4-13 CFaip與過度投資關聯性：依CFaip分組之迴歸分析...........53\r\n表4-14 CFaip與過度投資關聯性：依公司成長機會分組之迴歸分析.....54\r\n表4-15自由現金流量、股權結構與債務控制之關聯性：迴歸分析........56\r\n表4-16過度投資與自由現金流量、股權結構之關聯性White Test.......57\r\n表4-17財務槓桿與、自由現金流量、股權結構之關聯性：White Test...57\r\n表4-18財務槓桿與、自由現金流量、股權結構之關聯性：按White修正後迴歸分析結果..................................................58\r\n表4-19過度投資與自由現金流量、股權結構之關聯性：Durbin-Waston .58\r\n表4-20財務槓桿與自由現金流量、股權結構之關聯性：Durbin-Waston .58 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0933530341 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 自由現金流量 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 過度投資 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 代理成本 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 債務控制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Free cash flows | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | overinvestment | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | agency costs | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | debt control | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 財務槓桿、自由現金流量與過度投資關聯性之研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | The Association between Financial Leverage, Free Cash Flows and Overinvestment | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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