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題名 員工認股權憑證設計與公司治理
作者 何典諭
貢獻者 屠美亞
何典諭
關鍵詞 員工認股權憑證
公司治理
績效
管理者自利
日期 2006
上傳時間 14-Sep-2009 09:01:47 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究針對民國91到95之間,台灣發行員工認股權憑證之上市上櫃公司進行調查,利用羅吉特迴歸模型進行分析,希望能夠透過員工認股權憑證設計與公司治理變數之間的關聯性研究,找出能夠反映員工認股權憑證設計是否偏向管理當局的公司治理變數,並且提供政府與投資人未來在政策制訂與決策上的一些參考依據。
     本研究使用「外部股東持股>5%總和」、「政府持有」、「盈餘股份偏離比」、「董事會規模」、「外部董監事」作為公司治理變數;分析結果發現在「盈餘股份偏離比」的部分,於樣本觀察期間,都呈現正向關係,並且於93、94年達到顯著。盈餘股份偏離比越大的時候,一般象徵著盈餘權的不對等,同時也隱含公司治理風險,因此由上述結果本研究推論,當盈餘股份偏離比擴大時員工認股選擇權的設計方式將更朝向管理當局的偏好靠近。支持管理權力假說的看法;當進一步利用同樣的方法針對含公司特性控制變數的迴歸結果進行跨期的一致性分析時,發現盈餘股份偏離比以及董事會規模的顯著性雙雙提高,盈餘股份偏離比依舊為正相關董事會規模也呈現正相關。
參考文獻 Aboody, D., & Kasznik, R. (2000). CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 , pp. 73-100.
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Roell, A. (2003). Corporate governance and control. Handbook of the Economics of Finance , pp. 1-109.
Bechuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 , pp. 71-92.
Brenner, M., Sundaram, R., & Yermack, D. (2000). Altering the terms of executive stock options. Journal of Financial Economics 53 , pp. 103-128.
Callaghan, S. R., Saly, P. J., & Subramanian, C. (2004). The timing of option repricing. Journal of Finance 59 , pp. 1651-1676.
Chance, D. M., Kumar, R., & Todd, R. B. (2000). The "repricing" of executive stock options. Journal of Financial Economics 61 , pp. 129-154.
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & F., L. D. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51 , pp. 371-406.
Djankov, S., LaPorta, R., Silanes, F. L., & Shleifer, A. (2005). The law and economics of self-dealing. Working Paper .
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics 48 , pp. 35-54.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1998, 6). Taxes, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value. The Journal of Finance VOL LIII, NO.3 , pp. 819-843.
Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrik, A. (2003). Corporate governmence and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 , pp. 107-155.
Guay, W., Kothari, S. P., & Sloan, R. (2003). Accounting for employee stock options. American Economic Review 93 , pp. 405-409.
Hall, B. J., & J., M. K. (2003). The trouble with stock options. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 , pp. 49-70.
Hamid, M. (1995). Executive compensation, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38 , pp. 163-184.
Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Institutional investors and executive compensation. Journal of Finance 58 , pp. 2351-2374.
Harvey, K. D., & Shrieves, R. E. (2001). Executive compensation structure and corporate governance choices. Journal of Financial Research 24 , pp. 495-512.
Hermalin, B. E., & S., W. M. (2003, 4). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review , pp. 7-26.
Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10 , pp. 74-79.
Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13 , pp. 324-340.
Ikaheimo, Kjellman, Holmberg, & Jussila. (2004). Employee stock option plans and stock market reaction: evidence from Finland. The European Journal of Finance (10, pp105-122).
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 4 , pp. 305-360.
Kato, H. K., Lemmon, M., Lua, M., & James, S. (2005). An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Financial Economics forthcoming .
Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Weigelt, K. (1993). The structure of organizational incentives. Administrative Science Quarterly 38 , pp. 438-461.
LaPorta, R., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 106 , pp. 1113-1155.
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governmence. Business Lawyer 48 , pp. 163-184.
Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation, in O. Ashenfelter, and D. Cards. Handbook of Labor Economics V.3 .
Newman, H. A., & Mozes, H. A. (1999). Does the composition of the compensation committee influence CEO compensation practice? Financial Management 28 , pp. 41-53.
Oyer, P., & Schaefer, S. (2005). Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical analysis of alternative theory. Journal of Financial Economics 76 , pp. 99-133.
Pasternack, D., & Rosenberg, M. (2003). What determines stock option contract design? Swedish School of Economic Review 88 .
Ryan, H. E., Roy, & Wiggins, R. A. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Finance 73 , pp. 497-524.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of company news announcements. Journal of Finance Economics 40 , pp. 185-211.
白嘉眉, & 郭秀春. (2004年2月16日). 公開發行公司財務資訊揭露及會計處理新趨勢. 證券暨期貨月刊, 頁 77.
宋致皓. (2006). 董監酬勞與公司治理關聯性研究. 國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文.
林柏廷. (2005). 員工認股權、盈餘管理與公司治理. 國立彰化師範大學會計學系碩士論文.
張倫綺. (2006). 公司治理與員工認股權獎酬. 朝陽科技大學會計學系碩士論文.
許崇源. (2004). 員工認股權制度及其會計處理. 經濟部商業司, 頁 2-8.
陳盈翔. (2006). 公司治理機制與高階管理者薪酬關係之研究. 私立東海大學企業管理學系碩士論文.
陳寶玉. (2006). 公司治理機制、員工認股權證發行效果與公司經營譏笑之相關性--以台灣上市櫃電子業為例. 國立高雄應用科技大學商務經營研究所碩士論文.
藍凱莉. (2005). 台灣銀行業經理人超額報償與經營管理績效之關聯性. 國立逢甲大學經營管理碩士在職專班碩士論文.
證期局. (2003). 員工認股權憑證適用疑義問答.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
94357033
95
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094357033
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 屠美亞zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 何典諭zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 何典諭zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2006en_US
dc.date.accessioned 14-Sep-2009 09:01:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 14-Sep-2009 09:01:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 14-Sep-2009 09:01:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0094357033en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/30996-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 94357033zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 95zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究針對民國91到95之間,台灣發行員工認股權憑證之上市上櫃公司進行調查,利用羅吉特迴歸模型進行分析,希望能夠透過員工認股權憑證設計與公司治理變數之間的關聯性研究,找出能夠反映員工認股權憑證設計是否偏向管理當局的公司治理變數,並且提供政府與投資人未來在政策制訂與決策上的一些參考依據。
     本研究使用「外部股東持股>5%總和」、「政府持有」、「盈餘股份偏離比」、「董事會規模」、「外部董監事」作為公司治理變數;分析結果發現在「盈餘股份偏離比」的部分,於樣本觀察期間,都呈現正向關係,並且於93、94年達到顯著。盈餘股份偏離比越大的時候,一般象徵著盈餘權的不對等,同時也隱含公司治理風險,因此由上述結果本研究推論,當盈餘股份偏離比擴大時員工認股選擇權的設計方式將更朝向管理當局的偏好靠近。支持管理權力假說的看法;當進一步利用同樣的方法針對含公司特性控制變數的迴歸結果進行跨期的一致性分析時,發現盈餘股份偏離比以及董事會規模的顯著性雙雙提高,盈餘股份偏離比依舊為正相關董事會規模也呈現正相關。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 謝辭 2
     中文摘要 3
     英文摘要 3
     第一章 緒論 4
     第一節 研究動機 4
     第二節 研究目的 5
     第三節 研究架構 6
     第二章 文獻回顧 7
     第一節 員工認股權證制度之介紹 7
     第二節 相關文獻探討 12
     一、 獎酬制度與公司治理 12
     二、 管理權力與股票選擇權設計 15
     三、 員工認股權激勵效果之研究 17
     第三章 研究方法 20
     第一節 資料來源 20
     第二節 研究變數及衡量 20
     一、 員工認股權憑證特性變數 20
     二、 公司治理變數 22
     第三節 研究設計與研究假說 26
     第四章 實證分析 28
     第一節 敘述性統計 28
     一、 樣本特性 28
     二、 公司治理結構與員工認購權憑證設計 29
     第二節 迴歸結果 33
     一、 員工認股選擇權憑證設計與公司治理 33
     二、 公司營運績效與員工認股選擇權憑證設計 39
     第五章 結論建議與研究限制 49
     第一節 結論與建議 49
     第二節 研究限制 51
     參考文獻 53
     附錄 56
zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094357033en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 員工認股權憑證zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 績效zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 管理者自利zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 員工認股權憑證設計與公司治理zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Aboody, D., & Kasznik, R. (2000). CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 , pp. 73-100.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Roell, A. (2003). Corporate governance and control. Handbook of the Economics of Finance , pp. 1-109.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bechuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 , pp. 71-92.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Brenner, M., Sundaram, R., & Yermack, D. (2000). Altering the terms of executive stock options. Journal of Financial Economics 53 , pp. 103-128.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Callaghan, S. R., Saly, P. J., & Subramanian, C. (2004). The timing of option repricing. Journal of Finance 59 , pp. 1651-1676.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chance, D. M., Kumar, R., & Todd, R. B. (2000). The "repricing" of executive stock options. Journal of Financial Economics 61 , pp. 129-154.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & F., L. D. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51 , pp. 371-406.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Djankov, S., LaPorta, R., Silanes, F. L., & Shleifer, A. (2005). The law and economics of self-dealing. Working Paper .zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics 48 , pp. 35-54.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1998, 6). Taxes, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value. The Journal of Finance VOL LIII, NO.3 , pp. 819-843.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrik, A. (2003). Corporate governmence and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 , pp. 107-155.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Guay, W., Kothari, S. P., & Sloan, R. (2003). Accounting for employee stock options. American Economic Review 93 , pp. 405-409.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hall, B. J., & J., M. K. (2003). The trouble with stock options. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 , pp. 49-70.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hamid, M. (1995). Executive compensation, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38 , pp. 163-184.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Institutional investors and executive compensation. Journal of Finance 58 , pp. 2351-2374.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Harvey, K. D., & Shrieves, R. E. (2001). Executive compensation structure and corporate governance choices. Journal of Financial Research 24 , pp. 495-512.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hermalin, B. E., & S., W. M. (2003, 4). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review , pp. 7-26.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10 , pp. 74-79.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13 , pp. 324-340.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ikaheimo, Kjellman, Holmberg, & Jussila. (2004). Employee stock option plans and stock market reaction: evidence from Finland. The European Journal of Finance (10, pp105-122).zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 4 , pp. 305-360.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kato, H. K., Lemmon, M., Lua, M., & James, S. (2005). An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Financial Economics forthcoming .zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Weigelt, K. (1993). The structure of organizational incentives. Administrative Science Quarterly 38 , pp. 438-461.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) LaPorta, R., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 106 , pp. 1113-1155.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governmence. Business Lawyer 48 , pp. 163-184.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation, in O. Ashenfelter, and D. Cards. Handbook of Labor Economics V.3 .zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Newman, H. A., & Mozes, H. A. (1999). Does the composition of the compensation committee influence CEO compensation practice? Financial Management 28 , pp. 41-53.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Oyer, P., & Schaefer, S. (2005). Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical analysis of alternative theory. Journal of Financial Economics 76 , pp. 99-133.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Pasternack, D., & Rosenberg, M. (2003). What determines stock option contract design? Swedish School of Economic Review 88 .zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ryan, H. E., Roy, & Wiggins, R. A. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Finance 73 , pp. 497-524.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of company news announcements. Journal of Finance Economics 40 , pp. 185-211.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 白嘉眉, & 郭秀春. (2004年2月16日). 公開發行公司財務資訊揭露及會計處理新趨勢. 證券暨期貨月刊, 頁 77.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 宋致皓. (2006). 董監酬勞與公司治理關聯性研究. 國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 林柏廷. (2005). 員工認股權、盈餘管理與公司治理. 國立彰化師範大學會計學系碩士論文.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 張倫綺. (2006). 公司治理與員工認股權獎酬. 朝陽科技大學會計學系碩士論文.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 許崇源. (2004). 員工認股權制度及其會計處理. 經濟部商業司, 頁 2-8.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 陳盈翔. (2006). 公司治理機制與高階管理者薪酬關係之研究. 私立東海大學企業管理學系碩士論文.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 陳寶玉. (2006). 公司治理機制、員工認股權證發行效果與公司經營譏笑之相關性--以台灣上市櫃電子業為例. 國立高雄應用科技大學商務經營研究所碩士論文.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 藍凱莉. (2005). 台灣銀行業經理人超額報償與經營管理績效之關聯性. 國立逢甲大學經營管理碩士在職專班碩士論文.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 證期局. (2003). 員工認股權憑證適用疑義問答.zh_TW