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題名 賣方拍賣策略分析:評價效果
A Dynamic Analysis of Auction with Reputation Effects
作者 黃久晏
Huang,Chiu Yen
貢獻者 莊委桐
Juang, Wei Torng
黃久晏
Huang,Chiu Yen
關鍵詞 網路拍賣
評價
定價策略
AUCTIONS
REPUTATION
PRICING STRATEGY
日期 2006
上傳時間 14-Sep-2009 13:28:46 (UTC+8)
摘要 過去認為賣家評價對於價格是正、統計上顯著地影響價格,但是這影響卻不大,我們建立一個模型去解釋是兩種正負關係互相抵消,造成觀察到的結果是很小的情況。具體的說,賣家需要高評價分數去銷售高單價商品,而累積評價分數快速又低成本的方法就是利用低單價商品,利用降低低單價商品價格,讓銷售量增加的更快,銷售量增加快,評價就會增加快速。所以評價對於低價商品是一種負的關係,對於高單價商品才是正的關係。
It has been recognized empirically that in internet auctions, seller`s reputation has a positive, statistically significant, but small impact on the price. We construct a model on internet auctions and delineate this small impact with two opposite forces. To be specific, it needs higher reputation for sellers to sell high-price goods and a cheap way to achieve this objective is to lower the price of low-price goods. By this way one can raise the sale volume of low-price commodities to increase reputation score quickly, which benefits the sale of high-price goods. Therefore, reputation imposes positive impact on prices of "expensive" goods and negative impact on prices of "cheap" ones.
參考文獻 [1]Anderson, S., Friedman, D., Milam, G., and Singh, N. (2004), "Seller Strategies on eBay" UCSC Working paper.
[2]Budish, E.B. and Takeyama L.N. (2001), "Buy Price in Online Auctions: Irrationality on the Internet?" Economics Letters, 72, 325-33.
[3]Houser, D and Wooders, J.(2005), "Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay" University of Arizona Working paper.
[4]Kirkegaard, R. and Overgaard, P.B.(2007), "Buy-Out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demand," Brock University, Canada Working paper.
[5]Livingson, J.A. (2005), "How Valuable is a Good Reputation? A Simple Selection Model of Internet Auctions," Review of Economics and Statistics, 87, 453-65.
[6]Mathews, T. (2004), "The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Buy-out Option: a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay`s But-It-Now Feature," Journal of Economics, 81, 25-52.
[7]Mathews, T. and B. Katzman (2006), "The Role of Varying Risk Attitudes in an Auction with a Buyout Option," Economic Theory, 27, 597-613.
[8]Melnik, M. and Alm, J. (2002), "Does A Seller`s Ecommerce Reputation Matter? Evidence from eBay Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, 50, 337-349.
[9]Shapiro, C. (1983), "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputation," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 659-680.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟研究所
94258008
95
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094258008
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 莊委桐zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Juang, Wei Torngen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃久晏zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Huang,Chiu Yenen_US
dc.creator (作者) 黃久晏zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Huang,Chiu Yenen_US
dc.date (日期) 2006en_US
dc.date.accessioned 14-Sep-2009 13:28:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 14-Sep-2009 13:28:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 14-Sep-2009 13:28:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0094258008en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/32237-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 94258008zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 95zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 過去認為賣家評價對於價格是正、統計上顯著地影響價格,但是這影響卻不大,我們建立一個模型去解釋是兩種正負關係互相抵消,造成觀察到的結果是很小的情況。具體的說,賣家需要高評價分數去銷售高單價商品,而累積評價分數快速又低成本的方法就是利用低單價商品,利用降低低單價商品價格,讓銷售量增加的更快,銷售量增加快,評價就會增加快速。所以評價對於低價商品是一種負的關係,對於高單價商品才是正的關係。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) It has been recognized empirically that in internet auctions, seller`s reputation has a positive, statistically significant, but small impact on the price. We construct a model on internet auctions and delineate this small impact with two opposite forces. To be specific, it needs higher reputation for sellers to sell high-price goods and a cheap way to achieve this objective is to lower the price of low-price goods. By this way one can raise the sale volume of low-price commodities to increase reputation score quickly, which benefits the sale of high-price goods. Therefore, reputation imposes positive impact on prices of "expensive" goods and negative impact on prices of "cheap" ones.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1.INTRODUCTION.........................................3
     
     2. LITERATURE DISCUSSION SURVEY........................9
     
     3. BASIC MODEL.........................................11
     
      3.1 Traders` Behavior...........................11
     
      3.2 Commodities and Reputation .................14
     
      3.2.1 Low Price Commodity....................14
     
      3.2.2 High Price Commodity...................15
     
      3.2.3 Reputation and Sales Volume............15
     
     4. MAIN RESULTS........................................16
     
     5. FURTHER EXTENSION AND DISCUSSION....................24
     
      5.1 The Extensive Form of High Price Sale Volume...24
     
      5.2 When Sellers Have Sufficiently High Reputation.24
     
     6. CONCLUSION...........................................28
     
     REFERENCES...............................................29
zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094258008en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 網路拍賣zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 評價zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 定價策略zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) AUCTIONSen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) REPUTATIONen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) PRICING STRATEGYen_US
dc.title (題名) 賣方拍賣策略分析:評價效果zh_TW
dc.title (題名) A Dynamic Analysis of Auction with Reputation Effectsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [1]Anderson, S., Friedman, D., Milam, G., and Singh, N. (2004), "Seller Strategies on eBay" UCSC Working paper.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [2]Budish, E.B. and Takeyama L.N. (2001), "Buy Price in Online Auctions: Irrationality on the Internet?" Economics Letters, 72, 325-33.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [3]Houser, D and Wooders, J.(2005), "Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay" University of Arizona Working paper.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [4]Kirkegaard, R. and Overgaard, P.B.(2007), "Buy-Out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demand," Brock University, Canada Working paper.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [5]Livingson, J.A. (2005), "How Valuable is a Good Reputation? A Simple Selection Model of Internet Auctions," Review of Economics and Statistics, 87, 453-65.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [6]Mathews, T. (2004), "The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Buy-out Option: a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay`s But-It-Now Feature," Journal of Economics, 81, 25-52.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [7]Mathews, T. and B. Katzman (2006), "The Role of Varying Risk Attitudes in an Auction with a Buyout Option," Economic Theory, 27, 597-613.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [8]Melnik, M. and Alm, J. (2002), "Does A Seller`s Ecommerce Reputation Matter? Evidence from eBay Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, 50, 337-349.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [9]Shapiro, C. (1983), "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputation," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 659-680.zh_TW