| dc.contributor.advisor | 莊委桐 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Juang, Wei Torng | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 黃柏鈞 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Huang, Po Chun | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 黃柏鈞 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Huang, Po Chun | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2008 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 14-Sep-2009 13:31:07 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 14-Sep-2009 13:31:07 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 14-Sep-2009 13:31:07 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0096258018 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/32256 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 經濟研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 96258018 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 97 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Paradoxically, pepole avoid being totally the same with others to keep their uniquness but follow the fads to avoid isolation. We construct a simple model under this concept to explain the empirical findings of forecasters’ behavior such as old forecasters are more radical and late forecasters tend to anti-herd. We show that forecasters` forecasts are not necessarilly unbiased when they consider the benefit of making correct forecasts and the cost of being wrong. Furthermore, we extended our model and show that when uninformed agent cannot differentiate which informed agents is better, she chooses mean of the two experts` opinions when the difference of the opinions is small but choose randomly from the two experts` opinions when the difference is big. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1 Introduction 1 2 A Model of 2 Informed Agents 5 2.1 Set Up 5 2.2 Equilibrium 6 2.3 Old Analyst v.s. Young Analyst 8 3 A Model of 3 Informed Agents 10 3.1 Why Forecasters Lag Behind Reality 10 3.2 Late Forecasters Tend to Anti-Herd 11 4 Extension: Mean or Extreme 13 4.1 An Example 13 5 Conclusion 16 Appendix 18 Reference 23 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096258018 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 預測競賽 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 群聚 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 反群聚 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Forecast Contest | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Herding | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Abti-Herding | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 預測競賽, 解釋預測機構的行為 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Explaining forecasters` behavior: sequential forecast contest | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Ashiya, M., Doi, T., (2001). Herd behavior of Japanese economists, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 46, 343-346. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Avery, C.N., Chevalier, J.A., (1999). Herding over the career. Economics Letters, 63, 327-333. | zh_TW |
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| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Tetlock, P. E. (2005). Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? Princeton University Press. | zh_TW |
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