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題名 Financial Holding Company and Corporate Governance from the Perspective of Ownership and Control: Case Study of SinoPac Holdings Co., LTD.
作者 Yeh,Jessie
貢獻者 沈中華
Shen,Chung-Hua
Yeh,Jessie
關鍵詞 金控公司
代理理論
現金流量請求權
控制權
公司治理
Financial Holding Company
Principal-Agent Model
Ownership
Control
Cash flow rights
Voting power
Misalignment
Corporate Governance
日期 2003
上傳時間 17-九月-2009 18:55:03 (UTC+8)
摘要 In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.
參考文獻 Becht, Marco and B□hmer, Ekkehart, ‘Ownership and Voting Power in Germany’, The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.128-53.
Becht, M. and Mayer, C., ‘Introduction’, The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.1-45.
Berle, Adolf A. and Means, Gardiner C., The Evolution of Control’, ‘The divergence of Interest Between Ownership and Control’ and ‘The New Concept of the Corporation’, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Book 1, Chapters V and VI, Book 4, Chapter IV and appendices O and P, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968, pp. 66-111, 112-16, 309-13, 341-2.
Bianchi, M., Bianco, M., Enriques, L. ‘Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy’, The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.154-87.
Bloch, L and Kremp, E, ‘France: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance’, Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, Oxford University, 2001, pp. 121-9.
Boehmer, Ekkehart, ‘Germany: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance’, Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, Oxford University, 2001, pp. 96-120.
Canals, Jordi, Universal Banking, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 1-160.
Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon and Lang, Larry H.P., ‘The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporation’, The Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 2000, pp. 81-112.
Cubbin, John and Leech, Dennis, ‘The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement’, Economic Journal, 93, June 1983, pp.351-69.
Greuning, Hennie Van and Brajovic-Bratanovic, Sonja, ‘Key Players in the Corporate Governance and Risk Management Process’, Analyzing and managing banking risk: a framework for assessing corporate governance and financial risk management, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK, Washington, D.C., 2nd edition, 2003.
Jensen Michael C. and Meckling William H., ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 1976, pp.305-60.
Keasey, Kevin, Thompson, Steve and Wright, Mike, ‘Introduction: The Corporate Governance Problem – Competing Diagnoses and Solutions’, Corporate Governance, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.1-17.
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’, The Journal of Finance 57, 1999, pp. 1147-70.
Pertersen, H. Craig and Lewis, W. Cris, ‘Game Theory and Strategic Behavior’, Managerial Economics, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 4th edition, 1999, pp.370-398.
Plotkin, Mark E. and Volland, Debra R., “Banking in the United States in the New Millennium”, Journal of International Banking Law, 2000, Issue 2, pp.424-6.
Vives, Xavier, ‘Corporate Governance: Does It Matter’, Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.1-22.
Chinese:
王文宇，「建構我國金融控股公司法制相關問題之研究」，台灣金融財務季刊，第二輯第二期，90年6月，pp.33-54.
沈中華、吳孟紋，「銀行治理、銀行失敗與銀行績效：以台灣為例」，亞太論文管理叢刊，2003。
沈中華、吳孟紋、陳錦村，「更早期預警模型：台灣銀行道德指標的建立及影響」，管理學報二審。
李紀珠， ‘台灣開放民營銀行設立之經驗與展望’， 「台灣民營銀行發展經驗教訓及對大陸的啟示」國際學術研討會，91年12月13日.
李桐豪，「由美國金融服務業現代化法看我國的金融控股公司法」，台灣金融財務季刊，第二輯第二期，90年6月，pp.1-18.
陳駿逸、劉佩修、張慧雯、彭禎伶、邵朝賢，台灣金控大火併，商訊文化，2003.
彭金龍，「論我國金融控股公司之投資與被投資事業管理」，台灣金融財務季刊，第四輯第一期，92年3月，pp.163-183.
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩、鄭桂蕙，「控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量」，貨幣觀測與信用評等，42,43，2003.
曾淑瑜，公司法實例研習，三民書局，2003.
2002台灣地區企業集團研究，中華徵信所，2002年一月出版.
2003台灣地區企業集團研究，中華徵信所，2003年一月出版.
立法院公報，90卷43期3177號，pp.174-429.
Website:
SinoPac Holdings website: www.sinopac.com.tw
Market Observation Post System: mops.tse.com.tw
Taiwan Economics Journal database
The Legislative Yuan website:www.ly.gov.tw
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營管理碩士班(IMBA)
90933011
92
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0909330111
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 沈中華zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Shen,Chung-Huaen_US
dc.contributor.author (作者) Yeh,Jessieen_US
dc.creator (作者) Yeh,Jessieen_US
dc.date (日期) 2003en_US
dc.date.accessioned 17-九月-2009 18:55:03 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 17-九月-2009 18:55:03 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 17-九月-2009 18:55:03 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0909330111en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/33959-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國際經營管理碩士班(IMBA)zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 90933011zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 92zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents Chapter One – Discussions on Relevant Theories
Section One: Introduction ...………………………………………………. 1
Section Two: Corporate Governance Theories ……………………………. 4
2.1 Corporate Governance Models: Keasey, Thompson, and Wright models
2.2 Alignment between Ownership and Control under the Principal-Agent Model
2.3 Corporate Governance in Banking and Financial Sector

Chapter Two - Case Study of SinoPac Holdings 34
Section Three: Taiwan’s legal framework ………………………………….. 36
Section Four: Research ..……………………………………………………… 46
Section Five: Discussion ………………………………………………………. 63
Section Six: Conclusion ………………………………………………………. 90
References		zh_TW
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0909330111en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 金控公司zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理理論zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 現金流量請求權zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 控制權zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Financial Holding Companyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Principal-Agent Modelen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Ownershipen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Controlen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cash flow rightsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Voting poweren_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Misalignmenten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate Governanceen_US
dc.title (題名) Financial Holding Company and Corporate Governance from the Perspective of Ownership and Control: Case Study of SinoPac Holdings Co., LTD.zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Becht, Marco and B□hmer, Ekkehart, ‘Ownership and Voting Power in Germany’, The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.128-53.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Becht, M. and Mayer, C., ‘Introduction’, The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.1-45.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Berle, Adolf A. and Means, Gardiner C., The Evolution of Control’, ‘The divergence of Interest Between Ownership and Control’ and ‘The New Concept of the Corporation’, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Book 1, Chapters V and VI, Book 4, Chapter IV and appendices O and P, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968, pp. 66-111, 112-16, 309-13, 341-2.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bianchi, M., Bianco, M., Enriques, L. ‘Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy’, The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.154-87.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bloch, L and Kremp, E, ‘France: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance’, Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, Oxford University, 2001, pp. 121-9.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Boehmer, Ekkehart, ‘Germany: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance’, Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, Oxford University, 2001, pp. 96-120.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Canals, Jordi, Universal Banking, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 1-160.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon and Lang, Larry H.P., ‘The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporation’, The Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 2000, pp. 81-112.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Cubbin, John and Leech, Dennis, ‘The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement’, Economic Journal, 93, June 1983, pp.351-69.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Greuning, Hennie Van and Brajovic-Bratanovic, Sonja, ‘Key Players in the Corporate Governance and Risk Management Process’, Analyzing and managing banking risk: a framework for assessing corporate governance and financial risk management, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK, Washington, D.C., 2nd edition, 2003.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Jensen Michael C. and Meckling William H., ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 1976, pp.305-60.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Keasey, Kevin, Thompson, Steve and Wright, Mike, ‘Introduction: The Corporate Governance Problem – Competing Diagnoses and Solutions’, Corporate Governance, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.1-17.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’, The Journal of Finance 57, 1999, pp. 1147-70.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Pertersen, H. Craig and Lewis, W. Cris, ‘Game Theory and Strategic Behavior’, Managerial Economics, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 4th edition, 1999, pp.370-398.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Plotkin, Mark E. and Volland, Debra R., “Banking in the United States in the New Millennium”, Journal of International Banking Law, 2000, Issue 2, pp.424-6.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Vives, Xavier, ‘Corporate Governance: Does It Matter’, Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.1-22.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chinese:zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王文宇，「建構我國金融控股公司法制相關問題之研究」，台灣金融財務季刊，第二輯第二期，90年6月，pp.33-54.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 沈中華、吳孟紋，「銀行治理、銀行失敗與銀行績效：以台灣為例」，亞太論文管理叢刊，2003。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 沈中華、吳孟紋、陳錦村，「更早期預警模型：台灣銀行道德指標的建立及影響」，管理學報二審。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 李紀珠， ‘台灣開放民營銀行設立之經驗與展望’， 「台灣民營銀行發展經驗教訓及對大陸的啟示」國際學術研討會，91年12月13日.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 李桐豪，「由美國金融服務業現代化法看我國的金融控股公司法」，台灣金融財務季刊，第二輯第二期，90年6月，pp.1-18.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 陳駿逸、劉佩修、張慧雯、彭禎伶、邵朝賢，台灣金控大火併，商訊文化，2003.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 彭金龍，「論我國金融控股公司之投資與被投資事業管理」，台灣金融財務季刊，第四輯第一期，92年3月，pp.163-183.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩、鄭桂蕙，「控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量」，貨幣觀測與信用評等，42,43，2003.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 曾淑瑜，公司法實例研習，三民書局，2003.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 2002台灣地區企業集團研究，中華徵信所，2002年一月出版.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 2003台灣地區企業集團研究，中華徵信所，2003年一月出版.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 立法院公報，90卷43期3177號，pp.174-429.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Website:zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) SinoPac Holdings website: www.sinopac.com.twzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Market Observation Post System: mops.tse.com.twzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Taiwan Economics Journal databasezh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) The Legislative Yuan website:www.ly.gov.twzh_TW