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題名 公司管理階層多角化動機之探討
作者 許春蕙
貢獻者 屠美亞教授
許春蕙
關鍵詞 代理問題
公司績效
股權結構
多角化
日期 2002
上傳時間 17-Sep-2009 19:10:53 (UTC+8)
摘要 過去幾年學術界發現,多角化經營會減損公司績效,此結果有別於早期之實證研究。在此情況下,為何高階主管會進行多角化經營?其多角化動機為何?本研究於是從代理理論觀點,參考Aggarwal and Samwick(2003)之模型,探討主導公司管理階層多角化之動機。與過去研究最大之不同處在於:本文在推論過程中,同時納入代理理論兩個不同觀點-趨避風險及滿足私人利益,藉由控制多角化程度之變動,觀察高階主管誘因契約與公司績效連結性強弱,以此推論隱含之高階管理者多角化動機。
本研究認為:若高階主管持股比率與多角化程度呈現負相關,同時在多角化程度變動下,高階主管持股比率與公司績效之連結性越強,則主導高階主管多角化之動機為趨避風險;反之,若高階主管持股比率與多角化程度呈現正相關,同時在多角化程度變動下,高階主管持股比率與公司績效之連結性越弱,則主導高階主管多角化之動機為滿足私人利益。本研究以高階主管持股比率替代高階主管誘因契約,以Entropy指標衡量公司多角化程度,以Tobin’s Q衡量公司績效,在實證時,又將高階主管細分為經營團隊與董事長兩組。
實證結果顯示:在經營團隊組,並無明顯證據顯示其多角化動機由和因素所主導,可能原因為台灣公司家族企業比重高,使專業經理人難以進入權力核心,左右多角化決策,使得實證結果並不顯著;在董事長組,則明顯指出,其多角化動機為趨避風險。換句話說,由於董事長個人財富、職位及聲譽與公司績效關連性很大,因此希望藉由多角化經營降低本身暴露之非系統風險。本研究同時發現,在此情況下,董事長私人利益與公司利益較無衝突,使多角化經營造成公司績效減損之幅度較小。
參考文獻 一、中文部分
1.牛延苓,「股權結構、董事會組成與公司績效關係之研究-以高科技產業與傳統產業為例」,中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文,民國90年
2.江佳明,「公司成長、規模及負債與高階主管獎酬績效敏感性之實證研究」,中正大學會計學研究所碩士論文,民國90年
3.江毓潔,「從代理理論的觀點探討股權結構與公司多角化的關係」,中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文,民國86年
4.吳佩琪,「台灣地區集團企業多角化真實效果-公司價值與會計績效研究」,中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文,民國85年
5.吳政穎,「我國上市公司股權集中度、薪酬設計與公司經營績效關係之研究」,政治大學企業管理研究所博士論文,民國89年
6.李遵中,「企業成長之多角化策略與策略參考點關係之研究-以印刷電路板業為例」,台灣大學國際企業研究所碩士論文,民國89年
7.林永塗,「台灣上市公司股權結構、企業特性與轉投資之研究」,中正大學企業管理研究所碩士論文,民國82年
8.林玉霞,「台灣上市公司代理問題、公司治理與股東價值之研究」,中原大學會計學研究所碩士論文,民國91年
9.林淑芬,「董監事持股比例、多角化策略型態與財務績效關係之研究」,淡江大學管理科學研究所碩士論文,民國82年
10.邱錦妮,「高階主管風險承擔在獎酬制度、融資政策與公司績效間之關係所扮演之角色」,中正大學會計學研究所碩士論文,民國90年
11.施佑政,「多角化對台灣集團企業效率之影響」,東吳大學經濟學研究所碩士論文,民國90年
12.洪紫芳,「公司價值、研發與生產力的關係」,朝陽科技大學財務金融研究所碩士論文,民國90年
13.徐箴宜,「多角化與國際化對企業經營績效影響之實證研究」,成功大學國際企業研究所碩士論文,民國90年
14.程銀宗,「資本支出宣告之市場反應影響因素探討」,中正大學企業管理研究所碩士論文,民國89年
15.黃子菱,「集團企業多角化程度與經營績效相關性之研究-以平衡計分卡觀點探討」,東吳大學會計學研究所碩士論文,民國91年
16.黃仲生,「多角化對公司價值影響之實證研究」,中山大學財務管理學研究所碩士論文,民國85年
17.黃儀芳,「多角化對公司價值之影響」,中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文,民國91年
18.溫福星,「首度上市上櫃公司高階主管持股、初次投資宣告與公司價值關係之研究」,政治大學企業管理研究所博士論文,民國91年
19.經濟部統計處,「企業多角化調查報告」,民國87年
20.劉富美,「台灣上市公司產品多角化與國際化程度對財務特性影響之探討」,中山大學財務管理研究所碩士論文,民國90年
21.蕭黎明,「臺灣上市公司最高主管之報償、持股比例與公司績效之關係研究」,台灣大學財務金融研究所碩士論文,民國81年
22.戴維芯,「多角化策略型態對公司價值影響之實證研究-以高科技上市公司為例」,交通大學科技管理研究所碩士論文,民國86年
23.蘇姿樺,「從股權結構之變化探討公司上市對負債政策及轉投資決策的影響」,中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文,民國87年
24.蘇怡如,「台灣集團企業多角化程度之探討」,成功大學國際企業研究所碩士論文,民國91年
二、英文部分
1.Aggarwal, Rajesh K., and Andrew A. Samwick, 2003, “Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Agency Reconsidered.” The Journal of Finance 1, pp.71~118.
2.Amihud, Yakov, and B. Lev, 1981, “Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate.” The Bell Journal of Economics 12, pp.605~617.
3.Amit R., and J. Livant, 1988, “Diversification Strategies, Business Cycle, and Economic Performance.” Strategic Management Journal 9, pp.99~110.
4.Berger, Philip G., and Eli Ofek, 1995, “Diversification’s effect on firm value.” Journal of Financial Economics 37, pp.39~65.
5.Berry C. H., 1975, “Corporate Growth and Diversification.” Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
6.Booth, James R., Marcia Millon Cornett, and Hassan Tehranian, 2002, “Boards of Directors, Ownership, and Regulation.” Journal of Banking & Finance 26, pp.1973~1996.
7.Campa, Jose, and Simi Kedia, 2002, “Explaining the Diversification Discount.” The Journal of Finance 41, pp.1731~1762.
8.Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang, 2000, “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations.” Journal of Financial Economics 58, pp.81~112.
9.Chandler A. D., 1962, “Strategy and Structure: Chapter in the History of American Industrial Enterprise.” Cambridge MA MIT Press.
10.Chevalier, Judith, 1999, “Why Do Firms Undertake Diversifying Mergers? An Examination of the Investment Policy of Merging Firms.” Working paper, University of Chicago.
11.Cho, Myeong-Hyeon, 1998, “Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Financial Economics 47, pp.103~121.
12.Core, John E., Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker, 1999, “Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance.” Journal of Financial Economics 51, pp.371~406.
13.Denis, David, Diane Denis, and Atulya Sarin, 1997, “Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification.” The Journal of Finance 1, pp.135~159.
14.Denis, David, Diane Denis, and Atulya Sarin, 1999, “Agency Theory and The Influence of Equity Ownership Structure on Corporate Diversification Strategies.” Strategic Management Journal 20, pp.1071~1076.
15.Denis, David, Diane Denis, and Keven Yost, 2002, “Global Diversification, Industrial Diversification, and Firm Value.” The Journal of Finance 5, pp.1951~1979.
16.Gibbons, Robert, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1992, “Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Political Economy 100, pp.468~505.
17.Gort M., 1962, “Diversification and Integration in American Industry.” Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press.
18.Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv, 1988, “Corporate Governance Voting Rights and Majority Rules.” Journal of Financial Economics 20, pp.203~235.
19.Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael L. Katz, 1996, “Corporate Diversification and Agency.” Working Paper.
20.Jacqemin A. P., and Berry C. H., 1979, “Entropy Measure of Diversification and Corporate Growth.” Journal of Industrial Economics 27, pp.359~369
21.Jensen, Michael C., 1986, “Agency Cost of Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers.” American Economic Review 76, pp.323~329.
22.Jensen, Michael C., and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives”, Journal of Political Economy 98, pp. 225~264.
23.Jensen, Michael C., and R. Ruback, 1983, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence.” Journal of Financial Economics 11, pp.5~50.
24.Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3, pp.305~360.
25.Jin, Li, 2002, “CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives.” Journal of Financial Economics 66, pp.29~63.
26.Lamont, Owen A., and Christopher Polk, 2002, “Does Diversification Destroy Value? Evidence from the Industry Shocks.” Journal of Financial Economics 63, pp.51~77.
27.Lane, Peter J., Albert A. Cannella, and Michael H. Lubatkin, 1998, “Agency Problems as Antecedents to Unrelated Mergers and Diversification: Amihud and Lev Reconsidered.” Strategic Management Journal 19, pp.555~578.
28.Lane, Peter J., Albert A. Cannella, and Michael H. Lubatkin, 1999, “Ownership Structure and Corporate Strategy: One Question Viewed From Two Different Worlds.”, Strategic Management Journal 20, pp.1077~1086.
29.La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999, “Corporate Ownership around the World.” Journal of Finance 54, pp.471~518.
30.May, Don O., 1995, “Do Managerial Motives Influence Firm Risk Reduction Strategies?” The Journal of Finance 4, pp.1291~1308.
31.McConnell, John J., and Henri Servaes, 1990, “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value.” Journal of Financial Economics 27, pp.595~612.
32.Montgomery C. A., 1985, “Product Market Diversification and Market Power.” Academy of Management Journal 28.
33.Montgomery C. A., 1994, “Corporate Diversification.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, pp.163~178.
34.Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation-An empirical analysis.” Journal of Financial Economics 20, pp.293~315.
35.Palepu K., 1985, “Diversification, Strategy, Profit, Performance and the Entropy Measure.” Strategic Management Journal 6, pp.239~255.
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39.Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1989, “Management Entrenchment-The Case of Manager-Specific Investments.” Journal of Financial Economics 25, pp.123~139.
40.Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1997, “A Survey of Corporate Governance.” The Journal of Finance 2, pp.737~783.
41.Stulz, Rene M., 1990, “Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies.” Journal of Financial Economics 26, pp.3~27.
42.Teece D. J. 1982, “Towards an Economic Theory of the Multi-product Firms.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, pp.39~63.
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
90357013
91
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090357013
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 屠美亞教授zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 許春蕙zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 許春蕙zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2002en_US
dc.date.accessioned 17-Sep-2009 19:10:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 17-Sep-2009 19:10:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 17-Sep-2009 19:10:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0090357013en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34034-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 90357013zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 91zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 過去幾年學術界發現,多角化經營會減損公司績效,此結果有別於早期之實證研究。在此情況下,為何高階主管會進行多角化經營?其多角化動機為何?本研究於是從代理理論觀點,參考Aggarwal and Samwick(2003)之模型,探討主導公司管理階層多角化之動機。與過去研究最大之不同處在於:本文在推論過程中,同時納入代理理論兩個不同觀點-趨避風險及滿足私人利益,藉由控制多角化程度之變動,觀察高階主管誘因契約與公司績效連結性強弱,以此推論隱含之高階管理者多角化動機。
本研究認為:若高階主管持股比率與多角化程度呈現負相關,同時在多角化程度變動下,高階主管持股比率與公司績效之連結性越強,則主導高階主管多角化之動機為趨避風險;反之,若高階主管持股比率與多角化程度呈現正相關,同時在多角化程度變動下,高階主管持股比率與公司績效之連結性越弱,則主導高階主管多角化之動機為滿足私人利益。本研究以高階主管持股比率替代高階主管誘因契約,以Entropy指標衡量公司多角化程度,以Tobin’s Q衡量公司績效,在實證時,又將高階主管細分為經營團隊與董事長兩組。
實證結果顯示:在經營團隊組,並無明顯證據顯示其多角化動機由和因素所主導,可能原因為台灣公司家族企業比重高,使專業經理人難以進入權力核心,左右多角化決策,使得實證結果並不顯著;在董事長組,則明顯指出,其多角化動機為趨避風險。換句話說,由於董事長個人財富、職位及聲譽與公司績效關連性很大,因此希望藉由多角化經營降低本身暴露之非系統風險。本研究同時發現,在此情況下,董事長私人利益與公司利益較無衝突,使多角化經營造成公司績效減損之幅度較小。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論……………………………………….P1
第一節 研究背景與動機……………………….P1
第二節 研究目的……………………………….P4
第三節 研究對象與範圍……………………….P5
第四節 研究流程與論文架構………………….P6
第二章 文獻探討…………………………………..P8
第一節 公司多角化動機與衡量方式………….P8
第二節 公司價值與多角化策略之關係………P15
第三節 公司價值與股權結構之關係…………P20
第四節 股權結構與多角化策略之關係………P25
第三章 研究設計…………………………………P30
第一節 研究假說………………………………P30
第二節 樣本選擇與資料來源…………………P37
第三節 變數操作性定義………………………P39
第四節 實證分析方法…………………………P45
第四章 實證結果與分析…………………………P53
第一節 樣本基本統計分析……………………P53
第二節 迴歸結果分析…………………………P60
第五章 結論與建議………………………………P80
第一節 研究結論………………………………P80
第二節 對後續研究之建議……………………P83
參考文獻……………………………………………P84
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090357013en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理問題zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司績效zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股權結構zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 多角化zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 公司管理階層多角化動機之探討zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文部分zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1.牛延苓,「股權結構、董事會組成與公司績效關係之研究-以高科技產業與傳統產業為例」,中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文,民國90年zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 2.江佳明,「公司成長、規模及負債與高階主管獎酬績效敏感性之實證研究」,中正大學會計學研究所碩士論文,民國90年zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 3.江毓潔,「從代理理論的觀點探討股權結構與公司多角化的關係」,中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文,民國86年zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 4.吳佩琪,「台灣地區集團企業多角化真實效果-公司價值與會計績效研究」,中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文,民國85年zh_TW
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