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題名 創投如何降低資訊不對稱風險
作者 陳德仁
貢獻者 吳啟銘
陳德仁
關鍵詞 創投
資訊不對稱
Venture Capital
Asymmetric information
日期 2003
上傳時間 17-Sep-2009 19:11:58 (UTC+8)
摘要 一般創投業者對於公司的評估,因為公司內部人與外部投資人存在「資訊不對稱」(asymmetric information)的問題,投資人必須承擔資訊不對稱的風險,尤其是新創事業或未上市公司,由於未有適當的機制規範,資訊不對稱的情形更為嚴重。因此,對於從事新創事業投資的創投業者而言,其所面臨的風險除了非系統性風險外,也增加了資訊不對稱的風險。由於新創事業的投資風險相當的高,創投與創業家的合作是建立在互信的基礎上,若創業家為了吸引資金的投入而刻意隱藏或扭曲內部真實狀況,造成創投在投資後發現投資案不符預期,將對創投與創業家互信的基礎產生不利的影響。因此,創投或外部投資人在評估投資案時,如何降低資訊不對稱的風險是非常重要的事情。
本研究主要是站在資訊不對稱的立場,探討創投業在投資時面臨的問題,並嘗試發展出「資訊不對稱評估機制」,藉由提出一套新的篩選評估方法作為企業投資評估之輔助工具,解決因為資訊不對稱的問題導致投資者與被投資企業可能發生的衝突。期盼創投或一般投資人在投資的過程中,透過適當的機制來處理資訊不對稱的問題,希望能藉此機制來降低資訊不對稱的風險,增加投資人投資判斷的正確性,進而作出更有利的投資決策;對投資人而言,也可藉提供額外有關風險之資訊,成為考量投資對象之參考依據。
參考文獻 中文部分
1.劉常勇, 創業投資評估決策程序, 會計研究月刊134期, 民國86。
2.蔡志明, 台灣創業投資事業之代理問題與投資績效, 國立中山大學財務管理研究所未出版碩士論文, 民國82。
3.黃鈺玲, 我國創業投資公司對投資案的評估準則之研究, 中原大學企業管理研究所碩士論文, 民國78。
4.李春月, 創業投資公司投資評估模式建立之研究, 國立政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文, 民國81。
5.許杉能, 創業投資經理人對投資案評估準則之研究, 東吳大學企業管理學研究所碩士論文, 民國85。
6.陸彥妙, 台灣地區創業投資公司對投資案評估準則之探討, 國立交通大學管理科學研究所碩士論文, 民國83。
7.蔡志文, 創業投資事業之投資與管理決策的探討, 元智大學管理學研究所碩士論文, 民國87。
8.蔡幸娟, 台灣地區創業投資事業專業經理人投資評估準則之研究, 國立台灣大學國際企業學研究所碩士論文, 民國87。
9.彭紹華, 代理理論與所有權結構關係之研究,文化大學企業管理學研究所碩士論文, 民國81。
10.楊淑華, 從代理理論觀點探究上市公司股權集中度與經營績效及市場評價的關係,淡江大學金融研究所博士論文, 民國81。
英文部份
1.Akerlof G. (1970), The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 89, pp.488-500.
2.Amihud, Y. and B. Lev (1981), Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, Bell Journal of Economics 12, pp. 605-617.
3.Amit, Raphael, Lewrence Glosten, and Eitan Muller (1990), Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing, Management Science, Vol. 36, pp.1232-1245.
4.Barry, Christopher B., Chris J. Muscarella, John W. Peavy Ⅲ, and Michael R. Vetsuypens (1990), The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, October, pp.447-471.
5.Benston, George J. and Clifford W. Smith, Jr.(1976), A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theory of Financial Intermediation, The Journal of Finance, Vol.31, No. 2. pp.215-230.
6.Bigler, Hantfond E. Jr. (1984), Venture Capital, A Perspective, 2nd Ed. Bigler Investment Management Co., Inc.
7.Crutchley, Clair E. and Robert S. Hansen (1989), A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage and Corporate Dividends, Financial Management, pp. 36-45.
8.Davis and Stetson(1985), Creating Successful Venture: Backed Companies, The Journal of Business Strategy, 5: No.3, pp.45-56.
9.Dominquez J. R.(1974), Venture Capital, Lexington, Mass., Lexinton Book, pp.13-14.
10.Eisenhardt, Kathleen A.(1989), Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp.57-74.
11.Fama, Eugene F. and M. Miller(1972), The Theory of Finance, Dryden Press, Illinois.
12.Gavish, Bezalel and Avner kalay (1983), On the Asset Substitution Problem, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 18. pp.21-30.
13.Guesneric, Roger, Picerre Picard and Patrik Rey(1988), Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Risk Neutral Agents, European Economic Review 33, pp.807-823
14.Gorman, M. and Sahlman W. A.(1989),What Do Venture Capitalist Do ?, Journal of Business Venturing, No.4, pp.231-248.
15.Holmstrom, Bengt (1979), Moral Hazard and Observability, The Bell Journal of Economics, pp.71-90.
16.Jain, Bharat A. and Omesh Kini (1995), Venture capitalist participation and the post-issue operating performance of IPO firms, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 16, pp.593-606.
17.Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling(1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, pp.305-360.
18.Kelly, Campanella and Mckiernan(1971), A Guide Book for New Enterprises, Mass., The Management Institute, School of Management, Boston College, pp.33-34.
19.Lorenz,T.(1985),"Venture Capital Today", Cambridge:Woodhead Faulkner
20.Macmillan, Siegel and SubbaNarasimha(1985), Criteria Used by Venture Capital to Evaluation New Venture Proposals, Journal of Business Venturing, pp.119-128.
21.Maggi, G., Rodriguex-Clare(1995), Costly distortion in Agency Problem, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.675-689.
22.Petry, Glenn H. and James Sprow (1993), The Theory and Practice of Finance in the 1990s, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol.33, No.4, pp.359-381.
23.Poindexter, Jeffrey (1976), The Efficiency of Financial Markets: The Venture Capital Case, Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University.
24.Rasmusen, Eric (1994), Games and Information- an Introduction to Game Theory, 2nd ed., Blackwell Publishers.
25.Rubel S.M(1972), “Guide to Venture Capital Sources”, Capital Publishing Corporation, pp.9.
26.Ruhka and Youn(1987), “A Venture Capital Model of the Development Process for New Ventures”, Journal of Business Venturing.
27.Sahlman, William A.(1990), The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organization, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.27, pp.473-521.
28.Singh, Harbir and Farid Harianto (1989), Top Management Tenure, Corporate Ownership Structure and the Magnitude of Golden Parachutes, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 10, pp.143-156.
29.Smith, Clifford W. (1980), On the Theory of Financial Contracting, Journal of Financial Economics 6, pp.333-357.
30.Smith, C. W. and J. B. Warner (1979), On Financial Contracting- An Analysis of Bond Covenant, Journal of Financial Economics 7, pp.117-161.
31.Stulz, R.M. and H. Johnson (1985), An Analysis of Secured Debt, Journal of Financial Economics 14, pp.501-521.
32.Timmons, Terry A., and David E. Gumpert(1982), Discard Many Old Rules About Getting Venture Capital, Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb, pp.152-156.
33.Tyebjee and Bruno(1984) ,”A Model of Venture Capitalist Investment Activity”, Management Science, Sept. pp.1051-1066
34.Walkling, Ralph A. and Michael S. Long (1984), Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare and Takeover Bid Resistance, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp.54-68.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
90932719
92
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090932719
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 吳啟銘zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳德仁zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 陳德仁zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2003en_US
dc.date.accessioned 17-Sep-2009 19:11:58 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 17-Sep-2009 19:11:58 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 17-Sep-2009 19:11:58 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0090932719en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34038-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 90932719zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 92zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 一般創投業者對於公司的評估,因為公司內部人與外部投資人存在「資訊不對稱」(asymmetric information)的問題,投資人必須承擔資訊不對稱的風險,尤其是新創事業或未上市公司,由於未有適當的機制規範,資訊不對稱的情形更為嚴重。因此,對於從事新創事業投資的創投業者而言,其所面臨的風險除了非系統性風險外,也增加了資訊不對稱的風險。由於新創事業的投資風險相當的高,創投與創業家的合作是建立在互信的基礎上,若創業家為了吸引資金的投入而刻意隱藏或扭曲內部真實狀況,造成創投在投資後發現投資案不符預期,將對創投與創業家互信的基礎產生不利的影響。因此,創投或外部投資人在評估投資案時,如何降低資訊不對稱的風險是非常重要的事情。
本研究主要是站在資訊不對稱的立場,探討創投業在投資時面臨的問題,並嘗試發展出「資訊不對稱評估機制」,藉由提出一套新的篩選評估方法作為企業投資評估之輔助工具,解決因為資訊不對稱的問題導致投資者與被投資企業可能發生的衝突。期盼創投或一般投資人在投資的過程中,透過適當的機制來處理資訊不對稱的問題,希望能藉此機制來降低資訊不對稱的風險,增加投資人投資判斷的正確性,進而作出更有利的投資決策;對投資人而言,也可藉提供額外有關風險之資訊,成為考量投資對象之參考依據。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論1
第一節 研究動機及背景1
第二節 研究目的及對象2
第三節 論文架構3
第貳章 文獻回顧5
第一節 創投的投資決策程序5
第二節 資訊不對稱12
第三節 創投的監控行為17
第四節 創投的投資評估20
第參章 研究設計27
第一節 資訊不對稱評估機制27
第二節 文獻探討與資訊不對稱評估機制之比較29
第三節 研究限制30
第肆章 個案研究分析31
第一節 個案簡介31
第二節 個案文獻探討分析56
第三節 個案研究分析73
第伍章 實證結果與分析97
第一節 個案經營現況97
第二節 個案研究發現107
第陸章 結論與建議116
第一節 結論116
第二節 後續研究及建議117
參考文獻118
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090932719en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 創投zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊不對稱zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Venture Capitalen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Asymmetric informationen_US
dc.title (題名) 創投如何降低資訊不對稱風險zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1.劉常勇, 創業投資評估決策程序, 會計研究月刊134期, 民國86。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 2.蔡志明, 台灣創業投資事業之代理問題與投資績效, 國立中山大學財務管理研究所未出版碩士論文, 民國82。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 3.黃鈺玲, 我國創業投資公司對投資案的評估準則之研究, 中原大學企業管理研究所碩士論文, 民國78。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 4.李春月, 創業投資公司投資評估模式建立之研究, 國立政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文, 民國81。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 5.許杉能, 創業投資經理人對投資案評估準則之研究, 東吳大學企業管理學研究所碩士論文, 民國85。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 6.陸彥妙, 台灣地區創業投資公司對投資案評估準則之探討, 國立交通大學管理科學研究所碩士論文, 民國83。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 7.蔡志文, 創業投資事業之投資與管理決策的探討, 元智大學管理學研究所碩士論文, 民國87。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 8.蔡幸娟, 台灣地區創業投資事業專業經理人投資評估準則之研究, 國立台灣大學國際企業學研究所碩士論文, 民國87。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 9.彭紹華, 代理理論與所有權結構關係之研究,文化大學企業管理學研究所碩士論文, 民國81。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 10.楊淑華, 從代理理論觀點探究上市公司股權集中度與經營績效及市場評價的關係,淡江大學金融研究所博士論文, 民國81。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 英文部份zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1.Akerlof G. (1970), The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 89, pp.488-500.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 2.Amihud, Y. and B. Lev (1981), Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, Bell Journal of Economics 12, pp. 605-617.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 3.Amit, Raphael, Lewrence Glosten, and Eitan Muller (1990), Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing, Management Science, Vol. 36, pp.1232-1245.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 4.Barry, Christopher B., Chris J. Muscarella, John W. Peavy Ⅲ, and Michael R. Vetsuypens (1990), The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, October, pp.447-471.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 5.Benston, George J. and Clifford W. Smith, Jr.(1976), A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theory of Financial Intermediation, The Journal of Finance, Vol.31, No. 2. pp.215-230.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 6.Bigler, Hantfond E. Jr. (1984), Venture Capital, A Perspective, 2nd Ed. Bigler Investment Management Co., Inc.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 7.Crutchley, Clair E. and Robert S. Hansen (1989), A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage and Corporate Dividends, Financial Management, pp. 36-45.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 8.Davis and Stetson(1985), Creating Successful Venture: Backed Companies, The Journal of Business Strategy, 5: No.3, pp.45-56.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 9.Dominquez J. R.(1974), Venture Capital, Lexington, Mass., Lexinton Book, pp.13-14.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 10.Eisenhardt, Kathleen A.(1989), Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp.57-74.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 11.Fama, Eugene F. and M. Miller(1972), The Theory of Finance, Dryden Press, Illinois.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 12.Gavish, Bezalel and Avner kalay (1983), On the Asset Substitution Problem, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 18. pp.21-30.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 13.Guesneric, Roger, Picerre Picard and Patrik Rey(1988), Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Risk Neutral Agents, European Economic Review 33, pp.807-823zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 14.Gorman, M. and Sahlman W. A.(1989),What Do Venture Capitalist Do ?, Journal of Business Venturing, No.4, pp.231-248.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 15.Holmstrom, Bengt (1979), Moral Hazard and Observability, The Bell Journal of Economics, pp.71-90.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 16.Jain, Bharat A. and Omesh Kini (1995), Venture capitalist participation and the post-issue operating performance of IPO firms, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 16, pp.593-606.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 17.Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling(1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, pp.305-360.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 18.Kelly, Campanella and Mckiernan(1971), A Guide Book for New Enterprises, Mass., The Management Institute, School of Management, Boston College, pp.33-34.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 19.Lorenz,T.(1985),"Venture Capital Today", Cambridge:Woodhead Faulknerzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 20.Macmillan, Siegel and SubbaNarasimha(1985), Criteria Used by Venture Capital to Evaluation New Venture Proposals, Journal of Business Venturing, pp.119-128.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 21.Maggi, G., Rodriguex-Clare(1995), Costly distortion in Agency Problem, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.675-689.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 22.Petry, Glenn H. and James Sprow (1993), The Theory and Practice of Finance in the 1990s, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol.33, No.4, pp.359-381.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 23.Poindexter, Jeffrey (1976), The Efficiency of Financial Markets: The Venture Capital Case, Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 24.Rasmusen, Eric (1994), Games and Information- an Introduction to Game Theory, 2nd ed., Blackwell Publishers.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 25.Rubel S.M(1972), “Guide to Venture Capital Sources”, Capital Publishing Corporation, pp.9.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 26.Ruhka and Youn(1987), “A Venture Capital Model of the Development Process for New Ventures”, Journal of Business Venturing.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 27.Sahlman, William A.(1990), The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organization, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.27, pp.473-521.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 28.Singh, Harbir and Farid Harianto (1989), Top Management Tenure, Corporate Ownership Structure and the Magnitude of Golden Parachutes, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 10, pp.143-156.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 29.Smith, Clifford W. (1980), On the Theory of Financial Contracting, Journal of Financial Economics 6, pp.333-357.zh_TW
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