| dc.contributor.advisor | 屠美亞 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Twu, Mia | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 林惠珊 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Lin, Huei-Shan | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 林惠珊 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lin, Huei-Shan | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2007 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 17-Sep-2009 19:19:28 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 17-Sep-2009 19:19:28 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 17-Sep-2009 19:19:28 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0094357004 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34064 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財務管理研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 94357004 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 96 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | La Porta 等人以提高內部人持股可使內、外部股東利益一致，進而降低代理問題的觀點出發，在2002 年發表的實證研究中指出，提高內部人持股有助於提升公司的價值，特別是在對外部投資人保護較差的國家；他們也發現，對投資人保護程度愈好的國家，該國企業的價值也較高。本研究則從提高內部人持股可能產生的代理問題著手，在利弊同時存在之下，以涵蓋範圍更廣、時間更長的樣本，探討在不同的投資人保護環境下，提高內部人持股對公司價值的影響，以及投資人保護程度對於內部人持股集中與分散的公司價值是否也有不同的影響。 本研究發現，在投資人保護較佳的國家，提高內部人持股會傷害公司價值，但在投資人保護較差的國家，提高內部人持股可增加公司價值。另外，公司價值與內部人持股率之間呈現曲線關係，當內部人持股率相對較低時，提高內部人持股對公司價值是弊多於利；當內部人持股水準相對較高時，提高內部人持股則是利多於弊。而投資人保護程度對於內部人持股較分散的公司而言，顯得較為重要。因此，法律層面對投資人的保護程度和內部人持股集中度對於公司價值的影響有顯著的替代效果。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper uses a sample of companies from 34 countries around the world to shed light on the relationships among legal protection of shareholders, ownership structure, and firm value. La Porta et al. (2002) indicate a positive relationship between cash flow, ownership, and firm value, especially in countries with poor investor protection. Besides, they also find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders. However, they don’t consider the effect of higher ownership on the cost of stealing, which may cause the controlling shareholders to expropriate more from minority shareholders. Also, their study covers only large firms with a controlling shareholder by one year data. Theirresults can be restricted to large firms and a particular year. Therefore, we use more comprehensive time series and cross section data to probe into the subject.Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998), we find that higher ownership improves valuation in poor protection countries while higher ownership deteriorates valuation in good protection countries. In addition, stronger legal protection improves firm value, especially the firms with low ownership concentration. That is, there is a substitute effect of legal protection and ownership concentration on firm valuation. Finally, we also testify that dividends are valued more in poor protection countries and firms with low ownership concentration. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 11.1 Motivation and Purpose of the Study 11.2 Procedure of the Study 5CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 62.1 Literature Review 62.2.1 Legal Protection and Ownership Concentration 62.1.2 Legal Protection and Corporate Governance 92.1.3 Legal Protection, Ownership, and Valuation 102.2 Hypothesis Development 14CHAPTER 3 TEST DESIGN AND DATA 193.1 Test Design 193.1.1 Regression Model 193.1.2 Dependent Variables 213.1.3 Explanatory Variables 223.1.4 Controlling Variables 243.2 Data 253.2.1 Research Period and Data Resources 253.2.2 Countries Selection 263.2.3 Corporations Selection 263.3 Methodology 273.3.1 Wilcoxon Rank–Sum Test 273.3.2 T-test: Testing Differences between Two Means 283.3.3 Spearman Rank-Order Correlation 28CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 304.1 Descriptive Statistics 304.2 Correlation 334.2.1 Overall Correlation 334.2.2 Correlation of Separate Groups 384.3 Regression Analysis 414.4 Robustness-Regressions excluding U.S., U.K. and Japan 49CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 555.1 Summary and Discussions 555.2 Further Research 57REFERENCES 58 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094357004 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 內部人持股 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 現金流量權 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 投資人保護 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 代理問題 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 公司價值 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | insider ownership | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | cash flow rights | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | investor protection | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | agency problem | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | firm value | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 內部人持股，投資人保護與公司價值 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Ownership, Protection, and Firm Value | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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