| dc.contributor.advisor | 黃明聖 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 王佳慧 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 王佳慧 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2002 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Sep-2009 10:55:50 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Sep-2009 10:55:50 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Sep-2009 10:55:50 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0090255026 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34688 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 90255026 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 91 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 摘 要貪污在道德上會被嚴格批判，但貪污有助經濟成長，還是有害經濟成長？如果兩者的關係存在，貪瀆行為究竟是如何影響一國的經濟發展？此外，經濟發展程度與台灣相同的國家，其貪瀆程度與經濟發展之關係又為何？經濟文獻上，有些文獻認為貪瀆行為有助經濟成長，有些文獻認為貪瀆行為不利經濟成長，呈現兩極的說法。本研究從理論模型的探討，亦不能斷言貪瀆行為對經濟發展究竟是具有外部利益或是外部成本。但是貪瀆行為會影響經濟成長，卻是不爭的事實。本文以國際透明組織所調查的幾個國家資料，進行Panel及橫斷面實證分析得知：在低所得國家中，屬於高貪瀆程度者，其個人所得較中貪瀆程度者多0.31美元。然而，在中低所得國家中，被歸類在高貪瀆程度者，其個人所得會較中貪瀆程度者低。在中高所得國家 (台灣被歸類在此類中)，低貪瀆程度者，其個人所得較中貪瀆程度者少0.24美元。在高所得國家中，屬於低貪瀆程度者，其個人所得較中貪瀆程度者多0.06美元。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄第一章 緒 論…..………………...………..…………………………..………11.1 研究動機與目的…………………..……..……………..……..…......11.2 研究方法與流程…………………..……..……………………..……41.3 本文架構………………..…………..…………………….…..……...5第二章 文獻探討…………………………….....…………………..……..…..62.1 貪瀆行為具正面性經濟效益……..…..……………………..………72.2 貪瀆行為具負面性經濟效益…….……..…………………….........122.3 貪瀆與經濟效益的相關實證……….…..………………………….20第三章 理論模型…………………………..……..……………………….....243.1 基本模型……………………………..…..…………..……………..243.2 分權經濟之均衡解……….………………..……………………….283.3 集權經濟之均衡解…………………………..……….……...……..333.4 本章小結…………………….………………..………….……........39第四章 模型實證分析…………………………..…..…..……………….…..414.1 實證模型的設定……….………………………..………………….414.2 資料來源與計算方法…….……………………..………………….434.3 實證結果與分析…….………..…………………..……….………..44第五章 結 論…..………..…………………………………..……………….52參考文獻 …………………………………………………………………….57表目錄表一 持貪瀆行為具正面性經濟效益論點的學者………..………………...12表二 各政府財貨市場之比較結果…………………..……..………….……13表三 持貪瀆行為具負面性經濟效益論點的學者…………..……………...19表四 貪瀆與經濟效益之相關實證…….……………………..……….….....22表五 經濟成長率與各個變數之關係…..……………………..…………….40表六 各變數資料來源 ………………………..…….………..…..…...…...43表七 橫斷面資料實證結果……………..….………..…..……...…………...45表八 依國家所得分類之實證結果……………………....……..…………...47表九 國家所得與貪瀆程度之關係…………………..……....…..……..…...50附表一 國際透明組織2002年全球貪腐印象指數..….…………..…..……54附表二 依所得高低分類之國家………………………..…..………..……...56.圖目錄圖一 2002年貪腐印象指數 ………………………………………….…..….2圖二 本文研究流程圖 ……………………………...………………...……...5圖三 貪瀆的成因……..……………………………………....…….…..……13 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090255026 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 貪瀆 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 經濟成長 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 貪腐印象指數 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | 貪瀆與經濟成長之分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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