| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳家恩 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 陳怡君 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 陳怡君 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2005 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Sep-2009 10:57:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Sep-2009 10:57:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Sep-2009 10:57:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0093255007 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34697 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 93255007 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 94 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本文探討社會規範影響個人的勞動供給以及政府的最適移轉決策。利用效用函數分析個人勞動供給決策而得到以下的結果，在考慮社會規範的情況下，政府移轉造成個人勞動供給減少的幅度較小，所以社會規範具有提升個人勞動供給的誘因。除此之外，給付金額或所得稅稅率的增加，會降低個人的勞動供給。 為了兼顧移轉計畫的公平與效率目標，本文將個人的勞動供給決策放入社會福利函數加以考量，利用極大化社會福利函數以決定政府的最適移轉與所得稅稅率。結果發現，社會規範的強度增強，造成領取給付的人數比例下降，所以在政府移轉支出固定下，每位領取給付者的最適移轉金額提高。另外，考慮工作者有利他動機與道德危機的影響，發現工作者有利他動機時，個人的勞動供給會增加；道德危機增加時，個人的勞動供給隨之減少。政府則可以透過教育改變個人的行為，加以提升社會規範的強度，進而影響個人的勞動供給決策。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論...............................................11.1 研究背景與動機........................................11.2 研究目的.............................................31.3 研究方法與限制........................................31.4 研究架構.............................................4第二章 社會規範在文獻中的探討...............................62.1 社會規範的形成原因....................................62.2 社會規範對勞動供給的影響...............................72.3 社會規範和道德危機的關係...............................9第三章 社會規範對個人勞動供給的影響.........................113.1 基本模型.............................................113.2 Cobb-Douglas效用函數.................................143.3 CES效用函數..........................................16第四章 社會規範對政府最適移轉的影響.........................194.1 最適移轉模型.........................................194.2 Cobb-Douglas效用函數.................................204.3 CES效用函數..........................................21第五章 工作者的利他行為與道德危機之影響......................245.1 工作者有利他動機......................................245.1.1 Cobb-Douglas效用函數...............................245.1.2 CES效用函數........................................265.2 道德危機.............................................28第六章 結論與延伸.........................................296.1 結論................................................296.2 延伸................................................30參考文獻.................................................32 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093255007 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 社會規範 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 最適移轉 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 勞動供給 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 道德危機 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | 社會規範與最適移轉之研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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