| dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (作者) | 蘇美伊 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 蘇美伊 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2006 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-九月-2009 11:00:37 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-九月-2009 11:00:37 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-九月-2009 11:00:37 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) | G0094255027 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34721 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 94255027 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 95 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 我國偵查中之羈押處分還需由法官審查決定，由於法官須於短時間內審查決定是否羈押被告，因此備感壓力及困難，若處置有所失當便易引起輿論。本文以賽局中序列均衡的方法，藉由檢察官與法官對嫌疑犯罪刑輕重了解程度不同的資訊不對稱模型，探討若檢察官可以聲請羈押，並考慮法官駁回羈押聲請及社會大眾對檢察官之評量下之羈押賽局均衡結果。我們發現無論法官是否可以駁回檢察官羈押之聲請，嫌疑重大之嫌疑犯皆將會被羈押且判罪，而無辜的嫌疑犯則能獲得澄清；又若考慮社會大眾對檢方之評量，便會增加許多均衡策略的可能情況，但可以確定的是，檢察官聲請羈押的權利能帶給法官裁決的依據，並且當檢察官聲請羈押時法官便會判此嫌疑犯有罪。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In Taiwan, the judge has to examine the detention of investigation in the short time. If he makes improper decisions, the criticism will arise. Therefore the judge often endures the enormous pressure when he makes decisions. We explore a model of detention with asymmetric information in which the understanding to the defendant is different between the prosecutor and the judge. The sequential equilibrium (SE) method of the game theory is used to analyze the situation that the prosecutor can request the detention, the judge can reject the request, and the public can criticize the prosecutor’s behavior. We find that whether the judge can reject the request or not, the guilty will be detained and convicted while the innocent will be clarified. Moreover, considering the criticism at the same time, there will be many possible SE. The conclusion is that the conviction decision made by the judge will depend on the prosecutor’s detention right. It means that when the prosecutor requests the detention and the defendant will be convicted. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言……………………………………………………………1第二章 在未考慮法官不准羈押下之基本模型………………………8 第一節 模型介紹…………………………………………………8 第二節 序列均衡分析……………………………………………9第三章 在未考慮法官不准羈押下評量檢方羈押權之模型………..11 第一節 序列均衡分析…………………………………………..12 第二節 序列均衡分析結果……………………………………..14第四章 在考慮法官可以不准羈押下之羈押模型…………………..17 第一節 模型介紹………………………………………………..17 第二節 參賽者 2駁回羈押時，參賽者 1 採取提起抗告下....20 第三節 參賽者 2駁回羈押時，參賽者 1 不採取提起抗告下..20 第四節 參賽者 1 聲請羈押被拒絕下…………………………20 第五節 參賽者 2 決定是否准許羈押聲請……………………21 第六節 參賽者 1 最初決定是否提出羈押聲請………………..25 第七節 序列均衡分析結果………………………………………25第五章 在考慮法官可以不准羈押下評量檢方羈押權之模型………27 第一節 參賽者 1 聲請羈押被拒絕下…………………………29 第二節 參賽者 1 最初決定是否提出羈押聲請………………29 第三節 序列均衡分析…………………………………………..31第六章 結論……………………………………………………………41附錄……………………………………………………………………..43參考文獻 ………………………………………………………………45 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094255027 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 檢察官 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 法官 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 羈押 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 序列均衡 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | 檢察官羈押權的賽局分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Game-Theoretic Analysis of Prosecutor Detention Right | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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