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題名 異質性偏好與地方公共財之最適提供水準
Heterogeneous Preferences and the Optimal Provision of Local Public Goods
作者 王舒齡
Wang, Shu Ling
貢獻者 張勝文
Chang, Sheng Wen
王舒齡
Wang, Shu Ling
關鍵詞 Tiebout
異質性偏好
完全流動性
自我選擇機制
區分效果
日期 2007
上傳時間 18-Sep-2009 11:01:25 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文以Tiebout (1956) 之假說 (Tiebout Hypothesis) 為基礎,在數個轄區之經濟環境下,假設人民具有「異質性偏好」及「完全移動性」,利用模擬 (simulation) 的方式,探討人口以及地方公共財之最適配置狀況,並探討其背後所隱含之經濟意義。
本文之研究發現有以下三點。第一,對於公共財具有異質性偏好、且具有完全移動性時,個人會依據自我選擇機制 (self-selection),選擇使其效用極大化之轄區居住,產生區分 (sorting) 之效果,符合Tiebout所預期。第二,就比較靜態發現,在技術水準越高,或者私有財之偏好越高的情況下,高偏好轄區的人口越多,每人持有消費性公共財數量也越多;而當資本產出彈性增加,則高偏好地區人口越少,且每人持有消費性公共財數量越少。第三,若中央政府徵單一稅 (uniform tax) ,且定額稅與資本稅之稅額相等,則以中央政府的角度觀之,不論何種稅制,均不影響全國地方公共財之總提供水準,故異質性偏好在此未造成任何影響。但若以地方政府的角度觀之,並以「每人持有公共財數量」之角度切入,則異質性偏好不但造成區分效果,更使轄區之資源配置具有脫離對稱均衡的可能。若將社會總福利水準極大化時之定額稅定義為最適稅率,其所對應之每人持有地方公共財,定義為公共財之最適提供水準,以此作為比較基礎,則在課徵資本稅之下,生產要素使用之扭曲性,影響人民之消費行為,進而改變轄區內原來的資源配置,強化轄區間資源配置的差異。在本文以兩個轄區為例,並以消費性公共財為分析重點之模型,發現地方公共財的提供,受到轄區內個人偏好強度差異之影響,出現偏好強度高之轄區公共財提供過多,偏好強度低之轄區公共財提供不足之結果。

關鍵字:Tiebout、異質性偏好、完全流動性、自我選擇機制、區分效果。
參考文獻 Beckmenn, Martin J. and Yorgos Y. Papageorguou (1989). “Heterogeneous Tastes and Residential Location.” Journal of Regional Science, 29:3, 317-323.
Bewley, Truman F. (1981). “A Critique of Tiebout’s Theory of Local Public Expenditures.” Econometrica, 49:3, 713-740.
Bickers, Kenneth and Richard N. Engstrom (2006). “Tiebout Sorting in Metropolitan Areas.” Review of Policy Research, 23:6, 1181-1197.
Boadway, Robin (1982). “On the Method of Taxation and the Provision of Local Public Goods: Comment.” American Economic Review, 72:4, 846-851.
Brueckner, Jan K. (2004). “Fiscal Decentralization with Distortionary Taxation: Tiebout vs. Tax Competition.” International Tax and Public Finance, 11:2, 133-153.
Dawkins, Casey J. (2005). “Tiebout Choice and Residential Segregation by Race in US Metropolitan Areas, 1980-2000.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 35:6, 734-755.
Dowding, Keith, John, Peter; Biggs, Stephen (1994). “Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature.” Urban Studies, 31:4-5, 767-797.
Dye, Thomas R. (1990). American Federalism: Competition Among Governments. Lexington, Mass. Lexington Books Ltd.
Hansen, Nico A. and Anke S. Kessler (2001). “(Non-) Existence of Equilibria in Multicommunity Models.” Journal of Urban Economics, 50:3, 418-435.
Henderson, J. Vermon (1985). “The Tiebout Model: Bring Back the Entrepreneurs.” Journal of Political Economics, 9:2, 248-264.
Kessler, Anke S. and Christoph Lülfesmann (2005). “Tiebout and Redistribution in a Model of Residential and Political Choice.” Journal of Public Economics, 89:2-3, 501-528.
Peng, Shin-Kun and Ping Wang (2005). “Sorting by Foot: ‘Travel-for’ Local Public Goods and Equilibrium Stratification.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 38:4, 1224-1253.
Rhode, Paul W. and Koleman S. Strumpf (2003). “Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850-1990.” American Economic Review, 93:5, 1647-1678.
Samuelson, Paul A. (1954). “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 36:4, 387-389.
Schmidheity, Kurt (2006). “Income Segregation from Local Income Taxation When Households Differ in both Preferences and Incomes.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36:2, 270-299.
Starrett, David A. (1980). “On the Method of Taxation and the Provision of Local Public Goods.” American Economic Review, 70:3, 350-392.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1983). “The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five Years after Tiebout: A Perspective.” In George R. Zodrow, ed., Local Provision of Public Service: The Tiebout Model after Twenty-Five Years. Academic Press, New York, 17-53.
Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Public Economics, 64:5, 416-424.
Wildsin, David E. (1980). “Locational Efficiency in a Federal System.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 10:4, 453-471.
Williams, Alan (1966). “The Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local Governments.”Journal of Political Economics, 74:1, 18-33.
Wooders, Myrna (1980). “The Tiebout Model: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies.” Econometrica, 48:6, 1467-1485.
Zodrow, George R. (2001). “The Property Tax as a Capital Tax: A Room with Three Views.” National Tax Journal, 54:1, 139-156.
Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszkowski (1986). “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods.” Journal of Urban Economics, 19:3, 356-37.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
95255031
96
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095255031
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 張勝文zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chang, Sheng Wenen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 王舒齡zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Wang, Shu Lingen_US
dc.creator (作者) 王舒齡zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Wang, Shu Lingen_US
dc.date (日期) 2007en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Sep-2009 11:01:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Sep-2009 11:01:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Sep-2009 11:01:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0095255031en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34727-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 95255031zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 96zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文以Tiebout (1956) 之假說 (Tiebout Hypothesis) 為基礎,在數個轄區之經濟環境下,假設人民具有「異質性偏好」及「完全移動性」,利用模擬 (simulation) 的方式,探討人口以及地方公共財之最適配置狀況,並探討其背後所隱含之經濟意義。
本文之研究發現有以下三點。第一,對於公共財具有異質性偏好、且具有完全移動性時,個人會依據自我選擇機制 (self-selection),選擇使其效用極大化之轄區居住,產生區分 (sorting) 之效果,符合Tiebout所預期。第二,就比較靜態發現,在技術水準越高,或者私有財之偏好越高的情況下,高偏好轄區的人口越多,每人持有消費性公共財數量也越多;而當資本產出彈性增加,則高偏好地區人口越少,且每人持有消費性公共財數量越少。第三,若中央政府徵單一稅 (uniform tax) ,且定額稅與資本稅之稅額相等,則以中央政府的角度觀之,不論何種稅制,均不影響全國地方公共財之總提供水準,故異質性偏好在此未造成任何影響。但若以地方政府的角度觀之,並以「每人持有公共財數量」之角度切入,則異質性偏好不但造成區分效果,更使轄區之資源配置具有脫離對稱均衡的可能。若將社會總福利水準極大化時之定額稅定義為最適稅率,其所對應之每人持有地方公共財,定義為公共財之最適提供水準,以此作為比較基礎,則在課徵資本稅之下,生產要素使用之扭曲性,影響人民之消費行為,進而改變轄區內原來的資源配置,強化轄區間資源配置的差異。在本文以兩個轄區為例,並以消費性公共財為分析重點之模型,發現地方公共財的提供,受到轄區內個人偏好強度差異之影響,出現偏好強度高之轄區公共財提供過多,偏好強度低之轄區公共財提供不足之結果。

關鍵字:Tiebout、異質性偏好、完全流動性、自我選擇機制、區分效果。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 前言 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究方法 2
第三節 研究流程與架構 3
第二章 文獻回顧 4
第一節 Tiebout Model及其評論 5
第二節 異質性偏好及區分機制之均衡 6
第三節 地方分權與公共財之提供 7
第四節 Tiebout假說在實證上之探討 9
第三章 基本模型 11
第一節 基本理論模型 11
第二節 模擬分析之模型設定 17
第三節 過渡動態 (Transitional Dynamics) 19
第四章 模擬結果 23
第一節 均衡解及其穩定性 23
第二節 比較靜態分析 26
第五章 模擬結果之探討 35
第一節 公共財提供之最適水準 35
第二節 本模型與Tiebout及Zodrow與Mieszkowski模型比較 39
第六章 結論與建議 43
第一節 結論 43
第二節 研究建議 46
參考文獻 48



圖表目錄
圖 4-1 定額稅與社會福利水準之關係-消費性公共財 30
圖 4-2 資本稅與社會福利水準之關係-消費性公共財 30
圖 4-3 動態分析-定額稅為15 31
圖 4-4 動態分析-定額稅為18.19 31
圖 4-5 動態分析-定額稅為18.895 32
圖 4-6 動態分析-定額稅為20 32
圖 5-2 效用水準及人口之配置 42

表 4-1 定額稅模擬結果-消費性公共財 33
表 4-2 資本稅模擬結果-消費性公共財 34
表 5-1 地方資源配置模擬結果-定額稅 42
表 5-1 地方資源配置模擬結果-資本稅 42
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dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095255031en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tieboutzh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 異質性偏好zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 完全流動性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自我選擇機制zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 區分效果zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 異質性偏好與地方公共財之最適提供水準zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Heterogeneous Preferences and the Optimal Provision of Local Public Goodsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Beckmenn, Martin J. and Yorgos Y. Papageorguou (1989). “Heterogeneous Tastes and Residential Location.” Journal of Regional Science, 29:3, 317-323.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bewley, Truman F. (1981). “A Critique of Tiebout’s Theory of Local Public Expenditures.” Econometrica, 49:3, 713-740.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bickers, Kenneth and Richard N. Engstrom (2006). “Tiebout Sorting in Metropolitan Areas.” Review of Policy Research, 23:6, 1181-1197.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Boadway, Robin (1982). “On the Method of Taxation and the Provision of Local Public Goods: Comment.” American Economic Review, 72:4, 846-851.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Brueckner, Jan K. (2004). “Fiscal Decentralization with Distortionary Taxation: Tiebout vs. Tax Competition.” International Tax and Public Finance, 11:2, 133-153.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dawkins, Casey J. (2005). “Tiebout Choice and Residential Segregation by Race in US Metropolitan Areas, 1980-2000.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 35:6, 734-755.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dowding, Keith, John, Peter; Biggs, Stephen (1994). “Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature.” Urban Studies, 31:4-5, 767-797.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dye, Thomas R. (1990). American Federalism: Competition Among Governments. Lexington, Mass. Lexington Books Ltd.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hansen, Nico A. and Anke S. Kessler (2001). “(Non-) Existence of Equilibria in Multicommunity Models.” Journal of Urban Economics, 50:3, 418-435.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Henderson, J. Vermon (1985). “The Tiebout Model: Bring Back the Entrepreneurs.” Journal of Political Economics, 9:2, 248-264.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kessler, Anke S. and Christoph Lülfesmann (2005). “Tiebout and Redistribution in a Model of Residential and Political Choice.” Journal of Public Economics, 89:2-3, 501-528.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Peng, Shin-Kun and Ping Wang (2005). “Sorting by Foot: ‘Travel-for’ Local Public Goods and Equilibrium Stratification.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 38:4, 1224-1253.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Rhode, Paul W. and Koleman S. Strumpf (2003). “Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850-1990.” American Economic Review, 93:5, 1647-1678.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Samuelson, Paul A. (1954). “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 36:4, 387-389.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Schmidheity, Kurt (2006). “Income Segregation from Local Income Taxation When Households Differ in both Preferences and Incomes.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36:2, 270-299.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Starrett, David A. (1980). “On the Method of Taxation and the Provision of Local Public Goods.” American Economic Review, 70:3, 350-392.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1983). “The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five Years after Tiebout: A Perspective.” In George R. Zodrow, ed., Local Provision of Public Service: The Tiebout Model after Twenty-Five Years. Academic Press, New York, 17-53.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Public Economics, 64:5, 416-424.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Wildsin, David E. (1980). “Locational Efficiency in a Federal System.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 10:4, 453-471.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Williams, Alan (1966). “The Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local Governments.”Journal of Political Economics, 74:1, 18-33.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Wooders, Myrna (1980). “The Tiebout Model: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies.” Econometrica, 48:6, 1467-1485.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Zodrow, George R. (2001). “The Property Tax as a Capital Tax: A Room with Three Views.” National Tax Journal, 54:1, 139-156.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszkowski (1986). “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods.” Journal of Urban Economics, 19:3, 356-37.zh_TW