| dc.contributor.advisor | 楊建成 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 許耕維 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Hsu,Keng-Wei | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 許耕維 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hsu,Keng-Wei | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2006 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Sep-2009 11:02:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Sep-2009 11:02:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Sep-2009 11:02:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0882555011 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34733 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 博士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 88255501 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 95 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 第一篇文章係利用Meltzer and Richard (1981)所建構之中位數投票者模型，衡量政府進行所得重分配產生公共基金邊際成本大小。有別於過去研究公共基金邊際成本的文獻，假設租稅制度之現況為任意的或是在最適的均衡下，文章的主要貢獻在利用現存租稅制度本身代表著一個政治均衡的前題，推導出公共基金邊際成本之公式，故可以視為是將實證經濟學的特性應用在規範經濟學的領域之研究。有趣的是公式中以標準化後平均所得與中位數所得差距所衡量的所得不均度，可以用來衡量租稅的效率損失及重分配水準是否足夠。第二篇文章係利用 Laffont and Tirole(1986)的最適廠商管制機制模型，加入Raith(2003)誘因給付契約模型，建構較符合實際社會狀況的雙層不完全資訊模型。文章的貢獻在發現廠商最適管制機制，除Laffont and Tirole（1986）指出受廠商工作努力誘因及資訊淨租之影響外，還受到員工風險厭惡程度、生產成本風險及工作努力邊際負效用增加速度等因素的影響。當生產成本風險愈高，或是員工風險厭惡程度愈大及工作努力邊際效用增加速度愈快，使得廠商與員工間道德冒險的成本愈大時，廠商最適管制機制愈偏向成本加成契約，而非Laffont and Tirole(1986)指出偏向固定價格契約。此結論可廣泛應用於包括國防採購、政府部門與公有、公用事業之管控等問題，例如，航太、軍火、高速鐵路等生產成本風險較高產業，廠商最適管制機制愈偏向成本加成契約；但電力、自來水等生產成本風險較低產業，廠商最適管制機制愈偏向固定價格契約。第三篇文章討論過去文獻未分析的廠商最適利潤稅問題。廠商的實際利潤除有生產技術的差異外，還受員工工作努力及隨機變數等因素的影響。一方面，政府僅能觀察廠商事後利潤，並無法觀察其生產技術差異；另一方面，廠商也無法觀察員工工作努力及隨機變數等，兩者均存在不完全資訊的問題，因此，建構政府與廠商之間，以及廠商與員工之間的雙層不完全資訊架構，分析不同生產技術廠商的最適利潤稅對逆選擇、道德冒險及風險分攤的影響，是一個有趣且重要的課題。本篇發現廠商最適利潤稅有兩種情況，當政府觀察廠商事後利潤不會產生替代效果下，應課徵定額稅(lump-sum taxes)；除此之外，若存在逆選擇的問題，透過模擬數值分析結果發現，廠商最適利潤稅邊際稅率與員工風險厭惡程度及生產風險成正比。此外，隨著廠商生產技術愈高，利潤稅邊際稅率則逐漸下降，而且廠商生產技術愈高，不同風險厭惡程度及風險下的利潤稅邊際稅率差異也逐漸減少。當生產技術分配為柏拉圖(Pareto)分配時，最適廠商利潤稅邊際稅率較均等(Uniform)分配及對數常態(Lognormal)分配為低。當工作努力邊際效用與工作努力間為凸函數時，最適廠商利潤稅邊際稅率較兩者間為線性函數時為低。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一篇 政治經濟均衡和公共基金邊際成本－以Meltzer-Richard之中位數投票者模型為例 1 第1節 前言 1 第2節 Meltzer-Richard 模型 3 第2.1節 模型假設 3 第2.2節 政治均衡之決定 4 第3節 衡量政府進行所得重分配之MCF 5 第3.1節 公式推導 7 第3.2節 與其他均衡之比較 11 第4節 與其他文獻所推導的MCF公式比較 14 第5節 結論 17 參考文獻 18第二篇 雙層不完全資訊下之廠商最適管制機制 22 第1節 前言 22 第2節 文獻回顧 24 第3節 模型架構 29 第4節 最適誘因機制 33 第4.1節 廠商與員工間的不完全資訊模型 33 第4.2節 管制者與廠商間的不完全資訊模型 34 第4.3節 最適線性誘因契約 41 第4.4節 比較靜態分析 44 第5節 無法觀察廠商成本下的最適契約 48 第6節 結論 56 參考文獻 59第三篇 雙層不完全資訊下之最適廠商利潤稅 61 第1節 前言 61 第2節 文獻回顧 63 第3節 模型架構 67 第4節 最適廠商利潤稅 70 第4.1節 廠商與員工間的不完全資訊模型 70 第4.2節 政府與廠商間的不完全資訊模型 72 第4.2.1節 廠商之最適化問題 72 第4.2.2節 政府之最適化問題 75 第4.2.3節 執行問題 83 第4.3節 模擬數值分析 87 第5節 結論 97 參考文獻 99 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0882555011 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 中位數投票者 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 公共基金邊際成本 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 資訊不對稱 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 道德冒險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 逆選擇 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 風險分攤 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 管制機制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 利潤稅 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 最適租稅 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | 公共經濟學三篇論文 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Three Essays on Public Economics | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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