Publications-Theses

題名 擁擠成本對地方政府財政競爭的影響
作者 邱重威
貢獻者 蔡智發
邱重威
關鍵詞 基礎建設
擁擠成本
不配成本
財政競爭
水平差異
日期 2005
上傳時間 18-Sep-2009 11:04:36 (UTC+8)
摘要 Justman et al. (2001) 探究在彼此競爭的情況下,地方政府如何提供具有水平差異特質的基礎建設。該文得到兩地政府會盡量提供具有差異化的基礎建設,以避免陷入財政競爭的窘境。
本研究將擁擠成本放入上述模型修正,主要獲致三個結果。首先,在單一地方政府沒有競爭的情況下,地方政府提供單一基礎建設與兩種基礎建設相較,當政府提供兩種基礎建設,土地價值較大,故在沒有競爭的情況下,政府應該提供兩種基礎建設;其次,在兩個地方政府各提供單一基礎建設的競爭模型下,政府提供差異極大基礎建設種類的決策不會受到擁擠成本的影響,然而當兩地政府都提供相同的基礎建設時,廠商是沒有辦法利用政府彼此的競爭,而將在地區創造的所有利益都拿走;另外,在廠商群總數相同下,地方政府應該選擇基礎建設需求種類較多的廠商群,差異化仍主導了基礎建設決策的結果;最後,在一地政府提供兩種基礎建設,另一地提供單一基礎建設競爭模型中,若不考量擁擠成本,可以發現提供兩個基礎建設的地方政府,最終都沒有誘因願意去提供兩個基礎競爭來與提供單一基礎建設的另一地競爭,故在有競爭的情況下,地方政府應該會提供單一基礎建設。加入擁擠成本之後,可以發現當擁擠成本越大時,對地方政府而言,越可以紓解財政競爭張力,在基礎建設種類決策中兩地提供的基礎建設種類有逐漸相互趨近的情況。
參考文獻 Bjorvatn, K. (2000), “Urban Infrastructure and Industrialization,” Journal of Urban Economics, 48, 205-218.
Bonanno, J. (1987), “Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence,” The Review of Economic Studies, 54, 37-45.
Brueckner, J. K. (1983). “Property Value Maximization and Public Sector Efficiency,” Journal of Urban Economics, 14, 1-16.
Buchanan, J. M. (1965), “An Economic Theory of Clubs,” Economica, 33, 1-14.
Caminal, R. (2004), “Personal Redistribution and the Regional Allocation of Public Investment,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 34, 55-69.
Cummings, R. and W. D. Schulze (1978), “Optimal Investment Strategy for Boomtowns: A Theoretical Analysis,” American Economic Review, 374-385.
d’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J. and J.-F. Thisse (1979), “On Hotelling’s Stability in Competition,” Econometrica, 47, 1145-1150.
Gramlich, E. M. (1994), “Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, 1176-1196.
Hotelling, H. (1929), “Stability in Competition,” Economic Journal, 39, 41-57.
Justman, M., Thisse, J.-F. and T. van Ypersele (2001), “Fiscal Competition and Regional Differentiation,” Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics Papers, No. 0124.
Justman, M., Thisse, J.-F. and T. van Ypersele (2002), “Taking the Bite Out of Fiscal Competition,” Journal of Urban Economics, 52, 294-315.
Keen, M., and M. Marchand (1997), “Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 33-53.
Lambertini, L. (1997), “Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly,” Journal of Urban Economics, 41, 407-420.
Lynde, C. and J. Richmond (1992), “The Role of Public Capital in Production,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 73, 37-44.
Mansoorian, A., and G. M. Myers (1997), “On the Consequences of Government Objectives for Economies with Mobile Populations,” Journal of Public Economics, 63, 265-281.
Martinez-Giralt, X., and D. J. Neven (1988), “Can Price Competition Dominate Market Segmentation?,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 36, 431-442.
Mayeres, I. and S. Proost (1997), “Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion Type of Externalities,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99, 261-279.
Meiburg, C. O. (1963), “An Economic Analysis of Highway Services,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 77, 648-656.
Philips, L. and J.-F. Thisse (1982), “Spatial Competition and the Theory of Differentiated Markets: An Introduction,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 31, 1-9.
Salant, S. W., Switzer, S. and R. Reynolds (1983), “Loses from Horizontal Merger: the Effect of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98,185-213.
Scotchmer, S. (1986), “Local Public Goods in an Equilibrium: How Pecuniary Externalities Matter,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 16, 463-481.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-424.
Wooders, M. (1978), “Equilibria, the Core, And Jurisdiction Structures in Economies with a Local Public Good,” Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 328-348.
溫世仁 (2003),《溫世仁觀點:中國經濟的未來》,台北市:天下遠見。
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
92255006
94
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0922550061
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 蔡智發zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 邱重威zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 邱重威zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2005en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Sep-2009 11:04:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Sep-2009 11:04:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Sep-2009 11:04:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0922550061en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34748-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 92255006zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 94zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Justman et al. (2001) 探究在彼此競爭的情況下,地方政府如何提供具有水平差異特質的基礎建設。該文得到兩地政府會盡量提供具有差異化的基礎建設,以避免陷入財政競爭的窘境。
本研究將擁擠成本放入上述模型修正,主要獲致三個結果。首先,在單一地方政府沒有競爭的情況下,地方政府提供單一基礎建設與兩種基礎建設相較,當政府提供兩種基礎建設,土地價值較大,故在沒有競爭的情況下,政府應該提供兩種基礎建設;其次,在兩個地方政府各提供單一基礎建設的競爭模型下,政府提供差異極大基礎建設種類的決策不會受到擁擠成本的影響,然而當兩地政府都提供相同的基礎建設時,廠商是沒有辦法利用政府彼此的競爭,而將在地區創造的所有利益都拿走;另外,在廠商群總數相同下,地方政府應該選擇基礎建設需求種類較多的廠商群,差異化仍主導了基礎建設決策的結果;最後,在一地政府提供兩種基礎建設,另一地提供單一基礎建設競爭模型中,若不考量擁擠成本,可以發現提供兩個基礎建設的地方政府,最終都沒有誘因願意去提供兩個基礎競爭來與提供單一基礎建設的另一地競爭,故在有競爭的情況下,地方政府應該會提供單一基礎建設。加入擁擠成本之後,可以發現當擁擠成本越大時,對地方政府而言,越可以紓解財政競爭張力,在基礎建設種類決策中兩地提供的基礎建設種類有逐漸相互趨近的情況。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
研究目的 2
研究方法 2
第二章 文獻回顧 4
基礎建設投資理論 4
基礎建設是俱樂部財 6
產品差異與 Hotelling 模型 7
基礎建設之間的差異 8
第三章 理論模型 11
第一節 模型假設 11
基礎建設的種類與容量 11
擁擠成本與不配成本間的抵換關係 13
廠商的生產函數 14
不配成本的定義 16
擁擠成本的定義 17
第二節 地方政府與廠商之間行為 20
廠商的行為 20
地方政府的行為 22
追求土地價值極大化 22
單一政府提供一種基礎建設與兩種基礎建設的比較 25
第三節 小結 27
第四章 兩地方政府提供單一基礎建設競爭 28
第一節 加入擁擠成本的修正模型 28
第二節 第三階段-廠商決策與對基礎建設的需求 30
第三節 第二階段-地方政府決定人頭稅稅率 32
第四節 第一階段-地方政府決定興建基礎建設的種類數目 36
第五節 不同的廠商群對政府決策的影響 39
第六節 小結 42
第五章 地方政府間提供不同基礎建設種類數的競爭 43
第一節 二對一雙側競爭-未加入擁擠成本 44
第二節 二對一雙側競爭-加入擁擠成本 52
第三節 二對一同側競爭 56
第四節 小結 59
第六章 結論與延伸 61
結論 61
延伸 63
參考文獻 64
zh_TW
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0922550061en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 基礎建設zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 擁擠成本zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 不配成本zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 財政競爭zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 水平差異zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 擁擠成本對地方政府財政競爭的影響zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bjorvatn, K. (2000), “Urban Infrastructure and Industrialization,” Journal of Urban Economics, 48, 205-218.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bonanno, J. (1987), “Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence,” The Review of Economic Studies, 54, 37-45.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Brueckner, J. K. (1983). “Property Value Maximization and Public Sector Efficiency,” Journal of Urban Economics, 14, 1-16.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Buchanan, J. M. (1965), “An Economic Theory of Clubs,” Economica, 33, 1-14.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Caminal, R. (2004), “Personal Redistribution and the Regional Allocation of Public Investment,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 34, 55-69.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Cummings, R. and W. D. Schulze (1978), “Optimal Investment Strategy for Boomtowns: A Theoretical Analysis,” American Economic Review, 374-385.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) d’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J. and J.-F. Thisse (1979), “On Hotelling’s Stability in Competition,” Econometrica, 47, 1145-1150.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gramlich, E. M. (1994), “Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, 1176-1196.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hotelling, H. (1929), “Stability in Competition,” Economic Journal, 39, 41-57.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Justman, M., Thisse, J.-F. and T. van Ypersele (2001), “Fiscal Competition and Regional Differentiation,” Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics Papers, No. 0124.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Justman, M., Thisse, J.-F. and T. van Ypersele (2002), “Taking the Bite Out of Fiscal Competition,” Journal of Urban Economics, 52, 294-315.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Keen, M., and M. Marchand (1997), “Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 33-53.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lambertini, L. (1997), “Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly,” Journal of Urban Economics, 41, 407-420.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lynde, C. and J. Richmond (1992), “The Role of Public Capital in Production,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 73, 37-44.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Mansoorian, A., and G. M. Myers (1997), “On the Consequences of Government Objectives for Economies with Mobile Populations,” Journal of Public Economics, 63, 265-281.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Martinez-Giralt, X., and D. J. Neven (1988), “Can Price Competition Dominate Market Segmentation?,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 36, 431-442.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Mayeres, I. and S. Proost (1997), “Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion Type of Externalities,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99, 261-279.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Meiburg, C. O. (1963), “An Economic Analysis of Highway Services,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 77, 648-656.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Philips, L. and J.-F. Thisse (1982), “Spatial Competition and the Theory of Differentiated Markets: An Introduction,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 31, 1-9.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Salant, S. W., Switzer, S. and R. Reynolds (1983), “Loses from Horizontal Merger: the Effect of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98,185-213.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Scotchmer, S. (1986), “Local Public Goods in an Equilibrium: How Pecuniary Externalities Matter,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 16, 463-481.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Tiebout, C. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-424.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Wooders, M. (1978), “Equilibria, the Core, And Jurisdiction Structures in Economies with a Local Public Good,” Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 328-348.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 溫世仁 (2003),《溫世仁觀點:中國經濟的未來》,台北市:天下遠見。zh_TW