| dc.contributor.advisor | 翁堃嵐 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 陳政弘 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 陳政弘 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2004 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Sep-2009 11:05:00 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Sep-2009 11:05:00 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Sep-2009 11:05:00 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0922550121 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=36016 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 92255012 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 93 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 1980年代興起的「策略貿易理論」認為政府應該在貿易中扮演積極主動的角色，透過補貼來造成「利潤轉移效果」，進而提升本國的福利水準。不過，礙於 WTO的規定，政府通常無法對於出口廠商直接進行補貼。除此之外，國際貿易理論大多忽略了逃漏稅行為對於廠商生產決策的影響。本文嘗試將出口補貼的議題以及利潤稅逃漏的問題相結合，探討若政府不得使用補貼，則其是否能夠透過降低查核率，使得本國的福利水準上升。而我們的研究結果發現：允許出口廠商逃漏稅未必皆能攫取外國廠商的利潤，而是依稽核方法而異。當政府採取完全隨機的查核模式時，則政府不需進行稽查。但若政府是對申報收益訂定查核標準時，則我們發現在某些限制條件之下，政府的確可以透過對出口的廠商降低其查核率，使得本國的福利上升，且會使得本國廠商的產量超過 Stackelberg 的領導者的生產水準。最後我們考量兩國政府都使用降低稽核投入的情況下，則策略互動關係會變成一個「囚犯困境」，而且沒有適宜的遏止方法。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第1章 前言 1\n\n第2章 文獻回顧 3\n 2.1 策略貿易出口政策的相關文獻 3\n 2.2 利潤稅中立性的相關文獻 5\n\n第3章 模型 8\n 3.1 模型建立及廠商的最適化行為決策 8\n 3.1.1 本國廠商的最適化問題 8\n 3.1.2 外國廠商的最適化問題 12\n 3.1.3 市場互動反應 13\n 3.2 比較靜態分析 14\n 3.3 福利效果 16\n\n第4章 政府採取隨機查核 18\n\n第5章 政府以申報收益查核 21\n\n第6章 兩國政策互動模型 28\n\n第7章 結論 35\n\n參考文獻 37\n\n\n圖次\n\n圖一 查核率與最適逃漏數額的關係 11\n圖二 廠商最適生產決策的圖解 22\n圖三 查核投入對毛利潤影響的圖解 25 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0922550121 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 策略出口貿易 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 租稅逃漏 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 利潤轉移效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | 稽核策略與出口貿易政策之研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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