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題名 微分賽局在行銷通路之應用─合作廣告
作者 余俊慶
Yu, Chung-Ching
貢獻者 林柏生
Lin, Po-sheng
余俊慶
Yu, Chung-Ching
關鍵詞 行銷通路
微分賽局
動態規劃
合作廣告
marketing channel
differential game
dynamic programming
cooperative advertising
日期 2005
上傳時間 18-Sep-2009 14:09:26 (UTC+8)
摘要 在經濟活動發展迅速的情形下,產品的競爭與多樣化使得廠商在價格之外,也須將行銷策略納入考量。研究行銷通路中成員互動的理論模型從靜態模型開始,到用動態微分賽局的模型來研究廠商間的互動,過去的研究文獻得到了兩點結論:第一,通路合作為Pareto最適。第二,在通路無法合作的情況下,利用合作機制的建立,能使均衡結果產生Pareto改善。
然而,過去的文獻卻未說明將通路合作放入合作廣告的模型中,通路合作是否仍為Pareto最適。因此,本研究沿用Jørgensen et al.(2003)合作廣告模型的設定,將通路合作的情況放入模型中,比較通路合作、零售商遠視、零售商短視與合作廣告四種情形均衡時的行銷策略及廠商的利潤,並探討通路合作在合作廣告的模型中是否仍為Pareto最適。
參考文獻 (1)Blattberg, R.C., Neslin, S.A.(1990), Sales Promotion:Concepts,Methods, and Strategies. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs,NJ.
(2)Chintagunta, P.K., and Jain, D. (1991), “A Study of Manufacturer-Retailer Marketing Strategies: A Differential Game Approach”. In Dynamic Games in Economics,Hamalainen and Ehtamo (Eds). Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, Vol.157, Springer-Verlag.
(3)Chintagunta, P.K., and Jain, D. (1992), “A Dynamic Model of Channel Member Strategies for Marketing Expenditures”, Marketing Science, Vol.11, Iss.2, pp.168–188.
(4)Coughlan, A.T., Anderson, E., Stern, L.W.and A.I. El-Ansary (2001),Marketing Channels,Sixth Edition, Prentice Hall.
(5)Jeuland, A.P. and S. M. Shugan (1983), “Marketing Channel Profits”, Marketing Science, Vol. 2, Iss.3, pp.239-272.
(6)Jørgensen, S., Sigu´e, S. P., and Zaccour, G. (2000), “Dynamic Cooperative Advertising in a Channel”, Journal of Retailing, Vol.76, Iss.1, pp.71–92.
(7) Jørgensen, S., Sigu´e, S. P., and Zaccour, G. (2001a), “Stackelberg Leadership in a Marketing Channel”, International Game Theory Review, Vol.3, Iss.1, pp.13–26.
(8) Jørgensen, S., Taboubi, S., and Zaccour, G. (2001b), “Cooperative Advertising in a Marketing Channel”, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol.110, Iss.1,pp.145–158.
(9) Jørgensen, S., Taboubi, S. and Zaccour, G. (2003), “Retail Promotions with Negative Brand Image Effects: Is Cooperation Possible?”, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol.150, Iss.2, pp.395–405.
(10) Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. (1999), “Equilibrium Pricing and Advertising Strategies in a Marketing Channel”, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol.102,Iss.1, pp.111–125.
(11)Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. (2003a), “A Differential Game of Retailer Promotions”,Automatica, Vol.39, Iss.7, pp.1145–1155.
(12)Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. (2003b), “Channel Coordination over Time: Incentive Equilibria and Credibility”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol.27,pp.801–822.
(13)Kamien, M.I. and Schwarz, N.L. (1991),Dynamic Optimization: the Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control, North Holland, Amsterdam.
(14)McGuire T. and Staelin, R. (1986), “Channel Efficiency, Incentive Compatibility,Transfer Pricing, and Market Structure: An Analysis of Channel Relationships”, Research in Marketing, Vol.8, pp.181–223
(15)Martın-Herran, G.and Taboubi, S.(2003), “Shelf-space Allocation and Advertising Decisions in the Marketing Channel: A Differential Game Approach”, GERAD G-2003-60.
(16) Nerlove, M. and K.J. Arrow.(1962), “Optimal Advertising Policy under Dynamic Conditions.”,Economica,vol.29,pp.129-142.
(17)Reve, T. and Stern, L.W.(1979), “Interorganzational Relations in Marketing Channels”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 4, Iss.3, pp. 405-416.
(18)Stern, L.W.(1969), Distribution Channels:Behavioral Dimensions, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.
(19)Taboubi, S. and Zaccour, G. (2002), “Impact of Retailer’s Myopia on Channel’s Strategies”, in Optimal Control and Differential Games : Essays in Honor of Steffen Jorgensen, G. Zaccour ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers,pp. 179-192.
(20)Taboubi, S. and Zaccour, G. (2005), “Coordination Mechanisms in Marketing Channels:A Survey of Game Theory Models”, GERAD discussion paper G–2005–36.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易研究所
93351002
94
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093351002
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 林柏生zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Lin, Po-shengen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 余俊慶zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Yu, Chung-Chingen_US
dc.creator (作者) 余俊慶zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Yu, Chung-Chingen_US
dc.date (日期) 2005en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Sep-2009 14:09:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Sep-2009 14:09:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Sep-2009 14:09:26 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0093351002en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/35097-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 93351002zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 94zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在經濟活動發展迅速的情形下,產品的競爭與多樣化使得廠商在價格之外,也須將行銷策略納入考量。研究行銷通路中成員互動的理論模型從靜態模型開始,到用動態微分賽局的模型來研究廠商間的互動,過去的研究文獻得到了兩點結論:第一,通路合作為Pareto最適。第二,在通路無法合作的情況下,利用合作機制的建立,能使均衡結果產生Pareto改善。
然而,過去的文獻卻未說明將通路合作放入合作廣告的模型中,通路合作是否仍為Pareto最適。因此,本研究沿用Jørgensen et al.(2003)合作廣告模型的設定,將通路合作的情況放入模型中,比較通路合作、零售商遠視、零售商短視與合作廣告四種情形均衡時的行銷策略及廠商的利潤,並探討通路合作在合作廣告的模型中是否仍為Pareto最適。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機 1
1.2 研究目的 2
第二章 文獻回顧 4
2.1 通路合作 4
2.2 通路不合作 8
2.2.1 合作廣告 8
2.2.2 領導者模型 11
2.2.3 誘因策略 12
第三章 模型設定 14
第四章 模型求解 16
4.1 通路合作 16
4.2 通路不合作且無合作廣告 18
4.2.1 零售商是遠視的 18
4.2.2 零售商是短視的 21
4.3 合作廣告 23
第五章 均衡結果的比較分析 27
5.1 廠商的均衡行銷策略 27
5.1.1 製造商 27
5.1.2 零售商 28
5.2 廠商的福利水準 29
5.2.1 製造商 29
5.2.2 零售商 30
5.3 通路整體的福利水準 31
第六章 結論 34
6.1 本文結論 34
6.2 未來研究方向 35
參考文獻 36
zh_TW
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093351002en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 行銷通路zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 微分賽局zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 動態規劃zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 合作廣告zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) marketing channelen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) differential gameen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) dynamic programmingen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) cooperative advertisingen_US
dc.title (題名) 微分賽局在行銷通路之應用─合作廣告zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (1)Blattberg, R.C., Neslin, S.A.(1990), Sales Promotion:Concepts,Methods, and Strategies. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs,NJ.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (2)Chintagunta, P.K., and Jain, D. (1991), “A Study of Manufacturer-Retailer Marketing Strategies: A Differential Game Approach”. In Dynamic Games in Economics,Hamalainen and Ehtamo (Eds). Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, Vol.157, Springer-Verlag.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (3)Chintagunta, P.K., and Jain, D. (1992), “A Dynamic Model of Channel Member Strategies for Marketing Expenditures”, Marketing Science, Vol.11, Iss.2, pp.168–188.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (4)Coughlan, A.T., Anderson, E., Stern, L.W.and A.I. El-Ansary (2001),Marketing Channels,Sixth Edition, Prentice Hall.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (5)Jeuland, A.P. and S. M. Shugan (1983), “Marketing Channel Profits”, Marketing Science, Vol. 2, Iss.3, pp.239-272.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (6)Jørgensen, S., Sigu´e, S. P., and Zaccour, G. (2000), “Dynamic Cooperative Advertising in a Channel”, Journal of Retailing, Vol.76, Iss.1, pp.71–92.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (7) Jørgensen, S., Sigu´e, S. P., and Zaccour, G. (2001a), “Stackelberg Leadership in a Marketing Channel”, International Game Theory Review, Vol.3, Iss.1, pp.13–26.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (8) Jørgensen, S., Taboubi, S., and Zaccour, G. (2001b), “Cooperative Advertising in a Marketing Channel”, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol.110, Iss.1,pp.145–158.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (9) Jørgensen, S., Taboubi, S. and Zaccour, G. (2003), “Retail Promotions with Negative Brand Image Effects: Is Cooperation Possible?”, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol.150, Iss.2, pp.395–405.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (10) Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. (1999), “Equilibrium Pricing and Advertising Strategies in a Marketing Channel”, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol.102,Iss.1, pp.111–125.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (11)Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. (2003a), “A Differential Game of Retailer Promotions”,Automatica, Vol.39, Iss.7, pp.1145–1155.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (12)Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. (2003b), “Channel Coordination over Time: Incentive Equilibria and Credibility”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol.27,pp.801–822.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (13)Kamien, M.I. and Schwarz, N.L. (1991),Dynamic Optimization: the Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control, North Holland, Amsterdam.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (14)McGuire T. and Staelin, R. (1986), “Channel Efficiency, Incentive Compatibility,Transfer Pricing, and Market Structure: An Analysis of Channel Relationships”, Research in Marketing, Vol.8, pp.181–223zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (15)Martın-Herran, G.and Taboubi, S.(2003), “Shelf-space Allocation and Advertising Decisions in the Marketing Channel: A Differential Game Approach”, GERAD G-2003-60.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (16) Nerlove, M. and K.J. Arrow.(1962), “Optimal Advertising Policy under Dynamic Conditions.”,Economica,vol.29,pp.129-142.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (17)Reve, T. and Stern, L.W.(1979), “Interorganzational Relations in Marketing Channels”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 4, Iss.3, pp. 405-416.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (18)Stern, L.W.(1969), Distribution Channels:Behavioral Dimensions, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (19)Taboubi, S. and Zaccour, G. (2002), “Impact of Retailer’s Myopia on Channel’s Strategies”, in Optimal Control and Differential Games : Essays in Honor of Steffen Jorgensen, G. Zaccour ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers,pp. 179-192.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (20)Taboubi, S. and Zaccour, G. (2005), “Coordination Mechanisms in Marketing Channels:A Survey of Game Theory Models”, GERAD discussion paper G–2005–36.zh_TW