Publications-Theses

題名 從「做中學」的角度解釋分購策略
作者 賴秉銳
Lai, Ping Jui
貢獻者 溫偉任<br>張興華
<br>
賴秉銳
Lai, Ping Jui
關鍵詞 分購
做中學
split award
learning by doing
日期 2004
上傳時間 18-Sep-2009 14:15:52 (UTC+8)
摘要 促進競爭是文獻中解釋分購的理由之一,競爭的程度由參與供應商的數目決定,以供應商的家數作參數。我建立一個兩期的模型,用「從做中學」的效果,將競爭的程度用成本結構的差異大小來表現,成本結構差異越大,競爭越激烈,透過模型讓競爭的程度由購買者內生控制。希望透過這一個簡單的模型檢視當廠商數目固定時,購買者會否在考量控制供應商的成本相似下採用分購策略。雖然發現在我模型的設定中,購買者考量兩期之下一定選擇不採用分購策略,但是,仍能發現只考量第二期的購買價格下促進競爭的確是購買者採用分購的原因之一。
參考文獻 Anton, J and D. Yao (1987), “Second Sourcing and the Experience Curve: Price competition in Defense Procurement,” The RAND Jounal of Economics 18(1), pp. 57-76.
Anton, J and D. Yao (1989), “Split Awards, Procurement and Innovation,” The RAND Jounal of Economics 20(4), pp. 538-552.
Anton, J and D. Yao (1990), “Measuring The Effectiveness of Competition in Defense Procurement: A Survey of the Empirical Literature,” Jounal of Policy Analysis and Management (9), pp. 60-79.
Anton, J and D. Yao (1992), “Corordination in Split Award Auctions,” Quartely Journal of Economics 107, pp. 681-708.
Griesmer, J., R. Levitan and M. Shubik (1967), “Toward a Study of Bidding Process, Part 4 --Games with Unknown Costs,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 14(59), pp. 415-434.
Krishna, K. (2002) Auction Theory Elsevier Science(USA).
Maskin, E. S. and J. G Riley, (2000a) “Asymmetric Auctions,” The Review of Economic Studies 67, pp. 413-438
Maskin, E. S. and J. G Riley, (2000b) “Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions,” The Review of Economic Studies 67, pp. 439-454
McAfee, P. and J. McMillan (1987), “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic Literature 24 pp.699-738.
Perry M. K. and J. Sakovics (2001), “Auctions for Split-Award Contracts,” pp.1-32 Working Paper.
Seshadri, S. (1995) “Bidding for Contests,” Management Science 41(4), pp. 561-575 .
Swift, C. O. (1995), “Preferences for Single Sourcing and Supplier Selection Criteria,” Journal of Business Research 32, pp. 105-111
Vickrey, W. (1961), “Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of Finance 16(1), pp. 8-37.
Vickrey, W, (1962), “Auctions and Bidding Games," in Recent Advances in Game Theory,” Princeton Conference Series, 29, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 28, pp. 15-27.
Waehrer, K., Harstad, R. M. and Rothkopf M. H. (1998) “Auction Form of Risk-Averse Bid Takers,” The Rand Journal of Economics 29(1), pp.179-192
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易研究所
91351002
93
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0913510021
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 溫偉任<br>張興華zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor <br>en_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 賴秉銳zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lai, Ping Juien_US
dc.creator (作者) 賴秉銳zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lai, Ping Juien_US
dc.date (日期) 2004en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Sep-2009 14:15:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Sep-2009 14:15:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Sep-2009 14:15:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0913510021en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/35142-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 91351002zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 93zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 促進競爭是文獻中解釋分購的理由之一,競爭的程度由參與供應商的數目決定,以供應商的家數作參數。我建立一個兩期的模型,用「從做中學」的效果,將競爭的程度用成本結構的差異大小來表現,成本結構差異越大,競爭越激烈,透過模型讓競爭的程度由購買者內生控制。希望透過這一個簡單的模型檢視當廠商數目固定時,購買者會否在考量控制供應商的成本相似下採用分購策略。雖然發現在我模型的設定中,購買者考量兩期之下一定選擇不採用分購策略,但是,仍能發現只考量第二期的購買價格下促進競爭的確是購買者採用分購的原因之一。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一節□e言……………………………1
第二節□暰m探討………………………3
第三節□珓炯]定………………………7
第四節□期的競標行為………………9
第五節□臚G期的均衡形式……………14
第五之一節□主要均衡…………………14
第五之二節□非主要均衡………………24
第六節□祭蛂K…………………………27
參考文獻…………………………………28
附錄………………………………………30
zh_TW
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dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0913510021en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 分購zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 做中學zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) split awarden_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) learning by doingen_US
dc.title (題名) 從「做中學」的角度解釋分購策略zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anton, J and D. Yao (1987), “Second Sourcing and the Experience Curve: Price competition in Defense Procurement,” The RAND Jounal of Economics 18(1), pp. 57-76.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anton, J and D. Yao (1989), “Split Awards, Procurement and Innovation,” The RAND Jounal of Economics 20(4), pp. 538-552.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anton, J and D. Yao (1990), “Measuring The Effectiveness of Competition in Defense Procurement: A Survey of the Empirical Literature,” Jounal of Policy Analysis and Management (9), pp. 60-79.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anton, J and D. Yao (1992), “Corordination in Split Award Auctions,” Quartely Journal of Economics 107, pp. 681-708.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Griesmer, J., R. Levitan and M. Shubik (1967), “Toward a Study of Bidding Process, Part 4 --Games with Unknown Costs,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 14(59), pp. 415-434.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Krishna, K. (2002) Auction Theory Elsevier Science(USA).zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Maskin, E. S. and J. G Riley, (2000a) “Asymmetric Auctions,” The Review of Economic Studies 67, pp. 413-438zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Maskin, E. S. and J. G Riley, (2000b) “Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions,” The Review of Economic Studies 67, pp. 439-454zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) McAfee, P. and J. McMillan (1987), “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic Literature 24 pp.699-738.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Perry M. K. and J. Sakovics (2001), “Auctions for Split-Award Contracts,” pp.1-32 Working Paper.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Seshadri, S. (1995) “Bidding for Contests,” Management Science 41(4), pp. 561-575 .zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Swift, C. O. (1995), “Preferences for Single Sourcing and Supplier Selection Criteria,” Journal of Business Research 32, pp. 105-111zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Vickrey, W. (1961), “Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of Finance 16(1), pp. 8-37.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Vickrey, W, (1962), “Auctions and Bidding Games," in Recent Advances in Game Theory,” Princeton Conference Series, 29, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 28, pp. 15-27.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Waehrer, K., Harstad, R. M. and Rothkopf M. H. (1998) “Auction Form of Risk-Averse Bid Takers,” The Rand Journal of Economics 29(1), pp.179-192zh_TW