Publications-Theses

題名 央行官員薪資設計與第二代匯率制度變革
作者 林柏君
貢獻者 賴景昌
林柏君
關鍵詞 第二代匯率制度變革
央行官員
薪資設計
日期 2002
上傳時間 18-Sep-2009 15:53:58 (UTC+8)
摘要 摘 要
本文係以Obstfeld (1996) 所發展的第二代匯率制度模型為基礎,探討央行官員在不同薪資設計之下,提高他們的薪資懲罰,對匯率制度變革有何影響。再者,我們也探討了央行官員對自身薪資的關心程度,在提高薪資懲罰的過程中,扮演著何種角色。
經由本文的解析,我們可以得到:不論是以通貨膨脹或產出差距做為懲罰央行官員薪資的標準,提高他們的薪資懲罰程度皆可降低經濟體系中複數均衡解存在的可能性;此外,就匯率制度變革的機率而言,我們發現,相較於以通貨膨脹來懲罰央行官員的薪資制度,提高央行官員因產出差距受到的懲罰,能夠較大幅度降低民眾的預期匯率變動率,進而降低匯率制度變革的機率;同時,也大幅提高經濟體系對負面干擾的承受度;最後,央行官員如果愈關心自身的薪資,則提高他們的薪資懲罰所得到的效果將愈大。
參考文獻 參 考 文 獻
曹添旺、張文雅 (1999),「金融危機的研究及其對台灣的啟示—兼論未來的研究方向」,台灣經濟預測與政策,30,91-102。
賴景昌 (1994),國際金融理論:進階篇,台北:茂昌出版社。
賴景昌 (2001),總體經濟學,台北:雙葉書廊。
賴景昌 (2002),「時序不一致」,上課講義。
賴景昌 (2002),「第二代的匯率制度變革」,上課講義。
Agenor, P. R., Bhandari, J. S. and Flood, R. P. (1992), “Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance-of-Payments Crises,” IMF Staff Papers, 39, 357-394.
Barro, R. J. and Gordon, D. B. (1983), “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,” Journal of Political Economy, 91, 589-610.
Buiter, W. H. (1987), “Borrowing to Defend the Exchange Rate and the Timing of and Magnitude of Speculative Attacks,” Journal of International Economics, 23, 221-239.
Chortareas, G. E. and Miller, S. M. (2003), “Monetary Policy and Delegation, Contracts Costs and Contract Targets,” Bulletin of Economic Research, 55, 101-112.
Djajic, S. (1989), “Dynamics of Exchange Rate in Anticipation of Pegging,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 8, 559-571.
Drazen, A. and Masson, P. R. (1994), “Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policy Makers ,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 735-754.
Flood, R. P. and Garber, P. M. (1984), “Collapsing Exchange-Rate-Regimes: Some Linear Examples,” Journal of International Economics, 17, 1-13.
Flood, R. P. and Marion N. P. (1997), “Policy Implications of “Second Generation” Crises Models,” International Monetary Fund, 44, 383-390.
Flood, R. P. and Marion N. P. (1998), “Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crises,” NBER Working Paper, No. 6380.
Garfinkel, M. R. and Oh, S. (1993), “Stategic Discipline in Monetary Policy with Private Information: Optimal Targeting Horizons,” American Economic Review, 83, 99-117.
Gartner, M. (2000), “Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 14, 527-561.
Krugman, P. (1979), “A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 11, 311-325.
Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1977), “Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-491.
Lohmann, S. (1992), “Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility,” American Economic Review, 82, 273-286.
Meon, P. G. (2001), “A Model of Exchange Rate Crises with Partisan Governments,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 23, 517-535.
Meon, P. G. and Razzo J. M. (2002), “The Viability of Fixed Exchange Rate and Empirical Investigation,” Open Economic Review, 13, 111-132.
Obstfeld, M. (1984), “Balance-of-Payments Crises and Devaluation,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 16, 208-217.
Obstfeld, M. (1994), “The Logic of Currency Crises,” Cahiers Economiques et Monetaires, 43, 189-213.
Obstfeld, M. (1996), “Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features,” European Economic Review, 40, 1037-1047.
Rangvid, J. (2001), “Second Generation Models of Currency Crises,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 15, 613-646.
Rogoff, K. (1985), “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Targets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1169-1189.
Svensson, L. E. O. (1997), “Optimal Inflation Targets, “Conservative” Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts,” American Economic Review, 87, 98-114.
Velasco, A. (1996), “Fixed Exchange Rates: Credibility, Flexibility, and Multiplicity,” European Economic Review, 40, 1023-1035.
Waller, C. J. (1992), “The Choice of a Conservative Central Bank in a Multisector Economy,” American Economic Review, 82, 1006-1012.
Walsh, C. E. (1995), “Optimal Contracts for Central Banks,” American Economic Review, 85, 150-167.
Willman, A. (1988), “Balance-of-Payments Crises and Monetary Policy Reactions in a Model with Imperfect Substitutability between Domestic and Foreign Bonds,” Economics Letters, 26, 77-81.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟研究所
90258021
91
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090258021
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 賴景昌zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林柏君zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 林柏君zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2002en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Sep-2009 15:53:58 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Sep-2009 15:53:58 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Sep-2009 15:53:58 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0090258021en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/35739-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 90258021zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 91zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 摘 要
本文係以Obstfeld (1996) 所發展的第二代匯率制度模型為基礎,探討央行官員在不同薪資設計之下,提高他們的薪資懲罰,對匯率制度變革有何影響。再者,我們也探討了央行官員對自身薪資的關心程度,在提高薪資懲罰的過程中,扮演著何種角色。
經由本文的解析,我們可以得到:不論是以通貨膨脹或產出差距做為懲罰央行官員薪資的標準,提高他們的薪資懲罰程度皆可降低經濟體系中複數均衡解存在的可能性;此外,就匯率制度變革的機率而言,我們發現,相較於以通貨膨脹來懲罰央行官員的薪資制度,提高央行官員因產出差距受到的懲罰,能夠較大幅度降低民眾的預期匯率變動率,進而降低匯率制度變革的機率;同時,也大幅提高經濟體系對負面干擾的承受度;最後,央行官員如果愈關心自身的薪資,則提高他們的薪資懲罰所得到的效果將愈大。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 目 錄
第一章 緒 論………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機與目的…………………………… 1
第二節 本文架構…………………………………… 4
第二章 文獻回顧………………………………… 5
第三章 理論模型………………………………… 9
第一節 政府的目標函數…………………………… 9
第二節 央行官員的薪資設計………………………13
本章註釋 ………………………………………………17
第四章 匯率制度變革分析……………………19
第一節 法則與權衡…………………………………19
第二節 管制通貨膨脹與匯率制度變革……………23
第三節 管制產出差距與匯率制度變革……………40
本章註釋 ………………………………………………56
第五章 結 論………………………………………58
參考文獻………………………………………………… 61
zh_TW
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090258021en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 第二代匯率制度變革zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 央行官員zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪資設計zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 央行官員薪資設計與第二代匯率制度變革zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參 考 文 獻zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 曹添旺、張文雅 (1999),「金融危機的研究及其對台灣的啟示—兼論未來的研究方向」,台灣經濟預測與政策,30,91-102。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 賴景昌 (1994),國際金融理論:進階篇,台北:茂昌出版社。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 賴景昌 (2001),總體經濟學,台北:雙葉書廊。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 賴景昌 (2002),「時序不一致」,上課講義。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 賴景昌 (2002),「第二代的匯率制度變革」,上課講義。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Agenor, P. R., Bhandari, J. S. and Flood, R. P. (1992), “Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance-of-Payments Crises,” IMF Staff Papers, 39, 357-394.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Barro, R. J. and Gordon, D. B. (1983), “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,” Journal of Political Economy, 91, 589-610.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Buiter, W. H. (1987), “Borrowing to Defend the Exchange Rate and the Timing of and Magnitude of Speculative Attacks,” Journal of International Economics, 23, 221-239.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chortareas, G. E. and Miller, S. M. (2003), “Monetary Policy and Delegation, Contracts Costs and Contract Targets,” Bulletin of Economic Research, 55, 101-112.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Djajic, S. (1989), “Dynamics of Exchange Rate in Anticipation of Pegging,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 8, 559-571.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Drazen, A. and Masson, P. R. (1994), “Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policy Makers ,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 735-754.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Flood, R. P. and Garber, P. M. (1984), “Collapsing Exchange-Rate-Regimes: Some Linear Examples,” Journal of International Economics, 17, 1-13.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Flood, R. P. and Marion N. P. (1997), “Policy Implications of “Second Generation” Crises Models,” International Monetary Fund, 44, 383-390.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Flood, R. P. and Marion N. P. (1998), “Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crises,” NBER Working Paper, No. 6380.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Garfinkel, M. R. and Oh, S. (1993), “Stategic Discipline in Monetary Policy with Private Information: Optimal Targeting Horizons,” American Economic Review, 83, 99-117.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gartner, M. (2000), “Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 14, 527-561.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Krugman, P. (1979), “A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 11, 311-325.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1977), “Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-491.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lohmann, S. (1992), “Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility,” American Economic Review, 82, 273-286.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Meon, P. G. (2001), “A Model of Exchange Rate Crises with Partisan Governments,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 23, 517-535.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Meon, P. G. and Razzo J. M. (2002), “The Viability of Fixed Exchange Rate and Empirical Investigation,” Open Economic Review, 13, 111-132.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Obstfeld, M. (1984), “Balance-of-Payments Crises and Devaluation,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 16, 208-217.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Obstfeld, M. (1994), “The Logic of Currency Crises,” Cahiers Economiques et Monetaires, 43, 189-213.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Obstfeld, M. (1996), “Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features,” European Economic Review, 40, 1037-1047.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Rangvid, J. (2001), “Second Generation Models of Currency Crises,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 15, 613-646.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Rogoff, K. (1985), “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Targets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1169-1189.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Svensson, L. E. O. (1997), “Optimal Inflation Targets, “Conservative” Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts,” American Economic Review, 87, 98-114.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Velasco, A. (1996), “Fixed Exchange Rates: Credibility, Flexibility, and Multiplicity,” European Economic Review, 40, 1023-1035.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Waller, C. J. (1992), “The Choice of a Conservative Central Bank in a Multisector Economy,” American Economic Review, 82, 1006-1012.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Walsh, C. E. (1995), “Optimal Contracts for Central Banks,” American Economic Review, 85, 150-167.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Willman, A. (1988), “Balance-of-Payments Crises and Monetary Policy Reactions in a Model with Imperfect Substitutability between Domestic and Foreign Bonds,” Economics Letters, 26, 77-81.zh_TW