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題名 教育、階級流通與社會福利
Education, Mobility and Social Welfare
作者 吳致謙
Wu, Jhih Chian
貢獻者 莊委桐
Juang, Wei Torng
吳致謙
Wu, Jhih Chian
關鍵詞 義務教育
所得重分配
馬可夫鏈
階級流通
Compulsory Education
Income Transfer
Markov Chain
Social Mobility
日期 2007
上傳時間 18-Sep-2009 16:00:48 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文主旨在於討論政府的政策對於階級流通跟社會福利的影響。我們設計了一個簡單的階級流通的模型模型，在模型當中，我們想像社會上面的人都得要參加「職業考試」來決定個人的職業，如果通過考試，則可以得到比較高薪水的工作，反之，則只能得到薪資比較低的工作。在模型中，我們分析義務教育與所得重分配這兩種不同廣被使用的促進階級流通的政策下，分別對於社會福利所帶來的影響。

在模型當中，我們發現到的是，政策會產生兩種影響，第一種是縮短貧富差距的影響，第二種則是政策會讓家庭中小孩子受到的教育增加的影響，政策透過這兩種效果會影響社會上面的階級流通。而縮短貧富差距的效果要成立，有兩個條件：1. 這社會高資質的下一代，會是高資質的機率比其他低資質的小孩大；2. 這社會上面得要是有很多低資質的人處在比較高的社會階層。另外一部份，增加教育的效果要發生，也有兩個條件：1. 家長對於小孩教育的所得份額得要小於一；2. 高資質的能力得要夠高。唯有在上面的條件成立之下，政府政策所帶來的這些效果才會發生，並且也才有辦法影響社會階級流通跟社會福利。

而在不同政策下，所得重分配上，只會有縮短貧富差距的效果，在義務教育下，則是兩種效果都可能發生。也因此，本文認為，如義務教育或所得移轉之類的政府政策，並非一定有效，得要在如上述條件成立之下，才會發生階級流通的效果。
The main purpose of this article is to find the relationship between social mobility and policies which government execute. In this article, I discuss two policies:
income transfer and compulsory education. In article, I construct a model where people have to take a “occupation test” to decide what job they can obtain. If people’s scores are larger thanminimumscore, they will pass the test. If they pass the test, they will obtain a job with more earnings. If not, they will obtain a job with lower earnings. Scores of people is affected by their innate ability, family background, and levels of education. Furthermore, I set that if one’s parents are talented, then one is more likely to be a talented one than people
with untalented parents and I call this advantage of people with talented parents“advantage of ability inheritance”. Moreover, levels of education is positive related to their parental income. I find that these policies raisemobility by two effects: one effect is reduction of income gap and another one is net increasing of children’s education. Moreover, I find that when the government executes income transfer, only effect fromreduction of income gapmay work. However, upon executing compulsory education, two effects may both work. In addition, I find the keys for reduction of income gap to work are (1) the advantage of ability inheritance and (2) the amounts of untalented people who pass the test before executing policy. Moreover, the keys for compulsory education are (1) income share of children’s utility and (2) ability of talented people.
參考文獻 Becker, Gary (1993), A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, enl edition.
Becker, Gary and Tomes, Nigel (1979), “An equilibrium theory of the distribution of income and intergenerationalmobility”, The Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), 1153–1189.
Duflo, Esther (2001), “Schooling and labormarket consequences of school construction in indonesia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment”, The American Economic Review, 91(4), 795–812.
Iyigun,Murat F. (1999), “Public education and intergenerational economicmobility”, International Economic Review, 40(3), 697–710.
Loury, Glenn C. (1981), “Intergenerational transfers and the distribution of earnings”, Econometrica, 49(4), 843–867.
Meghir, Costas and Palme,Marten (2001), “The effect of a social experiment in education”, The Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Peter Burton, Shelley Phipps and Curtis, Lori (2002), “All in the family: A simultaneousmodel of parenting style and child conduct”, The American Economic Review, 92(2), 368–372.
Plug, Erik and Vijverberg, Wim (2003), “Schooling, family background, and adoption: Is it nature or is it nurture?”, The Journal of Political Economic,
111, 611–641.
Restuccia, Diego and Urrutia, Carlos(2004), “Intergenerational persistence of earnings: The role of early and college education”, The American Economic
Review, 94(5), 1354–1378.
Solon, Gary (1992), “Intergenerational income mobility in the united states”,
The American Economic Review, 82(3), 393–408.
Solon, Gary (2002), “Cross-country differences in intergenerational earningsmobility”,
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 59–66.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟研究所
95258016
96
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095258016
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 莊委桐zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Juang, Wei Torngen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 吳致謙zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Wu, Jhih Chianen_US
dc.creator (作者) 吳致謙zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Wu, Jhih Chianen_US
dc.date (日期) 2007en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Sep-2009 16:00:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Sep-2009 16:00:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Sep-2009 16:00:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0095258016en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/35781-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 95258016zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 96zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文主旨在於討論政府的政策對於階級流通跟社會福利的影響。我們設計了一個簡單的階級流通的模型模型，在模型當中，我們想像社會上面的人都得要參加「職業考試」來決定個人的職業，如果通過考試，則可以得到比較高薪水的工作，反之，則只能得到薪資比較低的工作。在模型中，我們分析義務教育與所得重分配這兩種不同廣被使用的促進階級流通的政策下，分別對於社會福利所帶來的影響。

在模型當中，我們發現到的是，政策會產生兩種影響，第一種是縮短貧富差距的影響，第二種則是政策會讓家庭中小孩子受到的教育增加的影響，政策透過這兩種效果會影響社會上面的階級流通。而縮短貧富差距的效果要成立，有兩個條件：1. 這社會高資質的下一代，會是高資質的機率比其他低資質的小孩大；2. 這社會上面得要是有很多低資質的人處在比較高的社會階層。另外一部份，增加教育的效果要發生，也有兩個條件：1. 家長對於小孩教育的所得份額得要小於一；2. 高資質的能力得要夠高。唯有在上面的條件成立之下，政府政策所帶來的這些效果才會發生，並且也才有辦法影響社會階級流通跟社會福利。

而在不同政策下，所得重分配上，只會有縮短貧富差距的效果，在義務教育下，則是兩種效果都可能發生。也因此，本文認為，如義務教育或所得移轉之類的政府政策，並非一定有效，得要在如上述條件成立之下，才會發生階級流通的效果。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The main purpose of this article is to find the relationship between social mobility and policies which government execute. In this article, I discuss two policies:
income transfer and compulsory education. In article, I construct a model where people have to take a “occupation test” to decide what job they can obtain. If people’s scores are larger thanminimumscore, they will pass the test. If they pass the test, they will obtain a job with more earnings. If not, they will obtain a job with lower earnings. Scores of people is affected by their innate ability, family background, and levels of education. Furthermore, I set that if one’s parents are talented, then one is more likely to be a talented one than people
with untalented parents and I call this advantage of people with talented parents“advantage of ability inheritance”. Moreover, levels of education is positive related to their parental income. I find that these policies raisemobility by two effects: one effect is reduction of income gap and another one is net increasing of children’s education. Moreover, I find that when the government executes income transfer, only effect fromreduction of income gapmay work. However, upon executing compulsory education, two effects may both work. In addition, I find the keys for reduction of income gap to work are (1) the advantage of ability inheritance and (2) the amounts of untalented people who pass the test before executing policy. Moreover, the keys for compulsory education are (1) income share of children’s utility and (2) ability of talented people.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1 Introduction 5
2 Model 10
2.1 Occupation Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Decision of Parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Mobility of Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 The Policy Effect 15
3.1 Quasilinear Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.1 Income Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.2 Compulsory Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Homothetic Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.1 Education in Homothetic Form. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.2 Income Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.3 Compulsory Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 Conclusion 35
Reference 37		zh_TW
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095258016en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 義務教育zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 所得重分配zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 馬可夫鏈zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 階級流通zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Compulsory Educationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Income Transferen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Markov Chainen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Social Mobilityen_US
dc.title (題名) 教育、階級流通與社會福利zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Education, Mobility and Social Welfareen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Becker, Gary (1993), A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, enl edition.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Becker, Gary and Tomes, Nigel (1979), “An equilibrium theory of the distribution of income and intergenerationalmobility”, The Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), 1153–1189.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Duflo, Esther (2001), “Schooling and labormarket consequences of school construction in indonesia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment”, The American Economic Review, 91(4), 795–812.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Iyigun,Murat F. (1999), “Public education and intergenerational economicmobility”, International Economic Review, 40(3), 697–710.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Loury, Glenn C. (1981), “Intergenerational transfers and the distribution of earnings”, Econometrica, 49(4), 843–867.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Meghir, Costas and Palme,Marten (2001), “The effect of a social experiment in education”, The Institute for Fiscal Studies.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Peter Burton, Shelley Phipps and Curtis, Lori (2002), “All in the family: A simultaneousmodel of parenting style and child conduct”, The American Economic Review, 92(2), 368–372.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Plug, Erik and Vijverberg, Wim (2003), “Schooling, family background, and adoption: Is it nature or is it nurture?”, The Journal of Political Economic,zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 111, 611–641.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Restuccia, Diego and Urrutia, Carlos(2004), “Intergenerational persistence of earnings: The role of early and college education”, The American Economiczh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Review, 94(5), 1354–1378.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Solon, Gary (1992), “Intergenerational income mobility in the united states”,zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) The American Economic Review, 82(3), 393–408.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Solon, Gary (2002), “Cross-country differences in intergenerational earningsmobility”,zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 59–66.zh_TW