Publications-Theses

題名 最適民營化程度與政治獻金
作者 林映均
Lin, Ying Chun
貢獻者 翁永和<br>王智賢
林映均
Lin, Ying Chun
關鍵詞 民營化
政治獻金
日期 2006
上傳時間 18-Sep-2009 16:06:45 (UTC+8)
摘要 在民主體制國家中,遊說行為往往是不可避免的,故政府在制定政策時,或多或少會受到利益團體所影響。本文以政治經濟學的觀點出發,採用 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 模型來探討政治獻金如何影響政府對最適民營化程度之決策。由本文之分析可知,民營化程度的高低取決於政府對於社會福利的相對重視程度 (相對於政治獻金收入)。當政府完全重視社會福利時,其所制定的最適民營化程度與傳統不考慮遊說行為下所制定的程度相同。此外,當政府某種程度上重視政治獻金時,其最適民營化程度會比沒有遊說行為下之最適民營化程度高,這說明了遊說行為的存在將促使公營事業民營化的程度更加提升。再者,隨著政府重視政治獻金的程度逐漸提高時,其最適民營化程度也會上升。當政府相對重視政治獻金的程度高於某個程度時,會產生公營事業完全民營化的現象,甚至使非常重視政治獻金的政府反而收取不到政治獻金的窘境。
參考文獻 王智賢與蔡坤良 (2005),〈政治獻金限額與關稅遊說〉,《經濟研究》,41(2): 207-247。
王智賢與翁永和 (2006),〈最適自製率與政治獻金〉,《人文與社會科學集刊》,18(2): 269-291。
吳世傑、黃鴻、黃財源 (2001),〈公營事業民營化程度與法定盈餘繳庫之福利分析〉,《台灣經濟學會年會論文集》,9: 239-268。
吳依芳與王智賢 (2005),〈勞資遊說賽局與關稅保護模型〉,《經社法制論叢》,36: 199-241。
林奇蓉 (2004),〈政治遊說與策略性貿易政策〉,《經濟論文叢刊》,32(3): 347-367。
翁永和、羅鈺珊、劉碧珍 (2003),〈市場結構與最適民營化政策〉,《經濟論文》,31(2): 149-169。
邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006),〈公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例分析〉,《經濟論文叢刊》,34(2): 245-259。
Adit, T. S. (1997), “Cooperative Lobbying and Endogenous Trade Policy,” Public Choice, 93, 3-4, 455-475.
Baraldi, A. L. (2003), “Privatization and Mixed Oligopoly: The Case of Telecommunications,” Studi-Economici, 58, 80, 123-149.
Berheim, B.D. and M.D. Whinston (1986), “Menu Auction, Resource Allocation and Economic Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1, 1-31.
Cremer, H., M. Marchand, and J.-F. Thisse (1989), “The Public Firm as an Instrument for Regulating an Oligopolistic Market,” Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 283-301.
De Fraja,G. and F. Delbono (1989), “Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly,” Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 302-311.
Dixit, A., G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,” Journal of Political Economy, 105, 4, 752-769.
Estrin, S. and de Meza (1995), “Unnatural Monopoly,” Journal of Public Economics, 57, 471-88.
Fershtman, C. (1990), “The Interdependence between Ownership Status and Market Structure: The Case of Privatization,” Economica, 57, 319-28.
Findlay, R. and S. Wellisz (1982), “Endogenous Tariff, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare,” in Bhagwati, J. N. ed., Import Competition and Response, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
Fjell, K. and D. Pal (1996), “A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firm,” Canadian Jorunal of Economics, 29, 3, 737-743.
Fjell, K. and J. S. Heywood (2004), “Mixed Oligopoly, Subsidization and the Order of Firm’s Moves: The Relevance of Privatization,” Economics Letters, 83, 3, 411-416.
Gawande, K., P. Krishna, and M. J. Robbins, “ Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy,” NBER working paper: 10205.
George, K. and M. La Manna (1996), “Mixed Duopoly, Inefficiency, and Public Ownership,” Review of Industrial Organization, 11, 853-60.
Goldberg, P. K. and G. Maggi (1999), “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 89, 5, 1135-1155.
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850.
Hillman, A. L. (1982), “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives, ” American Economic Review, 72, 1180-1187.
Magee, C. (2002), “Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobbying Formation: An Application to the Free-rider Problem,” Journal of International Economics, 57, 2,499-457.
Magee, S. P., Brock, W. A. and L. Young (1989), Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.
Maggi, G. and A. Rodriguez-Clare (1998), “The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures,” Journal of Political Economy, 106, 3, 574-601.
Matsumura, Toshihiro (1998), “Partial Privatization in Mixed Duopoly,” Journal of Public Economics, 70, 3, 473-483.
Mayer, W. (1984), “Endogenous Tariff Formation” American Economic Review, 74, 970-85.
Mujumdar, S. and D. Pal (1998), “Effects of Indirect Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly,” Economics Letters, 58, 199-204.
Ohori, S. (2006), “Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 29, 2, 225-233.
Pal, D. and M. White (1998), “Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization and Strategic Trade Policy,” Southern Economic Journal, 65, 264-81.
White, M. (1996), “Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization and Subsidization,” Economics Letters, 53, 189-95.
Wang, Jue-Shyan, Hui-wen Koo and Tain-Jy Chen (2006), “Resource Rivalry and Endogenous Lobby,” Japan and the World Economy, 18, 4, 488-511.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟研究所
94258002
95
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0942580021
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 翁永和<br>王智賢zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林映均zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin, Ying Chunen_US
dc.creator (作者) 林映均zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lin, Ying Chunen_US
dc.date (日期) 2006en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Sep-2009 16:06:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Sep-2009 16:06:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Sep-2009 16:06:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0942580021en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/35815-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 94258002zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 95zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在民主體制國家中,遊說行為往往是不可避免的,故政府在制定政策時,或多或少會受到利益團體所影響。本文以政治經濟學的觀點出發,採用 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 模型來探討政治獻金如何影響政府對最適民營化程度之決策。由本文之分析可知,民營化程度的高低取決於政府對於社會福利的相對重視程度 (相對於政治獻金收入)。當政府完全重視社會福利時,其所制定的最適民營化程度與傳統不考慮遊說行為下所制定的程度相同。此外,當政府某種程度上重視政治獻金時,其最適民營化程度會比沒有遊說行為下之最適民營化程度高,這說明了遊說行為的存在將促使公營事業民營化的程度更加提升。再者,隨著政府重視政治獻金的程度逐漸提高時,其最適民營化程度也會上升。當政府相對重視政治獻金的程度高於某個程度時,會產生公營事業完全民營化的現象,甚至使非常重視政治獻金的政府反而收取不到政治獻金的窘境。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 前言..............................................1
第二章 基本模型...........................................8
第三章 政治獻金遊說下最適民營化程度之決定...................14
第四章 政府相對重視本國福利 a 的大小與民營化程度.............20
第五章 結論..............................................23
數學附錄.................................................24
參考文獻.................................................26
zh_TW
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0942580021en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 民營化zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政治獻金zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 最適民營化程度與政治獻金zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王智賢與蔡坤良 (2005),〈政治獻金限額與關稅遊說〉,《經濟研究》,41(2): 207-247。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王智賢與翁永和 (2006),〈最適自製率與政治獻金〉,《人文與社會科學集刊》,18(2): 269-291。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 吳世傑、黃鴻、黃財源 (2001),〈公營事業民營化程度與法定盈餘繳庫之福利分析〉,《台灣經濟學會年會論文集》,9: 239-268。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 吳依芳與王智賢 (2005),〈勞資遊說賽局與關稅保護模型〉,《經社法制論叢》,36: 199-241。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 林奇蓉 (2004),〈政治遊說與策略性貿易政策〉,《經濟論文叢刊》,32(3): 347-367。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 翁永和、羅鈺珊、劉碧珍 (2003),〈市場結構與最適民營化政策〉,《經濟論文》,31(2): 149-169。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006),〈公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例分析〉,《經濟論文叢刊》,34(2): 245-259。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Adit, T. S. (1997), “Cooperative Lobbying and Endogenous Trade Policy,” Public Choice, 93, 3-4, 455-475.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Baraldi, A. L. (2003), “Privatization and Mixed Oligopoly: The Case of Telecommunications,” Studi-Economici, 58, 80, 123-149.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Berheim, B.D. and M.D. Whinston (1986), “Menu Auction, Resource Allocation and Economic Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1, 1-31.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Cremer, H., M. Marchand, and J.-F. Thisse (1989), “The Public Firm as an Instrument for Regulating an Oligopolistic Market,” Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 283-301.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) De Fraja,G. and F. Delbono (1989), “Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly,” Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 302-311.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dixit, A., G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,” Journal of Political Economy, 105, 4, 752-769.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Estrin, S. and de Meza (1995), “Unnatural Monopoly,” Journal of Public Economics, 57, 471-88.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Fershtman, C. (1990), “The Interdependence between Ownership Status and Market Structure: The Case of Privatization,” Economica, 57, 319-28.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Findlay, R. and S. Wellisz (1982), “Endogenous Tariff, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare,” in Bhagwati, J. N. ed., Import Competition and Response, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Fjell, K. and D. Pal (1996), “A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firm,” Canadian Jorunal of Economics, 29, 3, 737-743.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Fjell, K. and J. S. Heywood (2004), “Mixed Oligopoly, Subsidization and the Order of Firm’s Moves: The Relevance of Privatization,” Economics Letters, 83, 3, 411-416.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gawande, K., P. Krishna, and M. J. Robbins, “ Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy,” NBER working paper: 10205.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) George, K. and M. La Manna (1996), “Mixed Duopoly, Inefficiency, and Public Ownership,” Review of Industrial Organization, 11, 853-60.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Goldberg, P. K. and G. Maggi (1999), “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 89, 5, 1135-1155.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hillman, A. L. (1982), “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives, ” American Economic Review, 72, 1180-1187.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Magee, C. (2002), “Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobbying Formation: An Application to the Free-rider Problem,” Journal of International Economics, 57, 2,499-457.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Magee, S. P., Brock, W. A. and L. Young (1989), Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Maggi, G. and A. Rodriguez-Clare (1998), “The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures,” Journal of Political Economy, 106, 3, 574-601.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Matsumura, Toshihiro (1998), “Partial Privatization in Mixed Duopoly,” Journal of Public Economics, 70, 3, 473-483.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Mayer, W. (1984), “Endogenous Tariff Formation” American Economic Review, 74, 970-85.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Mujumdar, S. and D. Pal (1998), “Effects of Indirect Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly,” Economics Letters, 58, 199-204.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ohori, S. (2006), “Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 29, 2, 225-233.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Pal, D. and M. White (1998), “Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization and Strategic Trade Policy,” Southern Economic Journal, 65, 264-81.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) White, M. (1996), “Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization and Subsidization,” Economics Letters, 53, 189-95.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Wang, Jue-Shyan, Hui-wen Koo and Tain-Jy Chen (2006), “Resource Rivalry and Endogenous Lobby,” Japan and the World Economy, 18, 4, 488-511.zh_TW