| dc.contributor.advisor | 張俊仁 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Chang, Juin Jen | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 劉嘉瀅 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Liu, Chia Ying | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 劉嘉瀅 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Liu, Chia Ying | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2007 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Sep-2009 17:23:26 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Sep-2009 17:23:26 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Sep-2009 17:23:26 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0922585072 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/36176 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 博士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 經濟研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 92258507 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 96 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本論文試圖在一個內生成長的理論架構下，去探討分紅制度所扮演的角色。在第二章中，我們設立一個商品市場不完全競爭的內生成長模型。在分紅比率為外生給定的情況下，我們發現分紅比率越高，對於就業越有利，但對經濟成長的效果則是不確定。此外，我們也探討在規範分析下的最適稅率。在第三章，分紅比率經由廠商與工會協商談判決定，藉著這樣的設定，我們成功的解釋為何失業與經濟成長率之間存在正向的關係。並且，在一個分紅制度的經濟體系之下，工會化的程度與經濟成長之間並不存在一個單調的關係，而是取決於談判的方式。為了解釋廠商為何會有動機去採行分紅制度，第四章我們將效率工資引進一個採行分紅制度的成長模型中。經由分紅制度的採行，我們發現，效率工資可視為一個使經濟成長的動力。並且，我們發現，資本使用與經濟成長率之間存在一同向關係，但勞工的努力程度和經濟成長之間的關係則是不確定的。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This dissertation is a theoretical attempt to examine the role played by share-based schemes in an endogenous economic growth model. In Chapter 2 we set up an endogenous growth model with monopolistic competition in the goods market. Given an exogenously-determined worker share, we show that while a higher revenue-sharing ratio attributable to workers will promote employment, it will have an ambiguous effect on the balanced-growth rate. In addition, we investigate the optimal tax policy response to a revenue-sharing scheme and market imperfections, which are two market distortions. In Chapter 3, the worker’s share is determined via the negotiation between a trade union and an employer federation. By shedding light on the role of revenue sharing and the bargaining institution, we successfully provide a theoretical explanation as to why unemployment can be quite compatible with high economic growth. In addition, in a share economy, unionization does not exhibit a monotonic relationship with growth. It also depends on the presence of revenue sharing and the bargaining institution. To explain why firms themselves could be motivated to accept revenue sharing, we introduce the efficiency wage into our analytical framework and focus on the incentive effects of revenue sharing and their consequences on economic growth in Chapter 4. Specifically, our model comprises work effort and capital utilization. By virtue of the characteristics of modeling, we show that work effort can serve as an engine of economic growth. Of interest, we find that the balanced-growth rate is procyclical in relation to capital utilization, but it may be countercyclical in relation to work effort. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Abstract i Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Reference 8 Chapter 2 Macroeconomic Implications of a Sharing Compensation Scheme in a Model of Endogenous Growth 10 2.1 Introduction 10 2.2 The Model 14 2.2.1 Firms 14 2.2.2 Households 18 2.2.3 Government Budget Constraint 19 2.3 The Steady-State Effects in the Balanced- Growth Path Equilibrium 20 2.4 The (Sub)Optimal Tax Policies 25 2.5 Discussion: Endogenizing the Sharing Ratio Attributable to Labor 27 2.6 Concluding Remarks 30 References 32 Figures 34 Chapter 3 Equilibrium Unemployment and Growth: The Role of Revenue Sharing and Bargaining Institutions 35 3.1 Introduction 35 3.2 The Model 39 3.2.1 Bargaining in a Share Economy 40 3.2.2 Households 45 3.2.3 The Government and the Economy-Wide Resource Constraint 47 3.3 Balanced-Growth-Path Equilibrium 47 3.4 Comparative Statics and the Unemployment- Growth Relationship 53 3.5 Concluding Remarks 56 References 58 Appendix A 61 Appendix B 61 Figures 63 Chapter 4 Shared-based Schemes, Efficiency Wages, and Economic Growth 66 4.1 Introduction 66 4.2 The Analytic Framework 69 4.2.1 Firms 70 4.2.2 Households 72 4.2.3 The Government and the Resource Constraint 74 4.3 The Revenue Sharing Serves as an Engine of Economic Growth 74 4.4 Work Effort, Capital Utilization, and Economic Growth 78 4.5 Concluding Remarks 82 References 84 Appendix 1 86 Appendix 2 86 Figures 87 Chapter 5 Conclusions 88 References 91 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0922585072 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 分紅制度 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 內生成長 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 工會談判 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 失業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 效率工資 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | sharing compensation scheme | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | endogenous growth | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | colletive bargaining | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | unemployment | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | efficiency wage | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 分紅制度、不完全競爭與經濟成長 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Share-based Schemes, Market Imperfections, and Economic Growth | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 請參見每一章最後的部分 | zh_TW |
