| dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 吳依芳 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Wu ,I - Fang | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 吳依芳 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Wu ,I - Fang | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2003 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Sep-2009 17:36:05 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Sep-2009 17:36:05 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Sep-2009 17:36:05 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0091255012 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/36214 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 91255012 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 92 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 大部份的工會遊說文獻，假設工會的目標函數受就業量與工資影響，且影響方向為正。但在真實世界中其實不僅止於此，吾人觀察國際工會運動，發現工會亦重視產品的國內價格，因此本文希望可以提出一個模型，將這個現象納入其中。本文以 Wang, Koo and Chen (2003) 的模型為基礎，加入工會對國內產品價格的關心，並探討工會和廠商的遊說行為, 將對貿易政策產生何種影響，產品的國內價格又如何變動。另外，亦嘗試找尋遊說賽局的子賽局完美均衡，並與只有廠商遊說的情況比較。 本文發現，當參與遊說的兩部門利益方向一致，遊說標價皆落於國際價格的同一側，換句話說，不是同時高於國際價格，就是同時低於國際價格，那麼，遊說競賽的結果，不利於消費者福利。如果參與遊說的兩部門利益方向不同，其中一部門的遊說標價高於國際價格，另一部門的遊說標價則低於國際價格，只要勞工參與工會的比例大，則參與遊說的部門皆為廠商，可以提昇消費者福利；不過若是勞工參與工會的比例小，則提案的兩部門，一為廠商，一為工會，方能對消費者的福利有所增進。另外，若是聯合工會(跨產業的工會)參與遊說，消費者福利將達到最大。 因此工會加入遊說競賽，對消費者福利是提昇還是減損並無法確定，須視勞工參與工會的比例高低及對手部門而定。不過可以肯定，聯合工會的出現，對消費者來說，不蒂是一項福音。本文乃啟發自國際工會運動事件，並由模型的結論之一可得到和現實世界一致的趨勢，雖然事實上遊說行為會比模型來的複雜許多，不過這個模型仍貼近真實世界，可得到相同的觀察。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言....................................................1 第二章 文獻回顧................................................3 第三章 模型設定................................................6 第一節 消費面.............................................6 第二節 生產面.............................................7 第三節 工會...............................................7 第四節 政府...............................................8 第四章 遊說賽局................................................9 第一節 兩廠商遊說政府....................................10 第二節 廠商1和工會1遊說政府..............................12 第三節 廠商2和工會2遊說政府..............................15 第四節 廠商1和工會2遊說政府..............................17 第五節 廠商2和工會1遊說政府..............................21 第六節 廠商1和聯合工會遊說政府...........................25 第七節 廠商2和聯合工會遊說政府...........................28 第八節 小結..............................................31 第五章 結論...................................................33 附錄..........................................................36 參考文獻......................................................74 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091255012 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 工會 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 遊說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 關稅保護 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | 勞資遊說賽局與關稅保護模型 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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