| dc.contributor.advisor | 溫偉任 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 王泉仁 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 王泉仁 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2004 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Sep-2009 18:55:55 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Sep-2009 18:55:55 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Sep-2009 18:55:55 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0092351011 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/36594 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國際經營與貿易研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 92351011 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 93 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | We investigate why a firm hold “Sleeping Patents” in a two period model. Two main results are found by our simulation analysis. First, the larger the depreciation measure of the new patent goods is, the greater the possibility of not exercising new patent is, even if the new patent is still more profitable than the old in one-stage model. Second, the possibilities to exercise the less profitable patent increases if a monopolist can commit its stage-two quantity in stage one. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………... 1 2 The Model…………………………………………………………………..…... 2 3 Optimal Choices of the Monopolist ………………………………………..…... 4 3.1 Selling S1 Goods in Stage 1……………………………………………..……. 5 3.2 Selling S2 Goods in stage 1………………………...……………………..….. 7 3.3 Simulation Results……………………………...………………………..….. 8 4 Optimal Choices under Commitment ………………………………………….. 10 4.1 Selling S1 Goods in Stage 1 under commitment……...………….………..…… 10 4.2 Selling S2 Goods in stage 1 under commitment…………...……………..…….. 12 3.3 Simulation Results………………………………………...………….....…... 13 5 Conclusions…………………………………………………..………………..... 15 References…………………………………………………...………………..…... 15 Appendix 1…………………………………………………..…………………..... 16 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0092351011 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | sleeping patent | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Why does a firm keep "Sleeping Patents"? From the perespective of quality and depreciation | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Arya, A. and B. Mittendorf (2004), “Purchasing Sleeping Patents to Curtail Budget Padding.” | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Economics Letters, 82, 221-226. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Fudenberg, P and J. Tirole (1985), “Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Technology.” Review of Economic Studies, 52, 383-401. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Motta, Mussimo (1993), “Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition.” | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Journal of Industrial Economics, 41, 113-132. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Mussa, M. and Rosen, S. (1978), “Monopoly and Product Quality.” Journal of Economic | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Theory, 18, 301-317. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Kutsoati, E. and J. Zabujnik (2001), “Durable Goods Monopoly, Learning-by-doing and | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Sleeping Patents.” Working Paper WP2001-05, Tufts University. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Reinganum, J. (1983), “Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly.” American | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Economic Review, 73, 741-748 | zh_TW |
