| dc.contributor.advisor | 郭弘卿 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Kuo, Horng-Ching | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 蔡其諭 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Tsai, Chi-Yuh | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 蔡其諭 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Tsai, Chi-Yuh | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2001 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Sep-2009 19:03:20 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Sep-2009 19:03:20 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Sep-2009 19:03:20 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G91NCCU2052012 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/36638 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 會計研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 90 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 近年來，我國上市上櫃公司發行公司債籌措資金的情形蔚為風潮。依據我國目前規定，公司擬發行的公司債須由證期會認可之信用評等機構進行評等，並出具報告。既無信用評等向來重視會計資訊的品質，因此引起了本研究探討資訊揭露是否會降低公司債資金成本的動機。關於資訊揭露與負債資金成本的關係，僅見於Sengupta(1998)的研究，而本研究則試圖以資訊揭露能降低代理成本的角度，探討在國內資本市場中，資訊揭露是否與負債資金成本存在一反向關係。 本研究評估揭露指數方法與之前文獻所採用的的內容分析法不同。本研究是以公司發行公司債前一年度盈餘概估情形評估揭露指數口本研究採用最小平方法迴歸分析(OLS)對測試假說，其結果如下： 1.公司發行公司債之增額負債資金成本與資訊揭露程度存在反向關係。 本研究之實證結果顯示，我國資本市場中，公司資訊揭露程度與公司債之殖利率存有顯著的反向關係。顯示在債券的初級市場中，除了債券的條件與公司體質的好壞以外，資訊揭露也可能成為公司債殖利率的決定因素。 2.若公司債的代理成本較高，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本之反向變動關係會較強。 本研究以公司債轉換條款與擔保條款的有無，區分公司債代理成本的高低。實證結果發現，發行具轉換條款公司債之公司與發行不具轉換條款公司債之公司，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本影響顯著較低。驗證了設有轉換條款或擔保條款之公司債將因為債券本身的代理成本下降，而削弱資訊揭露對公司債殖利率的影響。也就是說若公司債屬於普通公司債或無擔保公司債時，資訊揭露對公司債之殖利率影響更大。因此對於有意發行無擔保公司債或普通公司債的公司而言，資訊揭露將更能降低其負債資金成本。 關鍵字：代理成本，負債資金成本，揭露程度，資訊不對稱 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In recent years, it has become a common phenomenon for listed corporations to issue bonds in Taiwan. Currently in Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Committee (SFC) forbids a corporation to issue bonds unless it has been properly rated by a credit rating agency certified by the SFC. Since the credit rating agency all along have generally placed a great deal of emphasis on the quality of accounting information, this research purports to investigate whether fuller disclosure of accounting information can indeed reduce the cost of debt capital. Only one study by Sengupta (1998) focused on the cost of debt capital, and addressed the issue about the relation between the disclosure level the cost of debt capital, and this study attempts to investigate whether a reverse relationship exists between disclosure and cost of debt capital in Taiwan form the angle of the agency cost. The method to determine the score of the disclosure level applied by this research is different from the content analysis method applied by prior studies. This research uses the earning estimation disclosure made in the year prior to the bond issuance, for measuring the disclosure level. This research applies the QLS model to test the hypotheses. After controlling for other variables, this research concludes that: 1.There may exist a reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level. The result shows that there exists a significant reverse relation between the yield to maturity of bond and the corporate disclosure level. This finding leads us to conclude that because of the ability to lower the agency costs and control the information asymmetry, corporate disclosure level, couple with the terms of the bond and the issuing corporation`s financial conditions, could be one determinant of the yield to maturity of the bond. 2.If the agency cost of the bond is higher, the reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be stronger. In this research, agency costs are considered low when the bond is convertible or secured, or vice versa. The result shows that for the corporation issuing convertible or secured bonds, the impact of the disclosure is less significant. This finding verifies that when the bond is convertible or secured, the reverse relation between the cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be weakened since the agency costs are lower. Therefore, this research draws a conclusion that for corporations that attempt to issue straight bonds or unsecured bonds, the disclosure level plays a more important rule to reduce the cost of debt capital. Key word: Agency Cost, Cost of Debt Capital, Disclosure Level, Information Asymmetry. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論-----1 第一節 研究動機-----1 第二節 研究目的-----6第二章 文獻回顧-----7 第一節 揭露相關文獻回顧-----7 第二節 代理問題、資訊不對稱、與負債資金成本-----16第三章 研究方法-----24 第一節 研究假說-----24 第二節 變數衡量-----26 第三節 樣本選取與資料來源-----34 第四節 研究模式-----37第四章 實證研究結果分析-----40 第一節 敘述性統計分析-----40 第二節 迴歸分析-----49第五章 結論與建議-----57 第一節 研究結論-----57 第二節 研究限制-----59 第三節 研究建議-----60附錄 研究樣本-----62參考文獻-----68表一、我國公司債發行概況-----5表二、TCRI的財務指標-----32表三、資料來源-----36表四、樣本的產業分佈情形-----40表五、樣本之公司債類型與數量-----41表六、揭露指數的驗證-----43表七、各產業樣本的揭露情形-----44表八、敘述統計值-----48表九、皮爾森相關係數-----54表十、多元迴歸模式一實證結果-----55表十一、多元迴歸模式二實證結果-----56 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCU2052012 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 代理成本 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 負債資金成本 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 揭露程度 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 資訊不對稱 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Agency cost | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Cost of debt capital | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Disclosure level | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Information asymmetry | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 揭露程度與負債資金成本之關係 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | The relation between the disclosure level and the cost of debt capital | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
