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題名 Ownership, Protection, and Dividends
作者 徐珮甄
Hsu, Pei-Chen
貢獻者 屠美亞
Twu, Mia
徐珮甄
Hsu, Pei-Chen
關鍵詞 Ownership
Protection
Dividend
日期 2003
上傳時間 18-Sep-2009 19:17:45 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文根據32個國家的資料，觀察是否代理問題嚴重的公司傾向發放較多股利。以股權集中度作為代理問題之代理變數，發現保護好的國家，以股權分散的公司居多，而在保護不好的國家，大部分的公司股權結構十分集中。所以在保護好的國家，主要是股東與經理人之間的代理問題，股權越分散，代理問題越大；而保護不好的國家，其主要的代理問題是介於大股東與小股東之間，股權越集中，代理問題越大。
     
     最後結論得出：在投資人保護好的國家，股利發放與股權集中度呈現正向關係；而在投資人保護差的國家，股利發放與股權集中度則呈現負向關係。代表代理問題嚴重的公司傾向發放較多的股利，由於公司有外部融資的需求，儘管在投資人保護差的國家，公司仍會藉由發放股利來減輕代理問題。
We use a sample of companies from 32 countries around the world to shed light on the relationship between dividend payouts and insider holdings. Schooley and Barney (1994) indicate that negative relationship between dividend payouts and ownership exists before a turning point; once managerial ownership exceeds the turning point, it switches to a positive one. Also, as La Porta et al. (2000) point out, legal protection causes that widely-held firms dominate in a protected environment and closely-held firms in an unprotected one. So, most research addresses a negative relationship between dividend payouts and ownership. It is because their samples are usually composed of firms in a protected environment, where widely-held firms are the normality.
     By contrast, in countries with poor shareholder protection, closely-held companies prevail, and most of their ownership is coupled with control. Dividends thus become a tool for controlling shareholders to signal the moderation of expropriation and to reduce agency costs. Because firms with more concentrated ownership have less cost to pay dividends and need to allay the concerns about expropriation, it implies that more dividends are paid as the insider holdings increase. We surmise a positive relationship between ownership and payouts can be observed in an unprotected environment. The empirical evidence supports our hypothesis.
參考文獻 Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1979, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and `the Bird-in-the-Hand` Fallacy, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 259-270
Carney, Michael and Eric Gedajlovic, 2002, The Coupling of Ownership and Control and the Allocation of Financial Resources: Evidence from Hong Kong, Journal of Management Studies, 39(1), 123-146
Chen, Carl R. and Thomas L. Steiner, 1999, Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy, The Financial Review, 34(1), 119-136
Claessens, Stjin, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang, 2000, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 81-112
Dittmar, Amy, Jan Mahrt-Smith, and Henri Servaes,, 2003, International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 111-133
D`Souza, Juliet and Atul K. Szxena, 1999, Agency Cost, Market Risk, Investment Opportunities and Dividend Policy - An International Perspective, Managerial Finance, 25(6), 35-43
Dutta, Amitabh S., 1999, Managerial Ownership, Dividend and Debt Policy in the US Banking Industry, Managerial Finance, 25(6), 57-68
Easterbrook, Frank H., 1984, Agency-cost Explanations of Dividends, The American Economic Review, 74(4), 650-659
Faccio, Mara and Larry H. P. Lang, 2002, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 365-395
Faccio, Mara, Larry H. P. Lang, and Leslie Young, 2001, Dividends and Expropriation, The American Economic Review, 91(1), 54-78
Fenn, George W. and Nellie Liang, 2001, Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives, Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 45-72
Gugler, Klaus, 2003, Corporate Governance, Dividend Payout Policy, and the Interrelation between Dividends, R&D, and Capital Investment, Journal of Banking &Finance, 27, 1297-1321
Gugler, Klaus and B. Burcin Yurtoglu, 2003, Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-out Policy in Germany, European Economic Review, 47, 731-758
Holder, Mark E., Frederick W. Langrehr, and J. Lawrence Hexter, 1998, Dividend Policy Determinants: An Investigation of the Influences of Stakeholder Theory, Financial Management, 27(3), 73-82
Jensen, Gerald R., Donald P. Solberg and Thomas S. Zorn, 1992, Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt and Dividend Policies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27(2), 247-263
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360
John, K. and J. Williams, 1985, Dividends, Dilutions, and Taxes: A Signaling Equilibrium, Journal of Finance, 40, 1053-1070
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate Ownership around the World, Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 2000, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World, Journal of Finance, 55(1), 1-33
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 2000, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3-27
Lloyd, William P., Jahera, John S., Jr., Page, Daniel E, 1985, Agency Costs and Dividend Payout Ratios, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 24(3), 19-29
Miller, M. and K. Rock, 1985, "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information", Journal of Finance, 40, 1031-1051
Rozeff, Michael S., 1982, Growth, Beta, and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Rations, Journal of Financial Research, 249-259
Schooley, Diane K., and L. Dwayne Barney Jr., 1994, Using Dividend Policy and Managerial Ownership to Reduce Agency Costs, Journal of Financial Research, 17(3), 363-373
Twu, Mia, 2003, Why Firms Pay Dividends and Issue Stocks Simultaneously: Ownership Concentration and Dividend Signaling Costs, Working Paper, National Chengchi University
Vogt, Stephen C., 1994, The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship: Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Firm, Financial Management, 23(2), 3-20
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
91357017
92
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091357017
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 屠美亞zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Twu, Miaen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 徐珮甄zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Hsu, Pei-Chenen_US
dc.creator (作者) 徐珮甄zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Hsu, Pei-Chenen_US
dc.date (日期) 2003en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Sep-2009 19:17:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Sep-2009 19:17:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Sep-2009 19:17:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0091357017en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/36687-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 91357017zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 92zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文根據32個國家的資料，觀察是否代理問題嚴重的公司傾向發放較多股利。以股權集中度作為代理問題之代理變數，發現保護好的國家，以股權分散的公司居多，而在保護不好的國家，大部分的公司股權結構十分集中。所以在保護好的國家，主要是股東與經理人之間的代理問題，股權越分散，代理問題越大；而保護不好的國家，其主要的代理問題是介於大股東與小股東之間，股權越集中，代理問題越大。
     
     最後結論得出：在投資人保護好的國家，股利發放與股權集中度呈現正向關係；而在投資人保護差的國家，股利發放與股權集中度則呈現負向關係。代表代理問題嚴重的公司傾向發放較多的股利，由於公司有外部融資的需求，儘管在投資人保護差的國家，公司仍會藉由發放股利來減輕代理問題。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) We use a sample of companies from 32 countries around the world to shed light on the relationship between dividend payouts and insider holdings. Schooley and Barney (1994) indicate that negative relationship between dividend payouts and ownership exists before a turning point; once managerial ownership exceeds the turning point, it switches to a positive one. Also, as La Porta et al. (2000) point out, legal protection causes that widely-held firms dominate in a protected environment and closely-held firms in an unprotected one. So, most research addresses a negative relationship between dividend payouts and ownership. It is because their samples are usually composed of firms in a protected environment, where widely-held firms are the normality.
     By contrast, in countries with poor shareholder protection, closely-held companies prevail, and most of their ownership is coupled with control. Dividends thus become a tool for controlling shareholders to signal the moderation of expropriation and to reduce agency costs. Because firms with more concentrated ownership have less cost to pay dividends and need to allay the concerns about expropriation, it implies that more dividends are paid as the insider holdings increase. We surmise a positive relationship between ownership and payouts can be observed in an unprotected environment. The empirical evidence supports our hypothesis.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents ABSTRACT III
     LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES IV
     CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
     1.1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 1
     1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 7
     1.3. PROCEDURE OF THE STUDY 9
     CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 10
     2.1. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND INVESTOR PROTECTION 10
     2.2. DIVIDEND POLICY AND INVESTOR PROTECTION 13
     2.3. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND DIVIDEND POLICY 15
     2.4. SUMMARY 23
     CHAPTER3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 24
     3.1. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA 24
     3.1.1. Research Period and Data Resources 24
     3.1.2. Countries Selection 25
     3.1.3. Corporations Selection 26
     3.2. DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 27
     3.2.1. Dependent Variables 27
     3.2.2. Explanatory Variables 28
     3.2.3. Controlling Variables 31
     3.3 METHODOLOGY 36
     3.3.1. Wilcoxon Rank–Sum Test 36
     3.3.2. T-test: Testing Differences between Two Means 37
     3.3.3. Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient 38
     3.3.4. Regression Model 39
     CHAPTER4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 41
     4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 41
     4.1.1. Dividend Payout Ratios 45
     4.1.2. Insider Holdings 46
     4.2. CORRELATION 47
     4.2.1. Overall Correlation 47
     4.2.2. Correlation of Separate Groups 49
     4.3. PANEL DATA REGRESSION 52
     4.4. ROBUSTNESS 57
     4.4.1. Random Effects Regression for Separate Groups 57
     4.4.2. Random Effects Regression excluding U.S. and U.K. 60
     CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 62
     5.1. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS 62
     5.2. FURTHER RESEARCH 63
     REFERENCES 65		zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091357017en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Ownershipen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Protectionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Dividenden_US
dc.title (題名) Ownership, Protection, and Dividendszh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1979, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and `the Bird-in-the-Hand` Fallacy, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 259-270zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Carney, Michael and Eric Gedajlovic, 2002, The Coupling of Ownership and Control and the Allocation of Financial Resources: Evidence from Hong Kong, Journal of Management Studies, 39(1), 123-146zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chen, Carl R. and Thomas L. Steiner, 1999, Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy, The Financial Review, 34(1), 119-136zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Claessens, Stjin, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang, 2000, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 81-112zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dittmar, Amy, Jan Mahrt-Smith, and Henri Servaes,, 2003, International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 111-133zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) D`Souza, Juliet and Atul K. Szxena, 1999, Agency Cost, Market Risk, Investment Opportunities and Dividend Policy - An International Perspective, Managerial Finance, 25(6), 35-43zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dutta, Amitabh S., 1999, Managerial Ownership, Dividend and Debt Policy in the US Banking Industry, Managerial Finance, 25(6), 57-68zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Easterbrook, Frank H., 1984, Agency-cost Explanations of Dividends, The American Economic Review, 74(4), 650-659zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Faccio, Mara and Larry H. P. Lang, 2002, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 365-395zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Faccio, Mara, Larry H. P. Lang, and Leslie Young, 2001, Dividends and Expropriation, The American Economic Review, 91(1), 54-78zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Fenn, George W. and Nellie Liang, 2001, Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives, Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 45-72zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gugler, Klaus, 2003, Corporate Governance, Dividend Payout Policy, and the Interrelation between Dividends, R&D, and Capital Investment, Journal of Banking &Finance, 27, 1297-1321zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gugler, Klaus and B. Burcin Yurtoglu, 2003, Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-out Policy in Germany, European Economic Review, 47, 731-758zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Holder, Mark E., Frederick W. Langrehr, and J. Lawrence Hexter, 1998, Dividend Policy Determinants: An Investigation of the Influences of Stakeholder Theory, Financial Management, 27(3), 73-82zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Jensen, Gerald R., Donald P. Solberg and Thomas S. Zorn, 1992, Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt and Dividend Policies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27(2), 247-263zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) John, K. and J. Williams, 1985, Dividends, Dilutions, and Taxes: A Signaling Equilibrium, Journal of Finance, 40, 1053-1070zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate Ownership around the World, Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 2000, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World, Journal of Finance, 55(1), 1-33zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 2000, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3-27zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lloyd, William P., Jahera, John S., Jr., Page, Daniel E, 1985, Agency Costs and Dividend Payout Ratios, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 24(3), 19-29zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Miller, M. and K. Rock, 1985, "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information", Journal of Finance, 40, 1031-1051zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Rozeff, Michael S., 1982, Growth, Beta, and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Rations, Journal of Financial Research, 249-259zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Schooley, Diane K., and L. Dwayne Barney Jr., 1994, Using Dividend Policy and Managerial Ownership to Reduce Agency Costs, Journal of Financial Research, 17(3), 363-373zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Twu, Mia, 2003, Why Firms Pay Dividends and Issue Stocks Simultaneously: Ownership Concentration and Dividend Signaling Costs, Working Paper, National Chengchi Universityzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Vogt, Stephen C., 1994, The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship: Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Firm, Financial Management, 23(2), 3-20zh_TW