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題名 台灣家族企業的經營績效：時間序列分析
Performance of Family Controlled Firms in Taiwan: A Time Series Analysis
作者 司宇文
Sylvain, Senechal
貢獻者 傅冶天
Fu, Ted
司宇文
Sylvain, Senechal
關鍵詞 台灣家族企業
日期 2008
上傳時間 18-Sep-2009 20:29:43 (UTC+8)
摘要 台灣家族企業的經營績效
This paper focuses on the performance and characteristics of Taiwan Stock Exchange listed family firms. It shows that the trend between 1997 and 2007 is for more firms to be widely held but that family firms retain their importance as a fraction of total asset. Family firms are found to be on average smaller, older and have a better return on equity than widely held firm. The better performance holds when controlling in a multivariate analysis for firm size, age and China investment.
Family firm return on equity is not shown to present the curvilinearity of entrenchment – alignment – entrenchment associated in other studies with increasing levels of control. In a time series analysis from 1997 to 2007, there is no evidence that the better performance of family firms is a temporal effect. The ROA and ROE of family firms is better when controlling for year, asset and debt/asset.
參考文獻 Anderson, R., and D. Reeb. “Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms.” Administrive Science Quartely 49.2 (2004): 209-237.
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=590305
Anderson, R., S. Mansi, and D. Reeb. “Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt.” Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2003): 263-285.
Anderson, R., and D. Reeb. “Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500.” The Journal of Finance 58 (2003): 1301-28.
Anderson, R., and D. Reeb. “Who monitors the family?” American University and University of Alabama, working paper (2003).
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=369620
Carney, M., and E. Gedajlovic. “Strategic innovation and the administrative heritage of East Asian family business groups.” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 20 (2003): 5-26.
Chin, C.-L., G. Kleinman, P. Lee, and M.-F. Lin. “Corporate ownership structure and accuracy and bias of mandatory earnings forecast: Evidence from Taiwan.” Journal of International Accounting Research 5.2 (2006): 41-62.
Chung, C.-N. “Markets, culture and institutions: The emergence of large business groups in Taiwan, 1950s-1970s.” Jounal of Management Studies 38 (2001): 719-745.
Chung, K. H., and S. W. Pruitt. “A simple approxiamtion of Tobin’s q.” Financial Management 23.3 (1994): 70-74.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang. “Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholding.” Journal of Finance 57.6 (2002): 2741-2771.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang. “Expropriation of minority shareholders: Evidence from East Asia.” World Bank, Working paper no. 2088 (1999).
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=620647
Davis, J., F. D. Schoorman, and L. Donaldson. “toward a stewardship theory of management.” Academy of Management Review 22 (1997): 20-47.
Fama E., and M. Jensen. “Separation of ownership and control.” Journal of Law and Economics 26 (1983): 301-325.
Filatotchev, I., Y.-C. Lien, and J. Piesse. “Corporate governance and performance in publicly listed, family-controlled firms: Evidence from Taiwan.” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 22 (2005): 257-283.
Gomez-Mejia, L., M. Nunez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez. “The role of family ties in agency contracts.” Academy of Management Journal 44 (2001): 81-95.
Hannah, Leslie. “The ‘Divorce’ of ownership from control from 1900 onwards: Re-calibrating imagined global trends.” Business History 49 (2007): 404-438.
Huang, H.-H., P.-C. Hsu, H. A. Khan, and Y.-L. Yu. “Does the appointment of an outside director increase firm value? Evidence from Taiwan.” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 44.3 (2008): 66-80.
Jenssen, J. I., T. Randoy, and C. S. Mishra. “The effect of founding family influence on firm value and corporate governance.” Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 12.3 (2001): 235-259.
LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. “Corporate ownership around the world.” Journal of Finance 54 (1999): 471-517.
Sraer, D., and D. Thesmar. “Performance and behavior of family firms: Evidence from the French stock market.” Journal of the European Economic Association 5.4 (2007): 709-751.
Yeh, Y.-H., C.-E. Ko, and Y.-H. Su. “Ultimate control and expropriation of minority shareholders: New evidence from Taiwan.” Academia Economic Papers 31.3 (2003): 263-299.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營管理碩士班(IMBA)
95933044
97
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0959330442
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 傅冶天zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Fu, Teden_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 司宇文zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Sylvain, Senechalen_US
dc.creator (作者) 司宇文zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Sylvain, Senechalen_US
dc.date (日期) 2008en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Sep-2009 20:29:43 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Sep-2009 20:29:43 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Sep-2009 20:29:43 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0959330442en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37023-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國際經營管理碩士班(IMBA)zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 95933044zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 97zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 台灣家族企業的經營績效zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper focuses on the performance and characteristics of Taiwan Stock Exchange listed family firms. It shows that the trend between 1997 and 2007 is for more firms to be widely held but that family firms retain their importance as a fraction of total asset. Family firms are found to be on average smaller, older and have a better return on equity than widely held firm. The better performance holds when controlling in a multivariate analysis for firm size, age and China investment.
Family firm return on equity is not shown to present the curvilinearity of entrenchment – alignment – entrenchment associated in other studies with increasing levels of control. In a time series analysis from 1997 to 2007, there is no evidence that the better performance of family firms is a temporal effect. The ROA and ROE of family firms is better when controlling for year, asset and debt/asset.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………1
TAIWAN FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS…………………………………………4
TAIWAN FAMILY FIRMS…………………………………………………………10
RESEARCH METHOD ………………………………………………………………12
DATA DESCRIPTION ……………………………………………………………12
PRESENCE OF FAMILY FIRMS AND EVOLUTION …………………………13
FAMILY FIRM CHARACTERISTICS……………………………………………18
CROSS-SECTIONAL MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS……………………………23
TEMPORAL EFFECT ANALYSIS………………………………………………26
CONCLUSIONS ………………………………………………………………………30
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………33

List of Tables
TABLE 1: S. CLAESSENS ET AL. (2000) CORRELATION BETWEEN AGE AND THE SIZE OF CONTROL STAKES IN EAST ASIAN CORPORATIONS………………………………………………5
TABLE 2: S. CLAESSENS ET AL. (2000), CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL AND COMPANY SIZE…………………………………………………………………………………………………………6
TABLE 3: CLAESSENS ET AL. (2000), HOW CONCENTRATED IS FAMILY CONTROL? …………………………………………………………………………………………………9
TABLE 4: PRESENCE OF FAMILY FIRMS IN TSE LISTED COMPANIES…………………………14
TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE FAMILY OWNERSHIP IN FIRMS PRESENT FROM 1997 TO 2007……17
TABLE 6: CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY FIRMS USING 10% CONTROL AS CUT-OFF………19
TABLE 7: CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY FIRMS USING 20% CONTROL AS CUT-OFF………22
TABLE 8: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION OF ROE……………………………………………………24
TABLE 9: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION OF OTHER PERFORMANCE INDICATORS…………24
TABLE 10: ROE AND ROA TIME PANELS REGRESSION WITH 10% CUT-OFF FOR FAMILY FIRMS………………………………………………………………………………………………………28
TABLE 11: ROE AND ROA TIME PANELS REGRESSION WITH 20% CUT-OFF FOR FAMILY FIRMS………………………………………………………………………………………………………28
FIGURE 1: YEH ET AL. (2003), EXAMPLE OF JITUAN QIYE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE…………7
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF FAMILY FIRMS AMONG TSE LISTED FIRMS……………………17		zh_TW
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0959330442en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 台灣家族企業zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 台灣家族企業的經營績效：時間序列分析zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Performance of Family Controlled Firms in Taiwan: A Time Series Analysisen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anderson, R., and D. Reeb. “Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms.” Administrive Science Quartely 49.2 (2004): 209-237.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=590305zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anderson, R., S. Mansi, and D. Reeb. “Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt.” Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2003): 263-285.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anderson, R., and D. Reeb. “Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500.” The Journal of Finance 58 (2003): 1301-28.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anderson, R., and D. Reeb. “Who monitors the family?” American University and University of Alabama, working paper (2003).zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=369620zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Carney, M., and E. Gedajlovic. “Strategic innovation and the administrative heritage of East Asian family business groups.” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 20 (2003): 5-26.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chin, C.-L., G. Kleinman, P. Lee, and M.-F. Lin. “Corporate ownership structure and accuracy and bias of mandatory earnings forecast: Evidence from Taiwan.” Journal of International Accounting Research 5.2 (2006): 41-62.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chung, C.-N. “Markets, culture and institutions: The emergence of large business groups in Taiwan, 1950s-1970s.” Jounal of Management Studies 38 (2001): 719-745.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chung, K. H., and S. W. Pruitt. “A simple approxiamtion of Tobin’s q.” Financial Management 23.3 (1994): 70-74.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang. “Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholding.” Journal of Finance 57.6 (2002): 2741-2771.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang. “Expropriation of minority shareholders: Evidence from East Asia.” World Bank, Working paper no. 2088 (1999).zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=620647zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Davis, J., F. D. Schoorman, and L. Donaldson. “toward a stewardship theory of management.” Academy of Management Review 22 (1997): 20-47.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Fama E., and M. Jensen. “Separation of ownership and control.” Journal of Law and Economics 26 (1983): 301-325.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Filatotchev, I., Y.-C. Lien, and J. Piesse. “Corporate governance and performance in publicly listed, family-controlled firms: Evidence from Taiwan.” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 22 (2005): 257-283.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gomez-Mejia, L., M. Nunez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez. “The role of family ties in agency contracts.” Academy of Management Journal 44 (2001): 81-95.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hannah, Leslie. “The ‘Divorce’ of ownership from control from 1900 onwards: Re-calibrating imagined global trends.” Business History 49 (2007): 404-438.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Huang, H.-H., P.-C. Hsu, H. A. Khan, and Y.-L. Yu. “Does the appointment of an outside director increase firm value? Evidence from Taiwan.” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 44.3 (2008): 66-80.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Jenssen, J. I., T. Randoy, and C. S. Mishra. “The effect of founding family influence on firm value and corporate governance.” Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 12.3 (2001): 235-259.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. “Corporate ownership around the world.” Journal of Finance 54 (1999): 471-517.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Sraer, D., and D. Thesmar. “Performance and behavior of family firms: Evidence from the French stock market.” Journal of the European Economic Association 5.4 (2007): 709-751.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Yeh, Y.-H., C.-E. Ko, and Y.-H. Su. “Ultimate control and expropriation of minority shareholders: New evidence from Taiwan.” Academia Economic Papers 31.3 (2003): 263-299.zh_TW