Publications-Theses

題名 鐵路事業公司化資產結構與組織變革之探討
A STUDY OF ASSET STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN THE CORPORATIZATION OF THE TAIWAN RAILWAY ADMINISTRATION
作者 曾偉豪
Tseng,Wei-Hao
貢獻者 張金鶚
Chang,Chin-Oh
曾偉豪
Tseng,Wei-Hao
關鍵詞 公司化
交易成本
資產結構
組織變革
鐵路局
Corporatization
Transaction Cost
Asset structure
Organizational Change
Taiwan Railway Administration
日期 2007
上傳時間 19-Sep-2009 13:17:17 (UTC+8)
摘要 本論文研究軸心,首先探討鐵路事業公司化政策執行過程,並在相關文獻中,歸納公司化政策面臨資產閒置與組織僵化等問題,導致債務與虧損問題日趨嚴重。其中,資產閒置問題,除了受到相關法令限制而無法提升效益之外,對於政府投資鐵路立體化建設而衍生組織龐大與交易成本問題,目前尚未從預算執行面進行檢討與分析。此外,對於行政部門之間及鐵路局內部,因組織僵化而產生公共事務代理問題,依舊阻礙公司化政策執行腳步。故本研究藉由以上問題之歸納,進一步從資產面建構兼顧運輸本業及債務處理之政策架構。<br>國營事業改革的方法之一,即採用公司化方式完成民營化的階段性目標。在法學上觀點,公司化後國家仍擔負各種不同的監督與管理義務,尤其在行政任務完全私化的過程之中,國家仍具各項主管法令之執行角色。因此「國家保留」之各項責任,不管是在公司化的任何過程之中,國家均具有憲法位階所賦予之「影響義務」。然而國家如何決定公營事業公司化的基本政策?而公司化之後的國家管制行為,如何在法律規範與擔保義務之間,建立適度的決策方法?依循代理理論與自償評估方法,可發現「臺鐵公司化基本方案」窒礙難行的主要關鍵為政策不確定性與道德危險問題之應如何妥善解決;而經重新檢討補貼負擔之基本對策後,對鐵路事業民營化之條件提升及相關權利義務之界定確有助益。<br>其次,對於為人詬病的資產閒置與無力更新等問題,政府積極投入鐵路設備更新計畫,以鐵路地下化建設為例,單一建設計畫就預算規劃角度分析,因涉預算制度差異與政治協商等問題,在預算執行中不僅惡化資金缺口並已危及鐵路事業財務體質。本文依據交易成本理論之基礎,分析臺北都會區鐵路地下化建設因涉及公務與事業預算所造成的實施成本擴大問題;並就資金缺口之弭平,提出補貼策略的修正建議。惟資金缺口背後隱含資訊不對稱而產生錯誤決策的政治層面問題,致使實施成本逐年擴增。此觀察引發本文從交易成本政治學觀點進行分析的研究旨趣,並就預算規劃衍生的代理關係,分從資訊不對稱、代理問題、交易成本、認知差距、權益配置與誘因設計等方向進行課題之論述與回應,以探索經濟層面所無法釐清的關鍵決策因素。由此,本文論證了預算制度的差異預留了政治行動者的利益競逐與衝突空間,從而惡化了預算執行與配置的失能無效,也顯現了預算治理制度的重建與策略再造建議的提出,將有效減低鐵路地下化交易成本與政策失靈之風險。<br>最後,我國鐵路事業改革方法,係採用公司化方式完成民營化政策的階段性目標。在公司化之前,鐵路局除了負擔公共運輸責任及龐大現金債務,並管理為數眾多的各項資產,但卻受限鐵路法及國有公用土地不得處分收益等因素,遲遲未能有效開發利用。因此,本文首先探討公司化政策執行過程,在不同政策架構之下,將足以影響鐵路公司資產的持有狀況,續利用資產目標函數進而歸納資產全數移交政府接管將可有助於清理歷史債務並挹注補貼負擔等資金缺口問題。換言之,過去部分文獻雖然論證以「車路合一」模式推動公司化政策仍有累積盈餘之潛力,但本文利用自償率分析資產結構與法令規範之間關係,則推論認為「車路分離」模式更能客觀建構資產、債務、補貼負擔之財政架構,甚至創造較為豐厚的資產報酬,以避免鐵路事業公司化政策轉變成為政府永無止境的財政負擔。
The axis of this thesis is about the corporatization policy of the railway business corporation. By collection of related literature, this thesis induces that the corporatization policy is facing the idle asset and ossified organization problems and aggravates the debt and loss situation. Among those, the idle asset problem, caused by restriction of related law to enhance efficiency and invest building construction, the mammoth organization and transaction cost problems have not yet been examined and analyzed from the viewpoint of budget implementation. In addition, the public affair agency problem engendered by the ossified organization inside the railways administration and related administrative administrations still hinders the process of the implementation of the corporatization policy. Hence, by summing up the questions above, this research constructs the policy structure considering both the transportation business and resolution of debt problem from the asset perspective.<br>Corporatization is one of the ways toward privatization in restructuring state owned enterprises. From legal perspective, government should still supervise and monitor the privatized enterprises. Especially, government should carry out regulation regime to protect stakeholders’ benefits during the corporatizating process. In other words, it requires a total state commitment endowed by the Constitution with influence duties. How to manage restructuring processes strategically in ways that will further economic democracy, efficiency and social progress? What are the obstacles which hinder the establishment of a state commitment in corporatization? Drawing perspectives from agency theory and refining self-liquidating evaluation, the author underscores the uncertainties and moral hazards in Taiwan Railway Administration’s corporatization and suggests how government can implement successful strategies to meet goals required by the privatization laws and build up a well-organized subsidy system to reinforce her influential role and regulatory capacity.<br>The second, the government positively invests the railway equipment to renew the problem of asset idle which denounced regarding the manner. Inspired by the perspectives from transaction cost economics and politics, this paper demystifies the hierarchy and authority relationships between supervising and operating agencies in the budgetary process. We unbound the blanket category of transaction costs into empirically verifiable elements including incomplete and asymmetric information, agency problems, transaction costs, stakeholder redistribution, ideology, incentives, etc. We identify political hazards as crucial determinants of the choice of political governance in budget execution and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards. The agencies in our analysis incur costs of providing a comprehensive budget design and tax revenue allocation, and are faced with a trade?off between providing incentives and reducing ex post costly enforcement. Extending transaction cost politics into the budgetary domains suggests that transaction costs in current political market did not lead project’s political stakeholders to move toward more efficient outcomes and result in significant enforcement costs. Framing the issue as a budgetary administration and project delivery problem, this paper highlights the challenges in using separation of power panels when the goals of the panels are uncodifiable. This paper concludes offering ideas for institutional engineering and a special subsidy is proposed. However, reformulating self-liquidating analysis and carefully justifying the authority and obligation relationships between agencies should play important roles in reducing transaction costs, ensuring enforceability of agreements, and achieving more efficient budgeting outcomes.<br>The final, corporatization is one of the ways toward privatization in restructuring state owned enterprises. In form of Corporatization, even though railway administration authority shoulders public transportation responsibility and huge debt, multitudinous real estate had not been effectively developed because of the limitation from railway act and on the liquidation of public facilities and state-owned land. This article first discourses that different formats of corporation policy affect assets’ efficient utilization, and uses market structure theory to set up asset objective function and learn that hand over all assets to government could clean up historical debts and enhances social welfare and assets’ utilization. In other words, although some literatures maintained that “infrastructure model” have potential of earnings accumulation, based on the use of Self-liquidation ratio to identify the relationship between asset structure and government regulation, the induction of “road model” could restructure asset/debt and subsidy. It even creates a richer property return to avoid railway operation being government‘s unlimited financial burden.
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描述 博士
國立政治大學
地政研究所
912575041
96
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0912575041
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 張金鶚zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chang,Chin-Ohen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 曾偉豪zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Tseng,Wei-Haoen_US
dc.creator (作者) 曾偉豪zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Tseng,Wei-Haoen_US
dc.date (日期) 2007en_US
dc.date.accessioned 19-Sep-2009 13:17:17 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 19-Sep-2009 13:17:17 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 19-Sep-2009 13:17:17 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0912575041en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37365-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 地政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 912575041zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 96zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文研究軸心,首先探討鐵路事業公司化政策執行過程,並在相關文獻中,歸納公司化政策面臨資產閒置與組織僵化等問題,導致債務與虧損問題日趨嚴重。其中,資產閒置問題,除了受到相關法令限制而無法提升效益之外,對於政府投資鐵路立體化建設而衍生組織龐大與交易成本問題,目前尚未從預算執行面進行檢討與分析。此外,對於行政部門之間及鐵路局內部,因組織僵化而產生公共事務代理問題,依舊阻礙公司化政策執行腳步。故本研究藉由以上問題之歸納,進一步從資產面建構兼顧運輸本業及債務處理之政策架構。<br>國營事業改革的方法之一,即採用公司化方式完成民營化的階段性目標。在法學上觀點,公司化後國家仍擔負各種不同的監督與管理義務,尤其在行政任務完全私化的過程之中,國家仍具各項主管法令之執行角色。因此「國家保留」之各項責任,不管是在公司化的任何過程之中,國家均具有憲法位階所賦予之「影響義務」。然而國家如何決定公營事業公司化的基本政策?而公司化之後的國家管制行為,如何在法律規範與擔保義務之間,建立適度的決策方法?依循代理理論與自償評估方法,可發現「臺鐵公司化基本方案」窒礙難行的主要關鍵為政策不確定性與道德危險問題之應如何妥善解決;而經重新檢討補貼負擔之基本對策後,對鐵路事業民營化之條件提升及相關權利義務之界定確有助益。<br>其次,對於為人詬病的資產閒置與無力更新等問題,政府積極投入鐵路設備更新計畫,以鐵路地下化建設為例,單一建設計畫就預算規劃角度分析,因涉預算制度差異與政治協商等問題,在預算執行中不僅惡化資金缺口並已危及鐵路事業財務體質。本文依據交易成本理論之基礎,分析臺北都會區鐵路地下化建設因涉及公務與事業預算所造成的實施成本擴大問題;並就資金缺口之弭平,提出補貼策略的修正建議。惟資金缺口背後隱含資訊不對稱而產生錯誤決策的政治層面問題,致使實施成本逐年擴增。此觀察引發本文從交易成本政治學觀點進行分析的研究旨趣,並就預算規劃衍生的代理關係,分從資訊不對稱、代理問題、交易成本、認知差距、權益配置與誘因設計等方向進行課題之論述與回應,以探索經濟層面所無法釐清的關鍵決策因素。由此,本文論證了預算制度的差異預留了政治行動者的利益競逐與衝突空間,從而惡化了預算執行與配置的失能無效,也顯現了預算治理制度的重建與策略再造建議的提出,將有效減低鐵路地下化交易成本與政策失靈之風險。<br>最後,我國鐵路事業改革方法,係採用公司化方式完成民營化政策的階段性目標。在公司化之前,鐵路局除了負擔公共運輸責任及龐大現金債務,並管理為數眾多的各項資產,但卻受限鐵路法及國有公用土地不得處分收益等因素,遲遲未能有效開發利用。因此,本文首先探討公司化政策執行過程,在不同政策架構之下,將足以影響鐵路公司資產的持有狀況,續利用資產目標函數進而歸納資產全數移交政府接管將可有助於清理歷史債務並挹注補貼負擔等資金缺口問題。換言之,過去部分文獻雖然論證以「車路合一」模式推動公司化政策仍有累積盈餘之潛力,但本文利用自償率分析資產結構與法令規範之間關係,則推論認為「車路分離」模式更能客觀建構資產、債務、補貼負擔之財政架構,甚至創造較為豐厚的資產報酬,以避免鐵路事業公司化政策轉變成為政府永無止境的財政負擔。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The axis of this thesis is about the corporatization policy of the railway business corporation. By collection of related literature, this thesis induces that the corporatization policy is facing the idle asset and ossified organization problems and aggravates the debt and loss situation. Among those, the idle asset problem, caused by restriction of related law to enhance efficiency and invest building construction, the mammoth organization and transaction cost problems have not yet been examined and analyzed from the viewpoint of budget implementation. In addition, the public affair agency problem engendered by the ossified organization inside the railways administration and related administrative administrations still hinders the process of the implementation of the corporatization policy. Hence, by summing up the questions above, this research constructs the policy structure considering both the transportation business and resolution of debt problem from the asset perspective.<br>Corporatization is one of the ways toward privatization in restructuring state owned enterprises. From legal perspective, government should still supervise and monitor the privatized enterprises. Especially, government should carry out regulation regime to protect stakeholders’ benefits during the corporatizating process. In other words, it requires a total state commitment endowed by the Constitution with influence duties. How to manage restructuring processes strategically in ways that will further economic democracy, efficiency and social progress? What are the obstacles which hinder the establishment of a state commitment in corporatization? Drawing perspectives from agency theory and refining self-liquidating evaluation, the author underscores the uncertainties and moral hazards in Taiwan Railway Administration’s corporatization and suggests how government can implement successful strategies to meet goals required by the privatization laws and build up a well-organized subsidy system to reinforce her influential role and regulatory capacity.<br>The second, the government positively invests the railway equipment to renew the problem of asset idle which denounced regarding the manner. Inspired by the perspectives from transaction cost economics and politics, this paper demystifies the hierarchy and authority relationships between supervising and operating agencies in the budgetary process. We unbound the blanket category of transaction costs into empirically verifiable elements including incomplete and asymmetric information, agency problems, transaction costs, stakeholder redistribution, ideology, incentives, etc. We identify political hazards as crucial determinants of the choice of political governance in budget execution and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards. The agencies in our analysis incur costs of providing a comprehensive budget design and tax revenue allocation, and are faced with a trade?off between providing incentives and reducing ex post costly enforcement. Extending transaction cost politics into the budgetary domains suggests that transaction costs in current political market did not lead project’s political stakeholders to move toward more efficient outcomes and result in significant enforcement costs. Framing the issue as a budgetary administration and project delivery problem, this paper highlights the challenges in using separation of power panels when the goals of the panels are uncodifiable. This paper concludes offering ideas for institutional engineering and a special subsidy is proposed. However, reformulating self-liquidating analysis and carefully justifying the authority and obligation relationships between agencies should play important roles in reducing transaction costs, ensuring enforceability of agreements, and achieving more efficient budgeting outcomes.<br>The final, corporatization is one of the ways toward privatization in restructuring state owned enterprises. In form of Corporatization, even though railway administration authority shoulders public transportation responsibility and huge debt, multitudinous real estate had not been effectively developed because of the limitation from railway act and on the liquidation of public facilities and state-owned land. This article first discourses that different formats of corporation policy affect assets’ efficient utilization, and uses market structure theory to set up asset objective function and learn that hand over all assets to government could clean up historical debts and enhances social welfare and assets’ utilization. In other words, although some literatures maintained that “infrastructure model” have potential of earnings accumulation, based on the use of Self-liquidation ratio to identify the relationship between asset structure and government regulation, the induction of “road model” could restructure asset/debt and subsidy. It even creates a richer property return to avoid railway operation being government‘s unlimited financial burden.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機………………………………………1
第二節 研究問題與目的………………………………4
第三節 研究方法…………….……………………….. 8
第四節 研究架構與流程……..……………………….11


第二章 理論與文獻回顧
第一節 公司化基本理念…..……….…………………15
第二節 政府角色與責任界定………….……………..18
第三節 政策發展歷程………………….……………..25
第四節 交易成本與代理問題……….………………..30
第五節 國營事業轉型之理論回顧……………...……34
第六節 組織變革的原因與意涵……………………...36
第七節 小結…………………………………...………43


第三章 公司化制度變遷之背景分析
第一節 基本特性與共同問題……..………………….45
第二節 鐵路事業之切割與調整…………...…………47
第三節 我國鐵路事業改革之背景分析……………...50
第四節 小結……………..………………………..…...53


第四章 公司化政策之代理分析
第一節 前言…..……………………………………….55
第二節 公司化代理問題及其對國家影響及管制義務之衝擊.……….……………………………….57
第三節 預期效益與政策分析………………….……..64
第四節 小結……………..………………………..…...72

第五章 鐵路立體化建設與公司化政策之關聯性分析
第一節 前言……………..……….……………………75
第二節 交易成本政治學於政策與預算規劃之應用...78
第三節 鐵路地下化政策及預算規劃的基本課題…...83
第四節 補貼機制與策略再造………………………...95
第五節 小結………………………………………….102

第六章 資產結構與與組織變革之探討
第一節 前言.……………………..…………………..104
第二節 資產結構的理論推導…….…………………105
第三節 公司化政策之比較分析…………………….111
第四節 車路分離政策價值的實踐…………….……115
第五節 組織變革與案例分析……..………..………120
第六節 小結….……….……………………………..126


第七章 結論與建議…………..…………………………...128


參考文獻…………………………………………………….133
圖目錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖…………...………………………….….13
圖5-1 鐵路地下化預算規劃及執行架構圖……………….83

表目錄
表2-1 政府角色與責任界定彙整表…………….…………24
表2-2 公司化政策與研究文獻彙整表…………………….29
表2-3 政策架構與問題歸納……………………………….33
表2-4 鐵路事業轉型與組織變革之分析彙整表………….38
表4-1 代理問題與解決方案……………………………….63
表4-2 公司化前、後預期效益分析……………………….65
表4-3 公司化政策之代理分析與策略檢討彙整表……….71
表5-1 政府投資與公司化政策之交易成本政治學分析表.82
表5-2 政策及預算規劃基本課題之彙整表……………….85
表5-3 鐵路地下化建設之策略再造方案………………….97
表6-1 三種公司化方案償債能力彙整分析表……………114
表6-2 車路分離政策價值彙整表…………………………119
表6-3 組織變革與資源整合分析表..………………….…122
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dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0912575041en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司化zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 交易成本zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資產結構zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 組織變革zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 鐵路局zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporatizationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Transaction Costen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Asset structureen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Organizational Changeen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Taiwan Railway Administrationen_US
dc.title (題名) 鐵路事業公司化資產結構與組織變革之探討zh_TW
dc.title (題名) A STUDY OF ASSET STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN THE CORPORATIZATION OF THE TAIWAN RAILWAY ADMINISTRATIONen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
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