| dc.contributor.advisor | 賴景昌 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 范志萍 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 范志萍 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2008 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 19-Sep-2009 13:41:38 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 19-Sep-2009 13:41:38 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 19-Sep-2009 13:41:38 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0892585011 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37416 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 博士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 經濟研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 89258501 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 97 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Kydland and Prescott (1977)及Barro and Gordon (1983)提出權衡性的貨幣政策伴隨著通貨膨脹傾向問題的產生，之後陸續有許多學者提出解決之道。如將貨幣政策委託給保守的央行官員執行、政府與央行官員簽訂績效契約、央行官員訂定目標通貨膨脹水準、提升央行的獨立性及增加貨幣政策的透明度等。這些解決通貨膨脹傾向的方法，不外乎從經濟或是政治結構、制度、貨幣當局的偏好及訊息等方面著手。因此，本文分別從結構面、訊息面及制度面探討如何降低通貨膨脹傾向。首先，從結構面著手，考慮名目工資僵固性的問題。藉由工資調整指數的增加，一方面使短期Phillips曲線的斜率變陡，改變了通貨膨脹與失業兩者的抵換關係，打消央行官員採行權衡性的貨幣政策提高產出的念頭；另一方面則降低任用保守央行官員的意願，非保守央行官員將選擇較高的通貨膨脹政策。因此工資調整指數是否可以減少通貨膨脹傾向，將決定於這兩種影響的相對大小。再者，從訊息面思考，民眾藉由央行官員宣示的目標產出水準的訊息，進行訊息提煉，修正通貨膨脹的預期，得到供給面訊息的透明度相對較低時，民眾會委託愈保守的獨立央行官員來制訂貨幣政策，進而改善通貨膨脹傾向問題的結論。最後，從制度面作考量，同時考慮工會、貨幣當局與財政當局三種角色的模型，結果發現：當我們任用愈保守的央行官員執行貨幣政策時，其對通貨膨脹傾向產生的影響有二：一是愈保守的央行官員會降低民眾通貨膨脹的預期，且選擇較低的通貨膨脹率政策，其對通貨膨脹傾向的影響是直接且為負向的，這管道與Rogoff (1985)相同；另一則是愈保守的央行官員在執行貨幣政策時，工會就可以利用央行官員保守的特性，致力追求高工資加碼，而不必擔心物價的上漲，所以選擇較高的工資加碼，為因應工會的決定，央行官員在考慮財政當局的決策行為下，將選擇較高的通貨膨脹率來回應之，其對通貨膨脹傾向的影響是間接且為正向的，這管道與Rogoff (1985)截然不同。就是因為多考慮了工會的角色，讓民眾作出現與Rogoff (1985)不同方向的通貨膨脹預期，因此，我們才會得到愈保守的央行官員執行貨幣政策，其帶來的通貨膨脹傾向影響決定於這兩種效果的相對大小的結論。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1第二章 工資調整指數、央行獨立性與權衡性的貨幣政策 8第一節 前言 8第二節 理論模型 10第三節 結論 24第三章 訊息提煉、央行獨立性與權衡性的貨幣政策 25第一節 前言 25第二節 理論模型 28第三節 結論 43第四章 工會下的權衡性貨幣政策與財政政策 45第一節 前言 45第二節 理論模型 48第三節 結論 64第五章 結論 66參考文獻 71附錄 75 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0892585011 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 時序不一致性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 中央銀行獨立性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 通貨膨脹傾向 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | 時序不一致性的三個議題 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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