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題名 租稅逃漏相關論文集
作者 黃則強
貢獻者 翁堃嵐
黃則強
關鍵詞 核課期間
租稅逃漏
從價稅
從量稅
日期 2008
上傳時間 19-Sep-2009 13:46:18 (UTC+8)
摘要 本論文集包括三個部分,首先探討核課期間對逃漏稅行為的影響。實務上稅法都有核課期間的規定,因此本文將核課期間納入考慮並探討其存在對納稅人逃漏稅行為的影響,並對現行稅法規定提供政策建議。研究顯示:(1) 忽略核課期間的考慮會高估逃漏稅的程度,因而會低估政府的預期稅收;此一結果似乎可用來解答為何實務上觀察到的租稅逃漏稅程度遠比理論模型所預測的輕微這個困惑。(2) 與傳統租稅逃漏模型相較,考慮核課期間後,納稅人的預期效用水準較低。有鑑於目前所得稅法中納稅人面對的核課期間都相同,我們建議一種租稅計畫:只要納稅人願意繳納一筆固定的款項,即可在報稅之後由稽徵機關立即核定其稅額,不再面對嗣後的核課期間;倘若納稅人不願意則面對既定的核課期間。文中並求導最適的租稅計畫,以及分析該計畫相對傳統稅制具有柏瑞圖增進的性質。
本論文第二部分旨在分析間接稅逃漏的情況下,從價稅與從量稅之優劣。在課徵從量稅時,納稅人選擇低報數量的方式以達逃漏稅的目的。課徵從價稅時,納稅人除了可以低報產量以外,也可以低報價格來逃漏間接稅。因此,從價稅與從量稅之間除了課稅方式的差異之外,也有租稅逃漏行為的差異,而這個差異將使得傳統文獻所得到的結果有所改變。本文分析發現,考慮租稅逃漏之後: (1) 在完全競爭市場之下,從量稅優於從價稅。此一結果與傳統理論認為兩者等價的觀念截然不同。 (2) 在獨占市場之下,從價稅不一定優於從量稅。這個結果也與傳統理論認為從價稅優於從量稅的結果有所差異。
本論第三部分旨在探討在類似分類所得稅之Dual Income Tax制度下,考量不同來源所得其逃漏稅之難易程度差異,稅率應如何訂定,方符合公平與效率的原則。主要的結果為:從水平公平的觀點來說,應對較容易逃漏的所得應課以較高稅率,對較不容易逃漏的所得應課以較低之稅率。但從效率的角度來看,則反之。
參考文獻 Allingham, M. G. and A. Sandmo (1972), “Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis”, Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.
Anderson, S., A. Palma and B. Kreider (2001), “The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition,” Journal of Public Economics, 81, 231-251.
Andreoni, J., B. Erard and J. Feinstein (1998), “Tax compliance”, Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 818-860.
Boadway, R. (2004), “The dual income tax system- an overview”, CESifo Dice Report, Journal for Institutional Comparisons, 2, 3-8.
Boadway, R. (2005), “Income tax reform for a globalized world: The case for a dual income tax”, Journal of Asian Economics, 16, 910-927.
Christian, K. and D. D. Martin (2007), “A growth oriented Dual Income Tax”, International Tax and Public Finance, 14, 191-221.
Chu, C.Y. (1990), “Plea bargaining with the IRS”, Journal of Public Economics, 41, 319-333.
Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1993), “Tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 50, 261-275.
Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1995), “Uncertainty and the optimal taxation: In defense of commodity taxes”, Journal of Public Economics, 56, 291-310.
Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1999), “Uncertainty, commitment, and optimal taxation”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1 , 51-70.
Delipalla, S. and M. Keen (1992), “The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition,” Journal of Public Economics, 49, 351-361.
Denicolò, V. and M. Matteuzzi (2000), “Specific and ad valorem taxation in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies.” International Tax and Public Finance, 7, 335-342.
Dierickx, I., C. Matutes and D. Neven (1988), “Indirect taxation and Cournot Equilibrium.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6 , 385-399.
Eckhard, J. and P. Wolfgang (1999), “Tax evasion, tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination: the case of interest taxation in Europe”, The Economic Journal, 109, 93-101.
Gordon, J. (1989), “Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion”, European Economic Review, 33, 797-805.
Kay, J. A. and M. J. Keen (1983), “How should commodities be taxed? –Market structure, product heterogeneity and the optimal structure of commodity taxes”, European Economic Review, 23, 339-358.
Kim, Y. (2003), “Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model of tax evasion”, Journal of Public Economic, 87, 1591-1616.
Lee, K. (2001), “Tax evasion and self-insurance”, Journal of Public Economics, 81, 73-81.
Myles, G.D. (1995), Public Economics, Cambridge University Press.
Myles, G.D. (1996), “Imperfect Competition and the Optimal Combination of ad valorem and Specific Taxation,” International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 29-44.
Nielsen, N. C. (1980), “Opsparing, velfærd og samfundsøkonomi (saving, welfare and the national economy)”, Arnold Busck.
Nielsen, S. B. and P. B. Sørensen (1997), “On the optimality of the Nordic system of dual income taxation”, Journal of Public Economics, 63, 311-329.
Skeath, S. and G. Trandel (1994), “ A Pareto comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments,” Journal of Public Economics, 53, 53-71.
Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (2002), “Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration” in Handbook of Public Economics, 3, 22, North-Holland, Amsterdam: Auerbach and M. Feldstein.
Slemrod, J. (2007), “Cheating ourselves: the economics of tax evasion,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, 25-48.
Sørensen, P. B. (1994), “From the global income tax to the dual income tax: recent reform in the Nordic countries”, International Tax and Public Finance, 1, 57-79.
Suits, D. B. and R. A. Musgrave (1953), “Ad valorem and unit taxes compared”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 67, 598-604.
Ueng, K. L. and C. C. Yang (2001), “Plea bargaining with the IRS: extensions and further results”, Journal of Public Economics, 81, 83-98.
Wolfgang, E. and G. Bernd (2005), “Dual income taxation in EU member countries”, CESifo Dice Report, 1, 41-47.
Yitzhaki, S. (1974), “A note on Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis”, Journal of Public Economics, 3, 201-202.
Yitzhaki, S. (1987), “On the excess burden of tax evasion”, Public Finance Quarterly, 15, 123-137.
Wicksell, K. (1896), Finanztheoretische Untersuchunfen, nebst Darstellung und Kritik des Steuerwesens Scwedens. Jena: Gustav Fisher. (translated as “Taxation in the monopoly case,” in R.A. Musgrave and C.S. Shoup (eds.)), Readings in the Economics of Taxation (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959).
描述 博士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
91255506
97
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091255506
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 翁堃嵐zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃則強zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 黃則強zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2008en_US
dc.date.accessioned 19-Sep-2009 13:46:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 19-Sep-2009 13:46:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 19-Sep-2009 13:46:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0091255506en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37420-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 91255506zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 97zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文集包括三個部分,首先探討核課期間對逃漏稅行為的影響。實務上稅法都有核課期間的規定,因此本文將核課期間納入考慮並探討其存在對納稅人逃漏稅行為的影響,並對現行稅法規定提供政策建議。研究顯示:(1) 忽略核課期間的考慮會高估逃漏稅的程度,因而會低估政府的預期稅收;此一結果似乎可用來解答為何實務上觀察到的租稅逃漏稅程度遠比理論模型所預測的輕微這個困惑。(2) 與傳統租稅逃漏模型相較,考慮核課期間後,納稅人的預期效用水準較低。有鑑於目前所得稅法中納稅人面對的核課期間都相同,我們建議一種租稅計畫:只要納稅人願意繳納一筆固定的款項,即可在報稅之後由稽徵機關立即核定其稅額,不再面對嗣後的核課期間;倘若納稅人不願意則面對既定的核課期間。文中並求導最適的租稅計畫,以及分析該計畫相對傳統稅制具有柏瑞圖增進的性質。
本論文第二部分旨在分析間接稅逃漏的情況下,從價稅與從量稅之優劣。在課徵從量稅時,納稅人選擇低報數量的方式以達逃漏稅的目的。課徵從價稅時,納稅人除了可以低報產量以外,也可以低報價格來逃漏間接稅。因此,從價稅與從量稅之間除了課稅方式的差異之外,也有租稅逃漏行為的差異,而這個差異將使得傳統文獻所得到的結果有所改變。本文分析發現,考慮租稅逃漏之後: (1) 在完全競爭市場之下,從量稅優於從價稅。此一結果與傳統理論認為兩者等價的觀念截然不同。 (2) 在獨占市場之下,從價稅不一定優於從量稅。這個結果也與傳統理論認為從價稅優於從量稅的結果有所差異。
本論第三部分旨在探討在類似分類所得稅之Dual Income Tax制度下,考量不同來源所得其逃漏稅之難易程度差異,稅率應如何訂定,方符合公平與效率的原則。主要的結果為:從水平公平的觀點來說,應對較容易逃漏的所得應課以較高稅率,對較不容易逃漏的所得應課以較低之稅率。但從效率的角度來看,則反之。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章、 緒論 3
第二章、 核課期間與租稅逃漏
2.1 前言 5
2.2 基本模型 7
2.2.1 傳統的租稅逃漏模型 8
2.2.2 考慮核課期間的租稅逃漏模型 9
2.3 福利效果之比較 11
2.4 政策建議 15
2.4.1 最適核課期間 16
2.4.2 柏瑞圖增進的機制設計 17
2.4.3 數值分析 24
2.5 本章結論 27
附表 28
第三章、從價稅與從量稅之比較—考慮租稅逃漏的情況
3.1 前言 40
3.2 完全競爭廠商課徵從量稅時的租稅逃漏模型 42
3.3 完全競爭廠商課徵從價稅時的租稅逃漏模型 42
3.4 從量稅與從價稅的比較 44
3.5 獨占市場的分析 47
3.6 本章結論 50
第四章、論Dual Income Tax的稅率結構—考慮不同所得逃漏稅的難易程度
4.1 前言 51
4.2 單一稅率制度下之模型分析 55
4.3 DIT制度下的稅率結構 59
4.4 本章結論 63
第五章、結論 65
參考文獻 66
zh_TW
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091255506en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 核課期間zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅逃漏zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 從價稅zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 從量稅zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 租稅逃漏相關論文集zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Allingham, M. G. and A. Sandmo (1972), “Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis”, Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anderson, S., A. Palma and B. Kreider (2001), “The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition,” Journal of Public Economics, 81, 231-251.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Andreoni, J., B. Erard and J. Feinstein (1998), “Tax compliance”, Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 818-860.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Boadway, R. (2004), “The dual income tax system- an overview”, CESifo Dice Report, Journal for Institutional Comparisons, 2, 3-8.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Boadway, R. (2005), “Income tax reform for a globalized world: The case for a dual income tax”, Journal of Asian Economics, 16, 910-927.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Christian, K. and D. D. Martin (2007), “A growth oriented Dual Income Tax”, International Tax and Public Finance, 14, 191-221.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chu, C.Y. (1990), “Plea bargaining with the IRS”, Journal of Public Economics, 41, 319-333.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1993), “Tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 50, 261-275.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1995), “Uncertainty and the optimal taxation: In defense of commodity taxes”, Journal of Public Economics, 56, 291-310.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1999), “Uncertainty, commitment, and optimal taxation”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1 , 51-70.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Delipalla, S. and M. Keen (1992), “The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition,” Journal of Public Economics, 49, 351-361.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Denicolò, V. and M. Matteuzzi (2000), “Specific and ad valorem taxation in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies.” International Tax and Public Finance, 7, 335-342.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dierickx, I., C. Matutes and D. Neven (1988), “Indirect taxation and Cournot Equilibrium.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6 , 385-399.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Eckhard, J. and P. Wolfgang (1999), “Tax evasion, tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination: the case of interest taxation in Europe”, The Economic Journal, 109, 93-101.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gordon, J. (1989), “Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion”, European Economic Review, 33, 797-805.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kay, J. A. and M. J. Keen (1983), “How should commodities be taxed? –Market structure, product heterogeneity and the optimal structure of commodity taxes”, European Economic Review, 23, 339-358.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kim, Y. (2003), “Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model of tax evasion”, Journal of Public Economic, 87, 1591-1616.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lee, K. (2001), “Tax evasion and self-insurance”, Journal of Public Economics, 81, 73-81.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Myles, G.D. (1995), Public Economics, Cambridge University Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Myles, G.D. (1996), “Imperfect Competition and the Optimal Combination of ad valorem and Specific Taxation,” International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 29-44.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Nielsen, N. C. (1980), “Opsparing, velfærd og samfundsøkonomi (saving, welfare and the national economy)”, Arnold Busck.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Nielsen, S. B. and P. B. Sørensen (1997), “On the optimality of the Nordic system of dual income taxation”, Journal of Public Economics, 63, 311-329.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Skeath, S. and G. Trandel (1994), “ A Pareto comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments,” Journal of Public Economics, 53, 53-71.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (2002), “Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration” in Handbook of Public Economics, 3, 22, North-Holland, Amsterdam: Auerbach and M. Feldstein.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Slemrod, J. (2007), “Cheating ourselves: the economics of tax evasion,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, 25-48.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Sørensen, P. B. (1994), “From the global income tax to the dual income tax: recent reform in the Nordic countries”, International Tax and Public Finance, 1, 57-79.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Suits, D. B. and R. A. Musgrave (1953), “Ad valorem and unit taxes compared”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 67, 598-604.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ueng, K. L. and C. C. Yang (2001), “Plea bargaining with the IRS: extensions and further results”, Journal of Public Economics, 81, 83-98.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Wolfgang, E. and G. Bernd (2005), “Dual income taxation in EU member countries”, CESifo Dice Report, 1, 41-47.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Yitzhaki, S. (1974), “A note on Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis”, Journal of Public Economics, 3, 201-202.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Yitzhaki, S. (1987), “On the excess burden of tax evasion”, Public Finance Quarterly, 15, 123-137.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Wicksell, K. (1896), Finanztheoretische Untersuchunfen, nebst Darstellung und Kritik des Steuerwesens Scwedens. Jena: Gustav Fisher. (translated as “Taxation in the monopoly case,” in R.A. Musgrave and C.S. Shoup (eds.)), Readings in the Economics of Taxation (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959).zh_TW