Publications-Theses

題名 學術期刊禁止一稿多投之經濟分析
An economic analysis of the prohibition against multiple submission
作者 林士揚
Lin, Shih-Yang
貢獻者 周德宇<br>林忠正
林士揚
Lin, Shih-Yang
關鍵詞 學術期刊
一稿多投
審稿延遲
academic journal
multiple submission
refereeing delay
日期 2008
上傳時間 19-Sep-2009 13:47:20 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究主旨在於探討學術期刊普遍禁止一稿多投的現象與其成因。文章中將使用考慮出版者以及學術投稿者的兩階段模型來刻劃投稿、審查,以及投稿規則決策的過程。

初步模型將呈現當投稿者無明顯時間偏好以及各期刊審稿延遲時間一致時,一稿一投或是一稿多投規則對於整體學術產業而言並無差異。其後本文第四章將導入差異審稿延遲所帶來的影響並得出擁有較高聲望的期刊為避免在一稿多投制度下次級期刊利用較快的審查速度奪取較高品質的文章因而將不願意開放一稿多投的結論。

本研究後部分章節將分析各投稿規則對於整體產業福利水準之影響並得到以下結論。一稿一投制度不見得會為整體產業帶來福利增進,但由於投稿者與出版者之間利益不一致性的存在終將難以使得一稿多投成為最後的均衡投稿規則。
This paper attempts to explore “why the journals in most academic fields like economics refuse to accept Multiple-submission (or simultaneous submission).” In this study, we use a two-stage model involving publishers and academic authors to illustrate the process of submitting, reviewing, and the submission policy determining.

The first model shows an indifference result for the whole academic industry to adopt a Sole-submission or a Multiple-submission rule when authors’ utility is time-irrelevant and the reviewing delays of both journals are identical. We latter introduce the effect of differentiated refereeing delay of journals on the authors’ submission behavior in chapter 4 and show that a journal with higher prestige will refuse to adopt multiple submission rule to avoid the possibility that a faster reviewing process may give the less prestigious journal ability to “steal” high quality papers from the more prestigious one under multiple-submission.

The welfare is further studied in the later sections. We calculate the overall welfare of the industry and find that even thought the current sole-submission system is not necessarily welfare superior than multiple-submission, it seems that the rigidity of the submission rule is hard to be removed due to the conflicting interests between authors and publishers.
參考文獻 Azar, Ofer H. (2006), “The Academic Review Process: How Can We Make It More Efficient?” American Economist, 50(1), 37-50
Coe, R. K., and I. Weinstock (1967), “Editorial Policies of Major Economic Journals,” Southern Economic Journal, 7(4), 37-43
Coupé, Tom (2004), “What do we Know about Ourselves? On the Economics of Economics,” Kyklos, 57, No. 2, 197-215
Ferber, Marianne A. and Michelle Teiman (1980), “Are Women Economists at a Disadvantage in Publishing Journal Articles?” Eastern Economics Journal, 6 , 189-193
Gordon, R. A. (1980), “The Advantage of a Simple System of Optional Published Refereeing,” Speculations in Science and Technology, 3, 607-609
Ng, Yew-Kwang (1991), “Polish and Publish: The Economics of Simultaneous Submission,” Seminar Paper, Department of Economics, Monash University
Peters, Douglas P. and Stephen J. Ceci (1982), “Peer-Review Practices of Psychological Journals: The Fate of Published Articles, Submitted Again,” The Behavioral and Brain Science, 5(2), 187-195
Pressman, Steven (1994), “Simultaneous Multiple Journal Submission: The Case Against,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 53(3), 316-333
Szenberg, Michael (1994), “Dissemination Scholarly Output: The Case for Elimination the Exclusivity of Journal Submission,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 53, 303-315
Yohe, Gary W. (1980), “Current Publication Lags in Economics Journals,” Journal of Economics Literature, 18, 1050-1055
Ziman, John. (1968), Public Knowledge: The Social Dimension of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge IIP.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
96255013
97
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255013
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 周德宇<br>林忠正zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林士揚zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin, Shih-Yangen_US
dc.creator (作者) 林士揚zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lin, Shih-Yangen_US
dc.date (日期) 2008en_US
dc.date.accessioned 19-Sep-2009 13:47:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 19-Sep-2009 13:47:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 19-Sep-2009 13:47:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0096255013en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37428-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 96255013zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 97zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究主旨在於探討學術期刊普遍禁止一稿多投的現象與其成因。文章中將使用考慮出版者以及學術投稿者的兩階段模型來刻劃投稿、審查,以及投稿規則決策的過程。

初步模型將呈現當投稿者無明顯時間偏好以及各期刊審稿延遲時間一致時,一稿一投或是一稿多投規則對於整體學術產業而言並無差異。其後本文第四章將導入差異審稿延遲所帶來的影響並得出擁有較高聲望的期刊為避免在一稿多投制度下次級期刊利用較快的審查速度奪取較高品質的文章因而將不願意開放一稿多投的結論。

本研究後部分章節將分析各投稿規則對於整體產業福利水準之影響並得到以下結論。一稿一投制度不見得會為整體產業帶來福利增進,但由於投稿者與出版者之間利益不一致性的存在終將難以使得一稿多投成為最後的均衡投稿規則。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper attempts to explore “why the journals in most academic fields like economics refuse to accept Multiple-submission (or simultaneous submission).” In this study, we use a two-stage model involving publishers and academic authors to illustrate the process of submitting, reviewing, and the submission policy determining.

The first model shows an indifference result for the whole academic industry to adopt a Sole-submission or a Multiple-submission rule when authors’ utility is time-irrelevant and the reviewing delays of both journals are identical. We latter introduce the effect of differentiated refereeing delay of journals on the authors’ submission behavior in chapter 4 and show that a journal with higher prestige will refuse to adopt multiple submission rule to avoid the possibility that a faster reviewing process may give the less prestigious journal ability to “steal” high quality papers from the more prestigious one under multiple-submission.

The welfare is further studied in the later sections. We calculate the overall welfare of the industry and find that even thought the current sole-submission system is not necessarily welfare superior than multiple-submission, it seems that the rigidity of the submission rule is hard to be removed due to the conflicting interests between authors and publishers.
en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction
1.1 Research background 1
1.2 Relative literature 2

2. The basic model
2.1 Assumptions 4
2.1.1 The utility of author
2.1.2 The utility of publishers
2.2 The equilibrium without time-preference and refereeing delay difference 6
2.2.1 The decisions of authors
2.2.2 The decisions of journals
2.3 Welfare analysis 11

3. Time preference submission model
3.1 The equilibrium with time preference 14
3.1.1 The decisions of authors
3.1.2 The decisions of journals
3.2 Welfare analysis 23

4. Asymmetric reply submission model
4.1 Specific assumptions 28
4.2 Equilibrium with Asymmetric reply time 30
4.2.1 The decisions of authors
4.2.2 The decisions of journals
4.2.3 Welfare Analysis 41

5. Conclusion and further extensions
5.1 Conclusion 46
5.2 Further extensions 47

Reference

Appendix
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dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255013en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 學術期刊zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 一稿多投zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 審稿延遲zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) academic journalen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) multiple submissionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) refereeing delayen_US
dc.title (題名) 學術期刊禁止一稿多投之經濟分析zh_TW
dc.title (題名) An economic analysis of the prohibition against multiple submissionen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Azar, Ofer H. (2006), “The Academic Review Process: How Can We Make It More Efficient?” American Economist, 50(1), 37-50zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Coe, R. K., and I. Weinstock (1967), “Editorial Policies of Major Economic Journals,” Southern Economic Journal, 7(4), 37-43zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Coupé, Tom (2004), “What do we Know about Ourselves? On the Economics of Economics,” Kyklos, 57, No. 2, 197-215zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ferber, Marianne A. and Michelle Teiman (1980), “Are Women Economists at a Disadvantage in Publishing Journal Articles?” Eastern Economics Journal, 6 , 189-193zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gordon, R. A. (1980), “The Advantage of a Simple System of Optional Published Refereeing,” Speculations in Science and Technology, 3, 607-609zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ng, Yew-Kwang (1991), “Polish and Publish: The Economics of Simultaneous Submission,” Seminar Paper, Department of Economics, Monash Universityzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Peters, Douglas P. and Stephen J. Ceci (1982), “Peer-Review Practices of Psychological Journals: The Fate of Published Articles, Submitted Again,” The Behavioral and Brain Science, 5(2), 187-195zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Pressman, Steven (1994), “Simultaneous Multiple Journal Submission: The Case Against,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 53(3), 316-333zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Szenberg, Michael (1994), “Dissemination Scholarly Output: The Case for Elimination the Exclusivity of Journal Submission,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 53, 303-315zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Yohe, Gary W. (1980), “Current Publication Lags in Economics Journals,” Journal of Economics Literature, 18, 1050-1055zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ziman, John. (1968), Public Knowledge: The Social Dimension of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge IIP.zh_TW