| dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 陳盈竹 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 陳盈竹 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2008 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 19-Sep-2009 13:48:25 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 19-Sep-2009 13:48:25 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 19-Sep-2009 13:48:25 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0962550021 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37436 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 96255002 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 97 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 在這多元化社會，資訊及科技的高度發展除了帶給全民便利以及更充足完整的資訊外，卻也帶來了侵權與犯罪。本文根據王智賢與楊敦雅 (2008) 一文做進一步的延伸，採用 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 的菜單式拍賣模型，探討當智慧財產權等無形資產為外國正版商所擁有時，外國正版廠商、國內仿冒商，以及國內部份消費者所組成的團體，三者的利益分配相互衝突時，本國政府將如何制定國內的仿冒查緝率。此外，我們將模型設定了外生變數查緝率下限以盼能更貼近現實社會，透過本研究我們可以發現在增加查緝率下限後，雙方共同遊說之下均衡查緝率可能由原先的零大幅提高至仿冒商品剛好可以生存的門檻，並且在均衡時只會有一方願意提供給本國政府政治獻金。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In this multiple society, although highly developing information and technology not only make all the people more convenient but also earn more sufficient information, it has brought the tort and crime as well. In this essay, we extend the essay written by Jue-Shyan Wang & Tun-Ya Yang (2008) and adapt a simple framework based on the Menu-auction Model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Discussing about how a domestic government decides optimal enforcement rate of counterfeit when intellectual property is held by a foreign company and foreign company、domestic consumers and domestic illegally copied company had a conflict between their benefit distribution. Furthermore, we are going to add a lower bound of enforcement rate as an external variable to close reality. After this study, we found that under the lobby of both foreign company and domestic consumers, the equilibrium of enforcement rate may change from zero to the entry barrier; what’s more, only one of the sides will be willing to pay political contributions to domestic government under equilibrium. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 一、前言......................................1二、基本模型..................................8三、政治獻金遊說下本國政府的最適查緝率決策......16四、結論.....................................32附錄.........................................34參考文獻.....................................40 | zh_TW |
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| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0962550021 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 仿冒查緝率 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 智慧財產權 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 遊說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | the optimal enforcement rate of counterfeit | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | intellectual property | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | lobby | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 最適仿冒品查緝率的制定 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Establishment of the optimal enforcement rate of counterfeit | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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