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題名 商品期貨市場從眾行為之研究-凱因斯選美競賽之應用
Herding behavior in commodity futures market-the application of Keynes beauty contests
作者 黃琬君
貢獻者 胡聯國
黃琬君
關鍵詞 從眾行為
選美競賽
資訊不對稱
理性預期
日期 2009
上傳時間 8-Dec-2010 01:52:18 (UTC+8)
摘要 本篇主要是依循Allen, Morris and Shin(2003) 的文章脈絡,利用建立一個帶有雜質的(即受供給面衝擊的)理性預期模型,使期貨價格無法完全反映期貨市場中的真實訊息,並將重覆預期的概念套入商品期貨的價格模型當中,討論是否期貨價格會受公開訊息的影響較大,而較不重視貨市場真實情形的私人訊息,進而了解商品期貨市場中的參與者過度倚賴公開訊息做決策時,可能會造成期貨價格偏離其基本價值的情形。
     
      由模型推導結果我們歸納出與Allen, Morris and Shin(2003) 一致的結論-當市場中的參與者對市場的平均作預期,藉以猜測其他人的想法時,其預期受市場公開訊息的影響程度可能較深,反而受較貼近市場真實價格的私人訊息影響較小,產生使市場被公開訊息支配的情形。
  This paper primary follows the methods derived by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2003), using a contaminated, or with a supply shock, rational expectation model to build the linear relationship for commodity futures price. In this way, the price could not fully reflect the true information in commodity futures price. Besides, we also use the notion of iterated expectation in our futures price model, and try to figure out whether the price is influences mainly by the public information, but no the true information in the market. Thus, we can imply form this that when participants excessively depend on public information to make decisions, it may cause the futures price to deviate from its true information and thus its fundamental value.
     
       From the derivation of our model, we can have identical conclusion as Allen, Morris and Shin (2003) put it-when participants in the market doing expectations about the market’s average to guess other participants’ opinions, their expectation may be influenced mostly by public information in the market but not the true, or private, information they possess, which may result in futures prices dominating by the public information.
參考文獻 1. Allen, F., Morris, S. and Shin, H. S. (2003). "Beauty
contests, bubbles and iterated expectations in asset markets", Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No 1406.
2. Allen, F., S. Morris and H. S. Shin (2003). “Public Signals and Private Information Acquisition in Asset Prices,” in progress.
3. Ausubel, L. (1990). “Partially-Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium in a Competitive Economy,” Journal of Economic Theory 50, 93-126.
4. Banerjee, A., 1992, A simple model of herd behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 197, p 724-748.
5. Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch, 1992, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, Journal of Political Economy, 100, p 992-1026.
6. Brown, D. and R. Jennings (1989). “On Technical Analysis,” Review of Financial Studies 2, 527-551.
7. Diamond, D. and R. Verrecchia (1981). “Information Aggregation in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy,” Journal of Financial Economics 9,221-235.
8. Froot, K., D. Scharfstein and J. Stein (1992). “Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation," Journal of Finance 47, 1461-1484.
9. Grossman, S. (1976). “On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets where Traders Have Diverse Information,” Journal of Finance 31, 573-585.
10. Grossman, S. J., 1981, An introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information, Review of Economic Studies 48, 541-559.
11. Grossman, S. J. and Joseph Stiglitz, 1980, On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets, American Economic Review 70, 393-408.
12. Grundy, B. and M. McNichols (1989). “Trade and Revelation of Information through Prices and Direct Disclosure,” Review of Financial Studies 2, 495-526.
13. Harrison M. and D. Kreps (1978). “Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics XCII, 323-336.
14. He, H. and J. Wang (1995). “Differential Information and Dynamic Behavior of Stock Trading Volume,” Review of Financial Studies 8, 914-972.
15. Hellwig, M. (1980). “On the Aggregation of Information in Competitive Markets,”Journal of Economic Theory 22, 477-498.
16. Kim, O. and R. Verrecchia (1991). “Market Reaction to Anticipated Announcements,” Journal of Financial Economics 30, 273-309.
17. Morris, S., H. S. Shin and A. Postlewaite (1995). “Depth of Knowledge and the Effect of Higher Order Uncertainty,” Economic Theory 6, 453-467.
18. Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2002). “The Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, 92, 1521-1534
19. Scharfstein, D. and J. Stein, 1990, Herding behavior and investment, American Economic Review, 80 , p465-479.
20. Townsend, R. (1978) “Market Anticipations, Rational Expectations and Bayesian Analysis” International Economic Review, 19, 481-94.
21. Townsend, R. (1983). “Forecasting the Forecasts of Others,” Journal of Political Economy 91, 546-588.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易研究所
97351013
98
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097351013
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 胡聯國zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃琬君zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 黃琬君zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2009en_US
dc.date.accessioned 8-Dec-2010 01:52:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 8-Dec-2010 01:52:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 8-Dec-2010 01:52:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0097351013en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/48881-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 97351013zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 98zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本篇主要是依循Allen, Morris and Shin(2003) 的文章脈絡,利用建立一個帶有雜質的(即受供給面衝擊的)理性預期模型,使期貨價格無法完全反映期貨市場中的真實訊息,並將重覆預期的概念套入商品期貨的價格模型當中,討論是否期貨價格會受公開訊息的影響較大,而較不重視貨市場真實情形的私人訊息,進而了解商品期貨市場中的參與者過度倚賴公開訊息做決策時,可能會造成期貨價格偏離其基本價值的情形。
     
      由模型推導結果我們歸納出與Allen, Morris and Shin(2003) 一致的結論-當市場中的參與者對市場的平均作預期,藉以猜測其他人的想法時,其預期受市場公開訊息的影響程度可能較深,反而受較貼近市場真實價格的私人訊息影響較小,產生使市場被公開訊息支配的情形。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要)   This paper primary follows the methods derived by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2003), using a contaminated, or with a supply shock, rational expectation model to build the linear relationship for commodity futures price. In this way, the price could not fully reflect the true information in commodity futures price. Besides, we also use the notion of iterated expectation in our futures price model, and try to figure out whether the price is influences mainly by the public information, but no the true information in the market. Thus, we can imply form this that when participants excessively depend on public information to make decisions, it may cause the futures price to deviate from its true information and thus its fundamental value.
     
       From the derivation of our model, we can have identical conclusion as Allen, Morris and Shin (2003) put it-when participants in the market doing expectations about the market’s average to guess other participants’ opinions, their expectation may be influenced mostly by public information in the market but not the true, or private, information they possess, which may result in futures prices dominating by the public information.
en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
       第一節 研究背景 1
       第二節 研究動機與目的 2
     第二章 理論基礎與文獻回顧 4
       第一節 從眾行為相關之文獻探討 4
       第二節 訊息不對稱下的理性預期模型 5
       第三節 異質性預期 8
     第三章 模型建立與推論 9
      第一節 模型概念 9
       第二節 模型設定 12
       第三節 模型推導與分析 16
     第四章 結論與建議 31
     附錄 33
     參考文獻 34
zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097351013en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 從眾行為zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 選美競賽zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊不對稱zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 理性預期zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 商品期貨市場從眾行為之研究-凱因斯選美競賽之應用zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Herding behavior in commodity futures market-the application of Keynes beauty contestsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. Allen, F., Morris, S. and Shin, H. S. (2003). "Beautyzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) contests, bubbles and iterated expectations in asset markets", Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No 1406.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 2. Allen, F., S. Morris and H. S. Shin (2003). “Public Signals and Private Information Acquisition in Asset Prices,” in progress.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 3. Ausubel, L. (1990). “Partially-Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium in a Competitive Economy,” Journal of Economic Theory 50, 93-126.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 4. Banerjee, A., 1992, A simple model of herd behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 197, p 724-748.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 5. Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch, 1992, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, Journal of Political Economy, 100, p 992-1026.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 6. Brown, D. and R. Jennings (1989). “On Technical Analysis,” Review of Financial Studies 2, 527-551.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 7. Diamond, D. and R. Verrecchia (1981). “Information Aggregation in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy,” Journal of Financial Economics 9,221-235.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 8. Froot, K., D. Scharfstein and J. Stein (1992). “Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation," Journal of Finance 47, 1461-1484.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 9. Grossman, S. (1976). “On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets where Traders Have Diverse Information,” Journal of Finance 31, 573-585.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 10. Grossman, S. J., 1981, An introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information, Review of Economic Studies 48, 541-559.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 11. Grossman, S. J. and Joseph Stiglitz, 1980, On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets, American Economic Review 70, 393-408.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 12. Grundy, B. and M. McNichols (1989). “Trade and Revelation of Information through Prices and Direct Disclosure,” Review of Financial Studies 2, 495-526.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 13. Harrison M. and D. Kreps (1978). “Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics XCII, 323-336.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 14. He, H. and J. Wang (1995). “Differential Information and Dynamic Behavior of Stock Trading Volume,” Review of Financial Studies 8, 914-972.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 15. Hellwig, M. (1980). “On the Aggregation of Information in Competitive Markets,”Journal of Economic Theory 22, 477-498.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 16. Kim, O. and R. Verrecchia (1991). “Market Reaction to Anticipated Announcements,” Journal of Financial Economics 30, 273-309.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 17. Morris, S., H. S. Shin and A. Postlewaite (1995). “Depth of Knowledge and the Effect of Higher Order Uncertainty,” Economic Theory 6, 453-467.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 18. Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2002). “The Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, 92, 1521-1534zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 19. Scharfstein, D. and J. Stein, 1990, Herding behavior and investment, American Economic Review, 80 , p465-479.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 20. Townsend, R. (1978) “Market Anticipations, Rational Expectations and Bayesian Analysis” International Economic Review, 19, 481-94.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 21. Townsend, R. (1983). “Forecasting the Forecasts of Others,” Journal of Political Economy 91, 546-588.zh_TW