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題名 企業信用及主導銀行認證效果對聯貸價碼之影響
作者 莊舒婷
貢獻者 顏錫銘
莊舒婷
關鍵詞 聯貸
企業信用
日期 2009
上傳時間 8-Dec-2010 01:54:11 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究探討在眾多影響台灣聯貸案件利率加碼之因素中,借款企業之信用評等是否在金融風暴前後對利率加碼之決定存在顯著變化,同時驗證主導銀行保留額度之多寡是否對台灣聯貸市場案件利率加碼有認證效果(Certification Effect)存在。
     
     研究結果發現,借款企業之信用評等不論在金融風暴前後均對利率加碼存在顯著影響,且金融風暴後影響程度更為顯著,而主導銀行保留額度比率則是在金融風暴後方對新台幣聯貸案件利率加碼存在顯著正向關係。實證結果充份反映出國內銀行在金融風暴後歷經授信策略及行為轉變下,導致借款企業信用評等及主導銀行保留額度多寡對利率加碼之影響程度在金融風暴後明顯有所不同。
     金融風暴前,國內資金充裕之環境使聯貸案多能圓滿籌組完成,故主導銀行保留額度比率低;而在金融風暴後,銀行一方面採取緊縮授信政策,但另一方面在須配合三挺政策增加放款之壓力下,轉而在授信審核上更趨嚴格,使借款企業信用評等成為決定聯貸借款利率之更關鍵因素,聯貸市場上形成信用評等良好借款企業之聯貸案利率加碼偏低且獲大幅超額認購,主導銀行保留額度低;但連年虧損、產業前景差或瀕臨紓困企業之聯貸案件,利率加碼偏高且主導銀行須保留極大額度以求順利完成額度募集之現象,故不論金融風暴前後,台灣聯貸市場並無存在主導銀行對利率加碼之認證效果,借款企業本身之信用評等才是決定利率加碼高低之最重要因素。
參考文獻 一、中文部份
1. 王俊智,2005,「台灣聯貸市場利率與參貸家數之決定因素-以上市、櫃公司為例」,國立中山大學財務管理學系研究所碩士論文。
2. 李長華,2009,「銀行聯合貸款策略之研究-兼論因應金融海嘯之道」,國立政治大學經營管理碩士學程碩士論文。
3. 葉美華,2006,「銀行聯合貸款業務之經營模式與策略研究─以台灣聯貸市場為例」,國立政治大學經營管理碩士學程碩士論文。
二、英文部份
1. Angbazo, L.A., J. Mei, and A. Saunders, 1998, “Credit spreads in the market for highly leveraged transaction loans”, Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 1249–1282.
2. Berger, A.N. and G..F. Udell, 1990, “Collateral, loan quality, and bank risk exposure”, Journal of Monetary Economics 25, 21–42.
3. Booth, J.R., 1992, ”Contract costs, bank loans and the cross-monitoring hypothesis.”, Journal of Financial Economics 31, 25-41.
4. Boot, A. and A. Thakor, 2000, “Can relationship banking survive competition?”, Journal of Finance 55, 679-713.
5. Casolaro, L., D. Focarelli and A.F. Pozzolo, 2003, “The pricing effect of certification on bank loans: evidence from the syndicated credit market”, In: Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
6. Casolaro, L., D. Focarelli and A.F. Pozzolo, 2008, “The pricing effect of certification on syndicated loans”, Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 335-349.
7. Dennis, S. and D.J. Mullineaux, 2000, “Syndicated loans”, Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, 404–426.
8. Dennis, S., N. Debarshi and L.G. Sharpe, 2000, “The determinants of contract terms in bank revolving credit agreements”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 87–110.
9. Diamond, D., 1984,” Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring”, Review of Economic Studies 51, 393–414.
10. Esty, B. and W. Megginson, 2003, “Creditor rights, enforcement, and debt ownership structure: evidence from the global syndicated loan market”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 37–59.
11. Gorton, G.B. and G.G. Pennacchi, 1995, “Banks and loan sales: marketing non-marketable assets”, Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 389–411.
12. Gaul, L. W. and V. Stebunovs, 2009, “Ownership and asymmetric information problems in the corporate loan market: Evidence from a heteroskedastic regression”, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371029.
13. Graham, J.R., Si Li and Jiaping Qiu, 2008, “Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting”, Journal of Financial Economics 89, 44-61.
14. Gupta, A., A.K. Singh and A.A. Zebedee, 2008, “Liquidity in the pricing of syndicated loans”, Journal of Financial Market 11, 339-376.
15. Holmston, B. and J. Tirole, 1997, “Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663-691.
16. Houston, J. and C. James, 1996, “Bank Information monopolies and the mix of private and public debt claims”, Journal of Finance 51, 1863-1869.
17. Ivashina, V., 2009, “Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads”, Journal of Financial Economics 92, 300-319.
18. Lee, S.W., Seung-woog Kwag and D.J. Mullineaux, 2010, “Financial distress, information asymmetry, and syndication Structure: Evidence from Japanese borrowers”, Finance Research Letters 7, 119-126.
19. John, K., A.W. Lynch and M. Puri, 2003, “Credit ratings, collateral and loan characteristics: implication for yield”, Journal of Business 76, 371–409.
20. Jones, J., W.W. Lang and P. Nigro, 2000, “Recent trend in bank loan syndication: evidence for 1995 to 1999”, Economic and Policy Analysis Working Paper , 2000-10, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, US Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC.
21. Lee, S.W. and D.J. Mullineaux, 2004, “Monitoring, financial distress, and the structure of commercial lending syndicates”, Financial Management, 107–130.
22. Leland, H.E. and D.H. Pyle, 1977, “Informational asymmetries, financial structure and financial intermediation”, Journal of Finance 32, 371–387.
23. Simons, K., 1993, “Why do banks syndicate loans?”, New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 1, 45-52.
24. Stanley, Roger and Lajaunie, “Loan pricing”, Bankers Magazine, Volume 178, N.5, 1995, 37-41.
25. Sufi, A., 2007, “Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated loans”, Journal of Finance 62, 629–668.
26. Sufi, A., 2009, “The Real Effects of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of Bank Loan Ratings”, Review of Financial Studies 22, 1659-1691.
27. Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina, 2008, “The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt trading: Evidence from the secondary loan market”, Journal of Accounting and Economics 46, 240-260.
28. Yi, H. and D. Mullineaux, 2002, “The Informational Role of Bank Loan Ratings”, University of Kentucky Working Paper.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
93357017
98
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093357017
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 顏錫銘zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 莊舒婷zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 莊舒婷zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2009en_US
dc.date.accessioned 8-Dec-2010 01:54:11 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 8-Dec-2010 01:54:11 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 8-Dec-2010 01:54:11 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0093357017en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/48951-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 93357017zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 98zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究探討在眾多影響台灣聯貸案件利率加碼之因素中,借款企業之信用評等是否在金融風暴前後對利率加碼之決定存在顯著變化,同時驗證主導銀行保留額度之多寡是否對台灣聯貸市場案件利率加碼有認證效果(Certification Effect)存在。
     
     研究結果發現,借款企業之信用評等不論在金融風暴前後均對利率加碼存在顯著影響,且金融風暴後影響程度更為顯著,而主導銀行保留額度比率則是在金融風暴後方對新台幣聯貸案件利率加碼存在顯著正向關係。實證結果充份反映出國內銀行在金融風暴後歷經授信策略及行為轉變下,導致借款企業信用評等及主導銀行保留額度多寡對利率加碼之影響程度在金融風暴後明顯有所不同。
     金融風暴前,國內資金充裕之環境使聯貸案多能圓滿籌組完成,故主導銀行保留額度比率低;而在金融風暴後,銀行一方面採取緊縮授信政策,但另一方面在須配合三挺政策增加放款之壓力下,轉而在授信審核上更趨嚴格,使借款企業信用評等成為決定聯貸借款利率之更關鍵因素,聯貸市場上形成信用評等良好借款企業之聯貸案利率加碼偏低且獲大幅超額認購,主導銀行保留額度低;但連年虧損、產業前景差或瀕臨紓困企業之聯貸案件,利率加碼偏高且主導銀行須保留極大額度以求順利完成額度募集之現象,故不論金融風暴前後,台灣聯貸市場並無存在主導銀行對利率加碼之認證效果,借款企業本身之信用評等才是決定利率加碼高低之最重要因素。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 5
     第一節 研究動機 5
     第二節 研究目的 7
     第三節 研究範圍與對象 7
     第四節 研究架構 8
     第貳章 文獻探討 9
     第一節 國外相關文獻探討 9
     第二節 國內相關文獻探討 14
     第參章 研究設計 15
     第一節 研究假說 15
     第二節 研究方法 18
     第三節 變數名稱與定義 19
     第四節 研究樣本 23
     第肆章 實證分析 26
     第一節 資料描述 26
     第二節 迴歸分析之結果 43
     第三節 實證結果與分析 58
     第伍章 研究結論與建議 64
     第一節 研究結論 64
     第二節 研究限制 65
     第三節 後續研究建議 65
     參考文獻 66
     附錄 69
zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093357017en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯貸zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 企業信用zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 企業信用及主導銀行認證效果對聯貸價碼之影響zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文部份zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. 王俊智,2005,「台灣聯貸市場利率與參貸家數之決定因素-以上市、櫃公司為例」,國立中山大學財務管理學系研究所碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 2. 李長華,2009,「銀行聯合貸款策略之研究-兼論因應金融海嘯之道」,國立政治大學經營管理碩士學程碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 3. 葉美華,2006,「銀行聯合貸款業務之經營模式與策略研究─以台灣聯貸市場為例」,國立政治大學經營管理碩士學程碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 二、英文部份zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. Angbazo, L.A., J. Mei, and A. Saunders, 1998, “Credit spreads in the market for highly leveraged transaction loans”, Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 1249–1282.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 2. Berger, A.N. and G..F. Udell, 1990, “Collateral, loan quality, and bank risk exposure”, Journal of Monetary Economics 25, 21–42.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 3. Booth, J.R., 1992, ”Contract costs, bank loans and the cross-monitoring hypothesis.”, Journal of Financial Economics 31, 25-41.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 4. Boot, A. and A. Thakor, 2000, “Can relationship banking survive competition?”, Journal of Finance 55, 679-713.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 5. Casolaro, L., D. Focarelli and A.F. Pozzolo, 2003, “The pricing effect of certification on bank loans: evidence from the syndicated credit market”, In: Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 6. Casolaro, L., D. Focarelli and A.F. Pozzolo, 2008, “The pricing effect of certification on syndicated loans”, Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 335-349.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 7. Dennis, S. and D.J. Mullineaux, 2000, “Syndicated loans”, Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, 404–426.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 8. Dennis, S., N. Debarshi and L.G. Sharpe, 2000, “The determinants of contract terms in bank revolving credit agreements”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 87–110.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 9. Diamond, D., 1984,” Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring”, Review of Economic Studies 51, 393–414.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 10. Esty, B. and W. Megginson, 2003, “Creditor rights, enforcement, and debt ownership structure: evidence from the global syndicated loan market”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 37–59.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 11. Gorton, G.B. and G.G. Pennacchi, 1995, “Banks and loan sales: marketing non-marketable assets”, Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 389–411.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 12. Gaul, L. W. and V. Stebunovs, 2009, “Ownership and asymmetric information problems in the corporate loan market: Evidence from a heteroskedastic regression”, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371029.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 13. Graham, J.R., Si Li and Jiaping Qiu, 2008, “Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting”, Journal of Financial Economics 89, 44-61.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 14. Gupta, A., A.K. Singh and A.A. Zebedee, 2008, “Liquidity in the pricing of syndicated loans”, Journal of Financial Market 11, 339-376.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 15. Holmston, B. and J. Tirole, 1997, “Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663-691.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 16. Houston, J. and C. James, 1996, “Bank Information monopolies and the mix of private and public debt claims”, Journal of Finance 51, 1863-1869.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 17. Ivashina, V., 2009, “Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads”, Journal of Financial Economics 92, 300-319.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 18. Lee, S.W., Seung-woog Kwag and D.J. Mullineaux, 2010, “Financial distress, information asymmetry, and syndication Structure: Evidence from Japanese borrowers”, Finance Research Letters 7, 119-126.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 19. John, K., A.W. Lynch and M. Puri, 2003, “Credit ratings, collateral and loan characteristics: implication for yield”, Journal of Business 76, 371–409.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 20. Jones, J., W.W. Lang and P. Nigro, 2000, “Recent trend in bank loan syndication: evidence for 1995 to 1999”, Economic and Policy Analysis Working Paper , 2000-10, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, US Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 21. Lee, S.W. and D.J. Mullineaux, 2004, “Monitoring, financial distress, and the structure of commercial lending syndicates”, Financial Management, 107–130.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 22. Leland, H.E. and D.H. Pyle, 1977, “Informational asymmetries, financial structure and financial intermediation”, Journal of Finance 32, 371–387.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 23. Simons, K., 1993, “Why do banks syndicate loans?”, New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 1, 45-52.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 24. Stanley, Roger and Lajaunie, “Loan pricing”, Bankers Magazine, Volume 178, N.5, 1995, 37-41.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 25. Sufi, A., 2007, “Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated loans”, Journal of Finance 62, 629–668.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 26. Sufi, A., 2009, “The Real Effects of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of Bank Loan Ratings”, Review of Financial Studies 22, 1659-1691.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 27. Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina, 2008, “The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt trading: Evidence from the secondary loan market”, Journal of Accounting and Economics 46, 240-260.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 28. Yi, H. and D. Mullineaux, 2002, “The Informational Role of Bank Loan Ratings”, University of Kentucky Working Paper.zh_TW