| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳安妮博士 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 李伶珠 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Lee, Ling Chu | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 李伶珠 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lee, Ling Chu | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2005 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 8-Dec-2010 13:50:05 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 8-Dec-2010 13:50:05 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 8-Dec-2010 13:50:05 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0087353502 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/49560 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 會計研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 87353502 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 94 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 傳統代理理論主張，企業可利用績效酬勞激勵員工努力工作，提昇組織績效；而競賽理論則強調，利用同儕競賽，並擴大勝負間的酬勞差距，以達企業利潤極大化目標。績效酬勞與競賽誘因對員工投入的努力皆具正面激勵效果，然而，在不同工作特性下，酬勞誘因隨著員工工作所需的合作程度不同，對組織績效的影響卻有所差異。 本文首先依據代理理論與競賽理論模型，將績效酬勞與競賽誘因同時納入酬勞誘因制度中，以利分析在不同工作特性的情況下，酬勞誘因對於營業單位經營績效之影響。在績效酬勞對經營績效之影響上，理論分析結果發現：不論對員工工作彼此獨立或對工作需合作的營業單位而言，績效酬勞的增加，都可提高經營績效；當隨機干擾因素增加，因員工獲得酬勞的不確定性增加，進而削弱員工努力的意願，降低營業單位之經營績效。在競賽誘因對組織績效的影響方面，靜態分析結果指出：在不同工作特性的情況下，競賽誘因會出現不同的效果。當員工工作彼此獨立時，擴大競賽後贏家與輸家間的酬勞差距，有利於組織績效之提高。相對的，在員工工作彼此合作的情況下，酬勞差距擴大後，一方面使員工最適個人努力提高，有益於組織經營績效；另一方面卻削弱員工彼此合作的意願，降低協助同儕的努力，兩種效果抵銷之後，使得酬勞誘因對組織經營績效之提昇受到限制。 本文以一家大型連鎖汽車公司為個案公司，研究期間為2001年至2004年，包括86個營業所及90家汽車修護廠的營業績效資料及中低階層員工之酬勞資料，以實地實證研究法進行實證研究。研究結果發現，當員工工作彼此獨立時，營業單位之個人績效酬勞愈大或收入變異程度愈小者，績效愈好；當員工工作彼此需要合作時，營業單位之團體績效酬勞愈大或收入變異程度愈小者，績效愈好。在競賽誘因方面，當員工工作彼此獨立時，不論是職務間或職務內的酬勞差距的擴大，皆對營業單位之經營績效具有正面提昇效果；相較於工作彼此獨立，當員工工作彼此需要合作時，職務間或職務內酬勞差距的擴大對營業單位績效提昇幅度顯著較小。由此可知，企業在進行酬勞誘因設計時，應同步考量工作特性與酬勞誘因機制間的配適性，俾利於組織績效的提昇。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Agency theory suggests that organizations can motivate employees to exert their efforts by providing individual-based compensation. Tournament theory argues that, by encouraging competition among employees and increasing the compensation gaps between winners and losers, firms can direct employees’ actions in alignment with the firm’s interests. Both compensation schemes can induce employees’ efforts and increase corporate performance. However, the positive effects on corporate performance vary in the need of cooperation among employees, ranging from independent to interdependent tasks.This paper uses a theoretical and empirical analysis of performance-based and tournament-based incentives to examine the impacts of compensation incentives on branch performance. For the impacts of performance-based incentives on branch performance, the performance will increase in the individual performance-based incentives. When employees work independently, the greater the compensation gaps lead to more efforts and higher performance. When employees work interdependently, two contradictory effects of greater the compensation gaps make the performance change unclear. On the one hand, greater compensation gaps will increase employees’ efforts for being winner in the tournament. On the other hand, greater compensation gaps will induce employees not to help their competitors and hurt the performance, although help efforts can contribute firms profits.Using four years of data from a large car company with 86 car dealer branches and 90 car repair service branches, we find that for the independent tasks, the branch performance increase as individual performance-based compensation increases or revenue variance decreases. For the tasks needed cooperation among employees, the branch performance is increasing in group-based compensation or decreasing in revenue variance. Besides, we find that the larger the compensation gaps between inter- or intra-jobs, the branch performance for the independent tasks are better. The impacts of the compensation gaps on the interdependent tasks are smaller than on the independent tasks. Therefore, incentive policy rewards the best performances with the complementary fit between tasks design and compensation schemes | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 圖次 Ⅲ表次 Ⅳ第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究背景與動機 1第二節 研究目的與問題 3第三節 研究方法 5第四節 研究貢獻 6第五節 論文架構 8第二章 文獻探討 10第一節 競賽理論之相關文獻 12第二節 員工工作彼此合作/獨立與競賽理論之相關文獻 18第三節 研究延伸 26第三章 汽車經銷與汽車維修保養產業介紹與個案公司探討 30第一節 汽車經銷與維修保養產業概況 30第二節 個案公司之介紹 34第四章 理論模式與假說發展 43第一節 在不同工作特性下，酬勞誘因對經營績效的影響 44第二節 公司酬勞結構設計 58第五章 研究方法 62第一節 觀念性架構 63第二節 研究設計 64第三節 選樣標準、研究期間及資料蒐集 66第四節 變數衡量 68第五節 實證模型 81第六節 資料分析方法 86第六章 實證結果與分析 94第一節 敍述性統計與相關分析 94第二節 績效酬勞誘因對於經營績效之影響 100第三節 不同工作特性下，酬勞差距對於經營績效之影響 105第四節 敏感性分析 111第七章 結論、研究限制與建議 135第一節 研究結論 135第二節 研究限制 140第三節 建議與未來研究方向 141參考文獻 143附錄一 151圖次圖1-1 論文架構圖----------------------------------------------------- 9圖3-1 台灣汽車總市場銷售量--------------------------------------------30圖3-2 個案公司組織架構圖--------------------------------------------- 36圖5-1 本文研究架構--------------------------------------------------- 63表次表2-1 競賽理論相關研究文獻整理----------------------------------------15表2-2 員工工作彼此合作/獨立與競賽理論之相關文獻整理-------------------22表2-3 本研究之研究延伸彙總表------------------------------------------29表3-1 2004年台灣地區汽車修理保養廠數目估算統計表----------------------32表3-2 營業所與維修保養廠工作特性比較表--------------------------------38表3-3 個案公司員工酬勞組成項目與分配方式----------------------------- 42表4-1 在員工工作彼此合作時，酬勞誘因對經營績效影響之靜態分析彙總表----57表5-1 個人績效酬勞與團體績效酬勞估計數之分配表------------------------74表5-2 酬勞相關變數應用於不同工作特性之對照表------------------------- 78表5-3 變數定義表----------------------------------------------------- 80表5-4 研究假說及實證模型之預期方向彙總表----------------------------- 85表5-5 各營業單位員工職等分配表--------------------------------------- 91表5-6 各營業單位更換所(廠)長頻率分配表------------------------------- 92表6-1 敍述統計量------------------------------------------------------95表6-2 營業所與維修保養廠敍述統計量與t檢定 -------------------------- 96表6-3 相關係數矩陣--------------------------------------------------- 99表6-4 當員工工作彼此獨立，個人績效酬勞與營業收入變異係數對經營績效的影響(檢定假說一與假說三) ------------------------------------------101表6-5 當員工工作彼此合作，團體績效酬勞與營業收入變異係數對經營績效的影響(檢定假說二與假說四) ------------------------------------------104表6-6 當員工工作彼此獨立，酬勞差距對營業單位績效之影響(檢定假說五至假說七) --------------------------------------------------------------107表6-7 不同工作特性下， 酬勞差距對營業單位績效之影響(檢定假說六與假說八)110表6-8當員工工作彼此獨立，個人績效酬勞對營業單位EVA影響之敏感性分析(檢定假說一與假說三)-----------------------------------------------112表6-9當員工工作彼此合作，團體績效酬勞對營業單位EVA影響之敏感性分析(檢定假說二與假說四)-----------------------------------------------113表6-10當員工工作彼此獨立，酬勞差距對營業單位EVA影響之敏感性分析(檢定假說五至假說七) ---------------------------------------------------114表6-11 不同工作特性下， 酬勞差距營業單位EVA影響之敏感性分析(檢定假說六與假說八)-------------------------------------------------------115表6-12以業務員或營業所資料估計個人績效酬勞之敏感性分析(檢定假說一與假說三)-----------------------------------------------------------121表6-13以維修廠月資料估計團體績效酬勞之敏感性分析(檢定假說二與假說四) 122表6-14 當員工工作彼此獨立，不同職等間晉升酬勞差距之敏感性分析(檢定假說五)-----------------------------------------------------------123表6-15 不同工作特性下， 不同職等酬勞差距之敏感性分析(檢定假說六)------124表6-16 當員工工作彼此獨立，單位主管異動頻率不同時，酬勞差距之敏感性分析(檢定假說五)-----------------------------------------------------126表6-17不同工作特性下，當單位主管異動頻率不同，職務間酬勞差距之敏感性分析析(檢定假說六)------------------------------------------------127表6-18不同工作特性下，同儕競賽酬勞誘因之敏感性分析(檢定假說七與假說八)129表6-19敏感性分析彙總表------------------------------------------------130表7-1實證研究結果彙總表-----------------------------------------------138附錄表1：比較協助他人排擠到個人努力程度不同時，對期望產出 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0087353502 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 工作特性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 競賽理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 經營績效 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 績效酬勞 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | task interdependence | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | performance-based compensation | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | tournament incentives | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | performance | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 在不同工作特性下，酬勞誘因對組織績效之影響：實地實證研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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