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題名 本國正版廠商遊說與最適仿冒查緝率
Lobbying by the domestic patentee and optimal enforcement rate
作者 高毓潞
貢獻者 王智賢
高毓潞
關鍵詞 遊說
仿冒查緝率
Lobby
Enforcement Rate
日期 2009
上傳時間 9-十二月-2010 16:01:19 (UTC+8)
摘要 由於今日數位科技發達,仿冒成本日漸降低,導致仿冒產業充斥於社會中,處處可見盜版商品的蹤跡,故仿冒查緝在現今變得非常重要。本文討論本國正版廠商參與遊說的情況下,本國政府仿冒查緝率將如何制定以及本國正版廠商在何種情況下願意提供政治獻金。並且,我們為政府仿冒查緝的工作加入了查緝成本,研究其對於政府仿冒查緝率決策的影響。本文研究後發現,政府必須根據市場規模大小以決定最適查緝率為零或是查緝率上限,且惟有在市場規模為中段之時,本國正版廠商才有意願提供政治獻金進行遊說。此外,若加入仿冒查緝成本,則本國政府最適查緝率為零的可能性將會提高。
Since the prevalence and availability of digital technologies, the cost of piracy becomes lower and lower. The society is full of counterfeiter and counterfeit, hence it is very important to protect the intellectual property. This paper assumes that the domestic company obtains the intellectual property. We try to discuss how the domestic government determines the optimal enforcement rate and to what extent is the domestic company willing to pay for political contributions if the domestic company is the only one lobbyist. Furthermore, considering the cost of crackdown on imitations, we find that the government decides the optimal enforcement rate according to the size of the market, and the domestic company has the desire to engage in lobbying only when the market is in the middle size. If there is some cost of squashing pirates, that optimal enforcement rate is more likely to be zero.
參考文獻 中文部分
王智賢、林惠敏 (2007), 「污染管制與政治獻金」,經社法制論叢,第 40 期,123-149。
王智賢、翁永和 (2006),「最適自製率與政治獻金」,人文與社會科學集刊,第 18 卷 2 期,269-291。
王智賢、陳盈竹 (2009),「最適仿冒品查緝率的制定」,財稅研究,第 41 卷 4 期,38-63。
王智賢、楊敦雅 (2008),「仿冒查緝與政治獻金」,經濟研究,第 44 卷 1 期,107-138。
王智賢、蔡坤良 (2005),「政治獻金限額與關稅遊說」,經濟研究,第 41 卷 2 期,207-247。
吳芝文、周建富 (2004),「智慧財產權與經濟效率」,經濟論文,第 32 卷 2 期,335-361。
吳依芳、王智賢 (2005),「勞資遊說賽局與關稅保護模型」,經社法制論叢,第 36 期,199-241。
林奇蓉 (2004),「政治遊說與策略性貿易政策」,經濟論文叢刊,第 32 輯 3 期,347-367。
周登陽、楊維娟、黃美卿 (2006),「保護智慧財產權之經濟分析—從南方的需求面探討之」,經濟研究,第 42 卷 2 期,183-207。
周德宇 (2001),「新經濟?新智慧財產權?—兼論最適智慧財產權」,國家發展研究,第 1 卷 1 期,117-145。
賴育邦 (2006),「污染許可交易與利益團體」,經濟論文叢刊,第 34 輯 3 期,264-284。
蔡明芳、邱俊榮 (2006),「仿冒與政府政策」,未發表論文。
蔡明芳、邱俊榮 (2008),「本國市場存在仿冒下的進口關稅」,經濟論文叢刊,第 36 輯 2 期,271-292。
英文部分
Aidt, T. S. (1997), “Cooperative Lobbying and Endogenous Trade Policy,” Public Choice, 93(3-4), 455-475.
Banerjee, D. S. (2003), “Software Piracy: A Strategic Analysis and Policy Instruments,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 97-127.
Banerjee, D. S. (2006), “Lobbying and commercial software piracy,” European Journal of Political Economy, 22, 139-155.
Bernheim, B. D. and M. D. Whinston (1986), “Menu Auction, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1-31.
Bertrand, K. (1998), “Hologram Fight Profit Drain of Counterfeit,Diverted Brands,” Brand Packaging, Oct/Nov, 7-22.
Besen, S. M. and S. N. Kirby (1989), “Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal Copying Royalties,” Journal of Law and Economics, 32, 255-280.
Chen, Y. N. and Png, I. (2003), “Information Goods Pricing and Copyright Enforcement: Welfare Analysis,” Information Systems Research, 14, 107–123.
Choi, E. K. (2006), “Mixed Markets with Counterfeit Producers,” Staff General Research Papers 12534, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
Conner, K. and R. P. Rumelt (1991), “Software Piracy : An Analysis of Protection Strategies,” Management Science, 37, 125-139.
Dixit, A., G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,” Journal of Political Economy, 105, 752-769.
Dollar, D. (1986), “Technological Innovations, Capital Mobility, and the Product Cycle in North-South Trade,” American Economic Review, 76, 177-190.
Facchini, G., J. Van Biesebroeck and G. Willmann (2005), “Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing,” NBER Working Paper No. 11269.
Feenstra, R. C. and Judd, K. L. (1982), “Tariffs, Technology Transfer, and Welfare,” Journal of Political Economy, 90(6), 1142-1165.
Findlay, R. and S. Wellisz (1982), “Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfare,” Import Competition and Response, University of Chicago Press.
Fredriksson, P. G. (1997), “The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 33, 44-58.
Freedman, D. H. (1999), “Fakers Paradise,” Forbes, 5, Special Supplement, 48-55.
Gallini, N. (1992), “Patent Policy and Costly Imitation,” Rand Journal Economics, 23, 52-63.
Gawande, K., P. Krishna and M. J. Robbins (2004), “Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy,” NBER Working Paper No. 10205.
Gawande, K. and U. Bandyopadhyay (2000), “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 82, 139-152.
Glass, A. J. and K. Saggi. (2002), “Intellectual Property Right and Foreign Direct Investment,” Journal of International Economics, 56, 387-410.
Goldberg, P. and G. Maggi (1999), “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 89, 1135-1155.
Grossman,G. and E. Helpman (1991a), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
Grossman,G. and E. Helpman (1991b), “Quality Ladders and Product Cycles,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 557-586.
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review, 84, 833-850.
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1995), “Trade Wars and Trade Talks,” Journal of Political Economy, 103, 675-708.
Grossman, G. M. and C. Shapiro (1988a) , “Foreign Counterfeiting of Status Goods,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 79-100.
Grossman, G. M. and C. Shapiro (1988b) , “Counterfeit-product trade,” American Economic Review, 78, 59-75.
Helpman, E. (1993), “Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Right,” Econometrica, 61, 1247-1280.
Higgins, R. S. and P. H. Rubin (1986), “Counterfeit Goods,” Journal of Law and Economics, 29, 211-230.
Hillman, A. (1982), “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives,” American Economic Review, 72(5), 1180-1187.
Jaisingh, J. (2007), “Impact of Piracy on Innovation at Software Firms and Implications for Piracy Policy,” Proceedings of the 11th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2007), 52-62.
Jensen, R. and Thursby, M. (1986), “A strategic approach to the product life cycle,” Journal of International Economics, 21, 269-284.
Johnson, W. R. (1985), “The Economics of Copying,” Journal of Political Economy, 93, 158-174.
Konishi, H., K. Saggi and S. Weber (1999), “Endogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direct Investment,” Journal of International Economics, 49, 289-308.
Krugman, P. R. (1979), “A model of Innovation Technology Transfer, and the World Distribution of Income,” Journal of Political Economy, 87, 253-266.
Lai, Y. B. (2006), “Interest Groups, Trade Liberalization, and Environmental Standards,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 34(2), 269-290.
Levy, P. (1999), “Lobbying and International Cooperation in Tariff Setting,” Journal of International Economics, 47, 345-370.
Liebowitz, S. J. (1985), “Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals,” Journal of Political Economy, 93, 945-957.
Ludema, R. D. (2001), “Market Collusion and the Politics of Protection,” European Journal of Political Economy, 17(4), 817-833.
Magee, C. (2002), “Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobby Formation: An Application to the Free-rider Problem,” Journal of International Economics, 57(2), 449-471.
Magee, S. P., W. A. Brock and L. Young (1989), Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, Cambridge University Press.
Maggi, G. and A. Rodriguez-Clare (1998), “The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures,” Journal of Political Economy, 106(3), 574-601.
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Mitra, D. (2002), “Endogenous Political Organization and the Value of Trade Agreements,” Journal of International Economics, 57, 473-485.
Mitra, D., D. Thomakos and M. Ulubasoglu (2002), “‘Protection for Sale’ in a Developing Country: Democracy vs. Dictatorship,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 497-508.
Novos, I. E and M. Waldman (1984), “The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 92, 236-246.
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Peltzman, S. (1976), “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), 211-240.
Rama, M. and G. Tabellini (1998), “Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policies,” European Economic Review, 42, 1295-1316.
Shy, O. and J. F. Thisse (1999), “A Strategic Approach to Software Protection,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 8, 163-190.
Stigler, G. (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economic Management and Science, 2, 3-21.
Takalo, T. (1998), “Innovation and imitation under imperfect patent protection,” Journal of Economics, 67(3), 229-241.
Takalo, T. and V. Kanniainen (2000), “Do Patent Slow Down Techonological Progress? Real Options in Research, Patenting, and Market Introduction,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18, 1105-1127.
Thurow, L. (1997), “Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights,” Harvard Business Review, 75(5), 95-103.
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Tullock, G. (1967), “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft,” Western Economic Journal, 5, 224-232.
Vishwasrao, S., Gupta, S. and Benchekroun, H. (2007), “Optimum Tariffs and Patent Length in a Model of North-South Technology Transfer,” International Review of Economics & Finance, 16(1), 1-14.
Wang, J.-S., H.-W. Koo and T.-J. Chen (2006), “Resource Rivalry and Endogenous Lobby,” Japan and the World Economy, 18(4), 488-511.
Yamazaki, T. (2004), “Tariff Rate as Public Good,” Review of International Economics, 12(1), 95-107.
Yang, G. and K. E. Maskus (2001), “Intellectual Property Right, Licensing and Innovation in an Endogenous Product-Cycle Model,” Journal of International Economics, 53, 169-187.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
97255003
98
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097255003
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 王智賢zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 高毓潞zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 高毓潞zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2009en_US
dc.date.accessioned 9-十二月-2010 16:01:19 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 9-十二月-2010 16:01:19 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 9-十二月-2010 16:01:19 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0097255003en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/50001-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 97255003zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 98zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 由於今日數位科技發達,仿冒成本日漸降低,導致仿冒產業充斥於社會中,處處可見盜版商品的蹤跡,故仿冒查緝在現今變得非常重要。本文討論本國正版廠商參與遊說的情況下,本國政府仿冒查緝率將如何制定以及本國正版廠商在何種情況下願意提供政治獻金。並且,我們為政府仿冒查緝的工作加入了查緝成本,研究其對於政府仿冒查緝率決策的影響。本文研究後發現,政府必須根據市場規模大小以決定最適查緝率為零或是查緝率上限,且惟有在市場規模為中段之時,本國正版廠商才有意願提供政治獻金進行遊說。此外,若加入仿冒查緝成本,則本國政府最適查緝率為零的可能性將會提高。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Since the prevalence and availability of digital technologies, the cost of piracy becomes lower and lower. The society is full of counterfeiter and counterfeit, hence it is very important to protect the intellectual property. This paper assumes that the domestic company obtains the intellectual property. We try to discuss how the domestic government determines the optimal enforcement rate and to what extent is the domestic company willing to pay for political contributions if the domestic company is the only one lobbyist. Furthermore, considering the cost of crackdown on imitations, we find that the government decides the optimal enforcement rate according to the size of the market, and the domestic company has the desire to engage in lobbying only when the market is in the middle size. If there is some cost of squashing pirates, that optimal enforcement rate is more likely to be zero.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 前言 ………………………………………………………………………... 1
第二章 基本模型 …………………………………………………………………... 6
第一節 本國正版商與外國仿冒商的市場競爭 ………………………………. 7
第二節 無利益團體遊說下,本國政府最適仿冒查緝率 ……………………. 10
第三章 政治獻金遊說下,本國政府最適查緝率決策 ………………………….. 13
第四章 加入查緝成本下,本國政府最適查緝率決策 ………………………….. 19
第一節 無利益團體遊說之下,本國政府最適仿冒查緝率 ………………… 19
第二節 本國正版商遊說下,本國政府最適查緝率決策 …………………… 21
第五章 結論 …………………………………………………………………......... 26
參考文獻 …………………………………………………………………...…….... 27
zh_TW
dc.format.extent 435570 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097255003en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 遊說zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 仿冒查緝率zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Lobbyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Enforcement Rateen_US
dc.title (題名) 本國正版廠商遊說與最適仿冒查緝率zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Lobbying by the domestic patentee and optimal enforcement rateen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王智賢、林惠敏 (2007), 「污染管制與政治獻金」,經社法制論叢,第 40 期,123-149。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王智賢、翁永和 (2006),「最適自製率與政治獻金」,人文與社會科學集刊,第 18 卷 2 期,269-291。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王智賢、陳盈竹 (2009),「最適仿冒品查緝率的制定」,財稅研究,第 41 卷 4 期,38-63。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王智賢、楊敦雅 (2008),「仿冒查緝與政治獻金」,經濟研究,第 44 卷 1 期,107-138。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王智賢、蔡坤良 (2005),「政治獻金限額與關稅遊說」,經濟研究,第 41 卷 2 期,207-247。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 吳芝文、周建富 (2004),「智慧財產權與經濟效率」,經濟論文,第 32 卷 2 期,335-361。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 吳依芳、王智賢 (2005),「勞資遊說賽局與關稅保護模型」,經社法制論叢,第 36 期,199-241。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 林奇蓉 (2004),「政治遊說與策略性貿易政策」,經濟論文叢刊,第 32 輯 3 期,347-367。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 周登陽、楊維娟、黃美卿 (2006),「保護智慧財產權之經濟分析—從南方的需求面探討之」,經濟研究,第 42 卷 2 期,183-207。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 周德宇 (2001),「新經濟?新智慧財產權?—兼論最適智慧財產權」,國家發展研究,第 1 卷 1 期,117-145。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 賴育邦 (2006),「污染許可交易與利益團體」,經濟論文叢刊,第 34 輯 3 期,264-284。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 蔡明芳、邱俊榮 (2006),「仿冒與政府政策」,未發表論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 蔡明芳、邱俊榮 (2008),「本國市場存在仿冒下的進口關稅」,經濟論文叢刊,第 36 輯 2 期,271-292。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 英文部分zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Aidt, T. S. (1997), “Cooperative Lobbying and Endogenous Trade Policy,” Public Choice, 93(3-4), 455-475.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Banerjee, D. S. (2003), “Software Piracy: A Strategic Analysis and Policy Instruments,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 97-127.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Banerjee, D. S. (2006), “Lobbying and commercial software piracy,” European Journal of Political Economy, 22, 139-155.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bernheim, B. D. and M. D. Whinston (1986), “Menu Auction, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1-31.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bertrand, K. (1998), “Hologram Fight Profit Drain of Counterfeit,Diverted Brands,” Brand Packaging, Oct/Nov, 7-22.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Besen, S. M. and S. N. Kirby (1989), “Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal Copying Royalties,” Journal of Law and Economics, 32, 255-280.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chen, Y. N. and Png, I. (2003), “Information Goods Pricing and Copyright Enforcement: Welfare Analysis,” Information Systems Research, 14, 107–123.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Choi, E. K. (2006), “Mixed Markets with Counterfeit Producers,” Staff General Research Papers 12534, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Conner, K. and R. P. Rumelt (1991), “Software Piracy : An Analysis of Protection Strategies,” Management Science, 37, 125-139.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dixit, A., G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,” Journal of Political Economy, 105, 752-769.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dollar, D. (1986), “Technological Innovations, Capital Mobility, and the Product Cycle in North-South Trade,” American Economic Review, 76, 177-190.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Facchini, G., J. Van Biesebroeck and G. Willmann (2005), “Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing,” NBER Working Paper No. 11269.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Feenstra, R. C. and Judd, K. L. (1982), “Tariffs, Technology Transfer, and Welfare,” Journal of Political Economy, 90(6), 1142-1165.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Findlay, R. and S. Wellisz (1982), “Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfare,” Import Competition and Response, University of Chicago Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Fredriksson, P. G. (1997), “The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 33, 44-58.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Freedman, D. H. (1999), “Fakers Paradise,” Forbes, 5, Special Supplement, 48-55.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gallini, N. (1992), “Patent Policy and Costly Imitation,” Rand Journal Economics, 23, 52-63.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gawande, K., P. Krishna and M. J. Robbins (2004), “Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy,” NBER Working Paper No. 10205.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gawande, K. and U. Bandyopadhyay (2000), “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 82, 139-152.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Glass, A. J. and K. Saggi. (2002), “Intellectual Property Right and Foreign Direct Investment,” Journal of International Economics, 56, 387-410.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Goldberg, P. and G. Maggi (1999), “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 89, 1135-1155.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Grossman,G. and E. Helpman (1991a), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Grossman,G. and E. Helpman (1991b), “Quality Ladders and Product Cycles,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 557-586.zh_TW
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