| dc.contributor.advisor | 曾巨威 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 吳昱瑩 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 吳昱瑩 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2007 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-Dec-2010 16:02:15 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 9-Dec-2010 16:02:15 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 9-Dec-2010 16:02:15 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0942550012 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/50006 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 94255001 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 96 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 為探討稅務員最適查稅獎金，以減少其相互勾結，使租稅稽徵更具效率，本文從理論角度出發，以Sanyal模型為基礎，進一步修正其模型，使其更具一般化，並代入數值，分析查核率與舉發率對查稅獎金的影響，最後經由我國數據資料，間接推算適用之獎金制度。本文的發現主要有以下幾點：（一）查稅獎金是否可簡化為一單純之表示方式，和其是否需賄賂上層稅務員有關。當其所需賄賂的上層稅務員增加，數學推導將越複雜。換言之，實際的稅務員層級眾多，查稅獎金制度很難達到理論上最適條件的要求。（二）代入數值運算後，可得一確定且收斂之查稅獎金比例值。此數值受舉發率和查核率交互影響。在舉發率小時，第三階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而上升；第二階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而下降；第一階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而下降。但在舉發率高時，第一階查稅獎金反而隨查核率上升而上升，第三階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而下降，只有第二階查稅獎金不受舉發率之影響，仍隨查核率上升而下降。（三）導入我國實際數據資料可知，欲使我國稅務員誠實舉發不收賄之查稅獎金，應讓第一階稅務員獲得最多之獎金最高，第二階次之，第三階則給予最少之獎金，且第三階之獎金可隨查核率提昇而微幅下降。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言 1第一節 研究動機與目的 1第二節 研究方法與架構 2第三節 章節安排 4第二章 文獻回顧 5第一節 最適查核制度之相關文獻 6第二節 層級勾結相關文獻 9第三節 小結 12第三章 SANYAL模型 13第一節 一次查核均衡模型 13第二節 重複無限次申報模型 16第四章 修正模型 20第五章 數值分析 30第一節 查核率與舉發率對查稅獎金的影響 30第二節 我國狀況之適用 33第六章 結論 37參考文獻 38附錄 查核率與舉發率對查稅獎金之變動關係圖 40 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0942550012 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 租稅逃漏、賄賂鏈、最適機制、層級查核 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | 最適查稅獎金制度之理論分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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