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題名 The Puzzle of the Discount Price for Foreclosed Houses: Does the Factor of Competition Explain More Discounts?
作者 張金鶚
 Chang,Chin-oh
關鍵詞 Foreclosed house; Auction market; Competition
日期 2008-12
上傳時間 15-Dec-2010 09:10:53 (UTC+8)
摘要 Using the data of the foreclosed houses and the brokerage houses in Taipei
     from 2001-2002, we try to answer “Does the factor of competition explain more
     price discount?” Three main empirical results are found: (1) The average price for
     the foreclosed houses in the biding market is lower 17.20% than that for the
     brokerage houses in the searching and bargaining market, controlling other things
     being equal. We propose the market mechanism such as the foreclosed-housing
     risk of the buyer exposure, and the participant number of biding can explains
     more for the deep-discount price. (2) The price discount is 15.99% if one bidder
     involves. Moreover, the more participant number of biding is, the lower price
     discount between auction market and search market is. This implies that full
     information disclosure can increase the competition and reduce the price discount
     of foreclosed houses in the court-oriented auction market.
關聯 交大管理學報, 28(2),1-39
資料類型 article
dc.creator (作者) 張金鶚zh_TW
dc.creator (作者)  Chang,Chin-oh-
dc.date (日期) 2008-12-
dc.date.accessioned 15-Dec-2010 09:10:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 15-Dec-2010 09:10:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 15-Dec-2010 09:10:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/50230-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Using the data of the foreclosed houses and the brokerage houses in Taipei
     from 2001-2002, we try to answer “Does the factor of competition explain more
     price discount?” Three main empirical results are found: (1) The average price for
     the foreclosed houses in the biding market is lower 17.20% than that for the
     brokerage houses in the searching and bargaining market, controlling other things
     being equal. We propose the market mechanism such as the foreclosed-housing
     risk of the buyer exposure, and the participant number of biding can explains
     more for the deep-discount price. (2) The price discount is 15.99% if one bidder
     involves. Moreover, the more participant number of biding is, the lower price
     discount between auction market and search market is. This implies that full
     information disclosure can increase the competition and reduce the price discount
     of foreclosed houses in the court-oriented auction market.
-
dc.language zh_TWen
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 交大管理學報, 28(2),1-39en
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Foreclosed house; Auction market; Competition-
dc.title (題名) The Puzzle of the Discount Price for Foreclosed Houses: Does the Factor of Competition Explain More Discounts?en
dc.type (資料類型) articleen