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題名 高階經理人薪酬與自願性盈餘預測之關聯性
On the association between CEO’s compensation and voluntary disclosure
作者 吳元婷
貢獻者 梁嘉紋
吳元婷
關鍵詞 高階經理人薪酬
自願性財務預測
代理問題
日期 2010
上傳時間 29-Sep-2011 16:39:09 (UTC+8)
摘要 自願性財務預測對公司來說,是傳遞內部資訊給外部使用者之方法之一,透過自願性財務預測,藉以消弭因資訊不對稱所產生之代理問題。公司為了減輕代理問題,透過薪酬之設計,使經營者與股東之目標趨於一致,因此,本研究欲探討高階經理人之薪酬,是否會受到其自願性財務預測之影響。
本研究針對2000年至2009年標準普爾前五百(S&P 500)之公司,進行高階經理人薪酬及自願性財務預測關聯性之探討。以是否發佈自願性財務預測、是否未達成自願性財務預測,以及自願性財務預測之準確性,分別探討其與高階經理人薪酬之關聯。實證結果發現,公司當年度有發佈自願性年盈餘預測,高階經理人薪酬變動會增加;本研究亦發現當未達到自願性年盈餘預測時,高階經理人薪酬有負向變動,而未達到季盈餘預測的情況下並未發現同樣結果;而預測之準確性,不論是年樣本或季樣本,皆未發現與高階經理人薪酬有顯著之關聯性。
關鍵
參考文獻 李建然與周俊德,2002,管理當局信譽與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵關係之研究,
會計評論,第34 期1月:77-99
傅鍾仁、歐進士與張寶光,2002,我國企業經理人薪酬與其經營績效之實證,管
理學報,第19卷第6期:1073-1096。
林穎芬與劉維琪,2003,從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用性,
管理學報,第20卷第2期:365-395。
洪玉舜與王泰昌,2005,績效衡量指標在高階主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要
性,證券市場發展季刊,第17卷第2期:35-100。
蔡柳卿,2006,相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬:論產業競爭程度之影響,管理評
論,第25卷第1期:69-94。
Ajinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. 2005. The association between outside
directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 43: 343-376.
Baber, S. K., and K.R. Kumar. 1998. Accounting earnings and executive
compensation: The role of earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25:169-193.
Baber, S. K., and K.R. Kumar. 1999. The explanatory power of earnings levels vs.
earnings changes in the context of executive compensation. The Accounting Review 74: 459-472.
Chuk, E., D. A. Matsumoto, and G. S. Miller. 2010. Assessing methods of identifying
management forecasts: CIG vs. researcher collected. Working Paper. University of Southern California.
Clinch, G., and J. Magliolo. 1993. CEO compensation and components of earnings in
bank holding companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:241-272.
Coughlan, A. T. and R. M. Schmidt. 1985. Executive compensation, management
turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 : 43-66.
Darrough, M. N., and N. M. Stoughton. 1990. Financial disclosure policy in an entry
game. Journal of Accounting and Economics 12: 219-243.
Dai, Z., S. Radhakrishnan, and W. Zhang. 2009. Implicit and explicit Incentives, and
management earnings forecasts. Working paper. University of Texas at Dallas.
Dechow, P., M.R. Huson, and R.G. Sloan. 1994. The effect of restructuring charges on
executives` cash compensation. The Accounting Review 69: 138-156.
Eisenhardt, K.M. 1989. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy of
Management Review 14: 57-74.
Finkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. 1989. Chief executive compensation: A study of
the intersection of markets and political process. Strategic Management Journal
10: 121-134.
Finkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. 1988. Chief executive compensation: A
synthesis and reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal 9: 543-558.
Firth, M., and A. Smith. 1992. The accuracy of profits forecast on initial public
offering prospectuses. Journal of Accounting and Bussiness Research 22:239-247
Frankel, R., M. McNichols, and G. Wilson. 1995. Discretionary disclosure and
external financing. The Accounting Review 70: 135–150.
Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. 1998. The relation between nonrecurring accounting
transactions and CEO cash compensation. The Accounting Review 73 : 235-253.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., H.Tosi, and T. Hinkin. 1987. Managerial control, performance,
and executive compensation. Academy of Management Journal 30:51-70.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R. and D.B. Balkin. 1992. Compensation organizational strategy
and firm performance. Cincinnati: Southwestern.
Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.
Janakiraman, S., R. Lambert, and D. Larcker. 1992. An empirical investigation of the
relative performance evaluation hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 30: 53-69.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Mecking, 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360.
Kanagaretnam, k., R. Mathieu and G. J. Lobo, 2005. CEO compensation mix and
analysts` forecast accuracy and bias. Working paper, McMaster University.
Karamanou, I., and N. Vafeas. 2005. The association between corporate boards, audit
committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 43: 453-486.
Kasznik, R., and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in
the face of an earnings surprise. The Accounting Review 70: 113–134.
King, R., G. Pownall and G.Waymire. 1990. Expectations adjustment via timely
management forecasts: review, synthesis, and suggestions for future research. Journal of Accounting Literature 9: 145-182.
Lambert, R., and D. Larcker. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting and market
measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 25: 85-125.
Lees, F. 1981. Public disclosure of corporate earnings forecast. New York, NY: The
Conference Board.
Lee, S. S., S. R. Matsunaga and C. W. Park. 2010. Management forecast accuracy and
CEO turnover. Working Paper, University of Illinois at Chicago.
Lennox, C. and C. W. Park. 2006. The informativeness of earnings and management’s
issuance of earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 439-458.
Matsunaga, S. R. and C. W. Park. 2001. The effect of missing a quarterly earnings
benchmark on the CEO`s annual bonus. The Accounting Review 76: 313-332
Mathis, R.L. and I. H. Jackson. 2003. Personnel/Human Resource Management,
West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn.
Nagar,V. , D. Nandab and P. Wysockic. 2003. Discretionary disclosure and
stock-based incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34: 283–309
Rees, L. L., A. Srivastava and S. Y. Tse. 2009. An examination of the accuracy and
usefulness of management earnings guidance around stock option grants. Working paper, Texas A&M University.
Sapp, S. 2008. The impact of corporate governance on executive compensation.
European Financial Management 14:710-746.
Skinner, D., 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting
Research 32: 38-60.
Sloan, R. 1996. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows
about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71: 289-315.
Trueman, B. 1986. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts? Journal
of Accounting and Economics 8:53-71.
Warner, J., R. L. Watts and K. H. Wruck. 1988. Stock prices and top management
changes. Journal of Financial Economic 20: 461-492.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
98353045
99
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098353045
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 梁嘉紋zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 吳元婷zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 吳元婷zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2010en_US
dc.date.accessioned 29-Sep-2011 16:39:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 29-Sep-2011 16:39:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 29-Sep-2011 16:39:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0098353045en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/50789-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 98353045zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 99zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 自願性財務預測對公司來說,是傳遞內部資訊給外部使用者之方法之一,透過自願性財務預測,藉以消弭因資訊不對稱所產生之代理問題。公司為了減輕代理問題,透過薪酬之設計,使經營者與股東之目標趨於一致,因此,本研究欲探討高階經理人之薪酬,是否會受到其自願性財務預測之影響。
本研究針對2000年至2009年標準普爾前五百(S&P 500)之公司,進行高階經理人薪酬及自願性財務預測關聯性之探討。以是否發佈自願性財務預測、是否未達成自願性財務預測,以及自願性財務預測之準確性,分別探討其與高階經理人薪酬之關聯。實證結果發現,公司當年度有發佈自願性年盈餘預測,高階經理人薪酬變動會增加;本研究亦發現當未達到自願性年盈餘預測時,高階經理人薪酬有負向變動,而未達到季盈餘預測的情況下並未發現同樣結果;而預測之準確性,不論是年樣本或季樣本,皆未發現與高階經理人薪酬有顯著之關聯性。
關鍵
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究問題 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第貳章 文獻探討 6
第一節 自願性財務預測 6
第二節 代理理論 9
第三節 高階經理人薪酬之決定因素 11
第參章 研究設計 14
第一節 研究假說 14
第二節 變數衡量與模型建立 16
第三節 實證模型 19
第肆章 實證結果與分析 25
第一節 敘述性統計分析 25
第二節 多元迴歸分析結果 32
第三節 額外測試 38
第伍章 研究結論、限制與建議 44
第一節 研究結論 45
第二節 研究限制 47
第三節 研究建議 47
第四節 研究貢獻 48
參考文獻 50
zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098353045en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 高階經理人薪酬zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自願性財務預測zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理問題zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 高階經理人薪酬與自願性盈餘預測之關聯性zh_TW
dc.title (題名) On the association between CEO’s compensation and voluntary disclosureen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 李建然與周俊德,2002,管理當局信譽與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵關係之研究,zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 會計評論,第34 期1月:77-99zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 傅鍾仁、歐進士與張寶光,2002,我國企業經理人薪酬與其經營績效之實證,管zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 理學報,第19卷第6期:1073-1096。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 林穎芬與劉維琪,2003,從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用性,zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 管理學報,第20卷第2期:365-395。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 洪玉舜與王泰昌,2005,績效衡量指標在高階主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 性,證券市場發展季刊,第17卷第2期:35-100。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 蔡柳卿,2006,相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬:論產業競爭程度之影響,管理評zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 論,第25卷第1期:69-94。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ajinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. 2005. The association between outsidezh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 43: 343-376.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Baber, S. K., and K.R. Kumar. 1998. Accounting earnings and executivezh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) compensation: The role of earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25:169-193.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Baber, S. K., and K.R. Kumar. 1999. The explanatory power of earnings levels vs.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) earnings changes in the context of executive compensation. The Accounting Review 74: 459-472.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Chuk, E., D. A. Matsumoto, and G. S. Miller. 2010. Assessing methods of identifyingzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) management forecasts: CIG vs. researcher collected. Working Paper. University of Southern California.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Clinch, G., and J. Magliolo. 1993. CEO compensation and components of earnings inzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) bank holding companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:241-272.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Coughlan, A. T. and R. M. Schmidt. 1985. Executive compensation, managementzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 : 43-66.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Darrough, M. N., and N. M. Stoughton. 1990. Financial disclosure policy in an entryzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) game. Journal of Accounting and Economics 12: 219-243.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dai, Z., S. Radhakrishnan, and W. Zhang. 2009. Implicit and explicit Incentives, andzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) management earnings forecasts. Working paper. University of Texas at Dallas.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dechow, P., M.R. Huson, and R.G. Sloan. 1994. The effect of restructuring charges onzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) executives` cash compensation. The Accounting Review 69: 138-156.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Eisenhardt, K.M. 1989. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy ofzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Management Review 14: 57-74.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Finkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. 1989. Chief executive compensation: A study ofzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) the intersection of markets and political process. Strategic Management Journalzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 10: 121-134.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Finkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. 1988. Chief executive compensation: Azh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) synthesis and reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal 9: 543-558.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Firth, M., and A. Smith. 1992. The accuracy of profits forecast on initial publiczh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) offering prospectuses. Journal of Accounting and Bussiness Research 22:239-247zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Frankel, R., M. McNichols, and G. Wilson. 1995. Discretionary disclosure andzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) external financing. The Accounting Review 70: 135–150.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. 1998. The relation between nonrecurring accountingzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) transactions and CEO cash compensation. The Accounting Review 73 : 235-253.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gomez-Mejia, L. R., H.Tosi, and T. Hinkin. 1987. Managerial control, performance,zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) and executive compensation. Academy of Management Journal 30:51-70.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gomez-Mejia, L. R. and D.B. Balkin. 1992. Compensation organizational strategyzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) and firm performance. Cincinnati: Southwestern.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Janakiraman, S., R. Lambert, and D. Larcker. 1992. An empirical investigation of thezh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) relative performance evaluation hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 30: 53-69.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Mecking, 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kanagaretnam, k., R. Mathieu and G. J. Lobo, 2005. CEO compensation mix andzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) analysts` forecast accuracy and bias. Working paper, McMaster University.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Karamanou, I., and N. Vafeas. 2005. The association between corporate boards, auditzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 43: 453-486.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kasznik, R., and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures inzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) the face of an earnings surprise. The Accounting Review 70: 113–134.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) King, R., G. Pownall and G.Waymire. 1990. Expectations adjustment via timelyzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) management forecasts: review, synthesis, and suggestions for future research. Journal of Accounting Literature 9: 145-182.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lambert, R., and D. Larcker. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting and marketzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 25: 85-125.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lees, F. 1981. Public disclosure of corporate earnings forecast. New York, NY: Thezh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Conference Board.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lee, S. S., S. R. Matsunaga and C. W. Park. 2010. Management forecast accuracy andzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) CEO turnover. Working Paper, University of Illinois at Chicago.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lennox, C. and C. W. Park. 2006. The informativeness of earnings and management’szh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) issuance of earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 439-458.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Matsunaga, S. R. and C. W. Park. 2001. The effect of missing a quarterly earningszh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) benchmark on the CEO`s annual bonus. The Accounting Review 76: 313-332zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Mathis, R.L. and I. H. Jackson. 2003. Personnel/Human Resource Management,zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Nagar,V. , D. Nandab and P. Wysockic. 2003. Discretionary disclosure andzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) stock-based incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34: 283–309zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Rees, L. L., A. Srivastava and S. Y. Tse. 2009. An examination of the accuracy andzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) usefulness of management earnings guidance around stock option grants. Working paper, Texas A&M University.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Sapp, S. 2008. The impact of corporate governance on executive compensation.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) European Financial Management 14:710-746.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Skinner, D., 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accountingzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Research 32: 38-60.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Sloan, R. 1996. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flowszh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71: 289-315.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Trueman, B. 1986. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts? Journalzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) of Accounting and Economics 8:53-71.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Warner, J., R. L. Watts and K. H. Wruck. 1988. Stock prices and top managementzh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) changes. Journal of Financial Economic 20: 461-492.zh_TW