| dc.contributor.advisor | 賴育邦 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Lai, Yu Bong | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 廖于瑩 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Liao, Yu Ying | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 廖于瑩 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Liao, Yu Ying | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2010 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 5-Oct-2011 14:52:35 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 5-Oct-2011 14:52:35 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 5-Oct-2011 14:52:35 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0098255001 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/51393 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 98255001 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 99 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 隨著人類的經濟活動發展造成環境的污染，近年來，人們開始注重環境的保護，並試著在經濟發展和環境保護之間取得平衡，本文便以此想法結合地區之間的租稅競爭，進而研究地方政府之間在環境政策的競爭是否會造成環境品質的向下沉淪 (race to the bottom)。本文中的地方政府利用對製造污染的廠商課徵資本稅(本文以從量稅和從價稅為例，但資本稅稅率為外生條件)以做為公共財的財源，同時管制廠商所排放的污染量。本文主要得到了三個結論：(1) 地方政府之間競爭的結果將會造成環境政策的向下沉淪；(2) 在單位稅額相同的情況下，地方政府選擇以從量稅或從價稅課徵資本稅，並不影響環境政策向下沉淪的程度，以及 (3) 影響環境政策向下沉淪的因素主要取決於該地方政府面臨的競爭對手數量，競爭的轄區愈多，環境政策向下沉淪的程度愈甚。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | As the development of economy, the environment becomes much polluted. In recent years, environment protection has become an important issue, and people have tried to strike a balance between the development of economy and environment protection. In this thesis, we combine this idea and tax competition among jurisdictions, and discuss the issue that whether the tax competition among jurisdictions leads to “the race of bottom.” In this environmental quality, the local governments levy tax on the capital of polluting industries, with either unit tax or ad valorem tax and with fixed tax rate, and use the tax revenues to finance public goods. Each government also imposes a cap on firms’ emissions.I obtain three main results:(1) The competition between local governments will lead to the race to the bottom in environment policy.(2) Given the same revenue per unit of tax, both the unit tax and the ad valorem tax lead to the same environmental policy.(3) The level of race to the bottom in environment policy depends on the number of the competitors to the local government. As the number of jurisdictions increases, the more the level of race to the bottom in the environment policy. Key words: environment policy, capital tax, tax competition | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機及目的 1第二節 研究方法 3第三節 本文架構 3第二章 文獻回顧 5第一節 環境聯邦制 5第二節 從量稅與從價稅的比較 7第三節 資本稅和環境政策的交互影響 7第四節 綜合整理 8第三章 模型設定 10第一節 基本經濟環境 10第二節 地方政府之最適環境政策：以從量方式課徵資本稅 13第三節 地方政府之最適環境政策：以從價方式課徵資本稅 17第四章 歸納與整理 21第一節 從量稅與從價稅的比較 21第二節 極少的轄區數目 22第三節 轄區數目趨於無限大 24第四節 綜合整理與比較 26第五章 結論 28附錄 30參考文獻 32 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098255001 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 環境政策 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 資本稅 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 租稅競爭 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | environment policy | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | capital tax | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | tax competition | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 資本稅對地方環境政策之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | The effect of capital taxation on local environmental policy | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Hoyt, William H. (1991), “Property Taxation, Nash Equilibrium, and Market Power,” Journal of Urban Economics, 30, 123-31 | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Kunce, Mitch and Jason F. Shogren (2005), “On Interjurisdictional Competition and Environmental Federalism” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50, 212-24. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Kunce, Mitch; Jason F. Shogren (2008), “Efficient Decentralized Fiscal and Environmental Policy: A Dual Purpose Henry George Tax,” Ecological Economics, 65, 569-73. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Lockwood Ben (2004), “Competition in Unit vs. Ad Valorem Tax,” International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 763-72. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Markusen, James R., Edward R. Morey and Nancy Olewiler (1995), “Competition in Regional Environmental Policies When Plant Locations Are Endogenous,” Journal of Public Economics, 56, 55-77. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Oates, Wallance E. and Robert. M. Schwab (1988), “Economic Competition among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?,” Journal of Public Economics, 35, 333-54. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Rauscher, Michael (1995), “Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting Industries,” International Tax and Public Finance, 2, 229-44. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Tiebout Charles. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-24 | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Woods, Neal D. (2006) ,“Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis,” Social Science Quarterly, 87, 174-89. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszowski (1986), “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods,” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 296¬¬-315 | zh_TW |
