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題名 資本稅對地方環境政策之影響
The effect of capital taxation on local environmental policy
作者 廖于瑩
Liao, Yu Ying
貢獻者 賴育邦
Lai, Yu Bong
廖于瑩
Liao, Yu Ying
關鍵詞 環境政策
資本稅
租稅競爭
environment policy
capital tax
tax competition
日期 2010
上傳時間 5-十月-2011 14:52:35 (UTC+8)
摘要 隨著人類的經濟活動發展造成環境的污染,近年來,人們開始注重環境的保護,並試著在經濟發展和環境保護之間取得平衡,本文便以此想法結合地區之間的租稅競爭,進而研究地方政府之間在環境政策的競爭是否會造成環境品質的向下沉淪 (race to the bottom)。本文中的地方政府利用對製造污染的廠商課徵資本稅(本文以從量稅和從價稅為例,但資本稅稅率為外生條件)以做為公共財的財源,同時管制廠商所排放的污染量。
本文主要得到了三個結論:(1) 地方政府之間競爭的結果將會造成環境政策的向下沉淪;(2) 在單位稅額相同的情況下,地方政府選擇以從量稅或從價稅課徵資本稅,並不影響環境政策向下沉淪的程度,以及 (3) 影響環境政策向下沉淪的因素主要取決於該地方政府面臨的競爭對手數量,競爭的轄區愈多,環境政策向下沉淪的程度愈甚。
As the development of economy, the environment becomes much polluted. In recent years, environment protection has become an important issue, and people have tried to strike a balance between the development of economy and environment protection. In this thesis, we combine this idea and tax competition among jurisdictions, and discuss the issue that whether the tax competition among jurisdictions leads to “the race of bottom.” In this environmental quality, the local governments levy tax on the capital of polluting industries, with either unit tax or ad valorem tax and with fixed tax rate, and use the tax revenues to finance public goods. Each government also imposes a cap on firms’ emissions.

I obtain three main results:
(1) The competition between local governments will lead to the race to the bottom in environment policy.
(2) Given the same revenue per unit of tax, both the unit tax and the ad valorem tax lead to the same environmental policy.
(3) The level of race to the bottom in environment policy depends on the number of the competitors to the local government. As the number of jurisdictions increases, the more the level of race to the bottom in the environment policy.

Key words: environment policy, capital tax, tax competition
參考文獻 Hoyt, William H. (1991), “Property Taxation, Nash Equilibrium, and Market Power,” Journal of Urban Economics, 30, 123-31
Kunce, Mitch and Jason F. Shogren (2005), “On Interjurisdictional Competition and Environmental Federalism” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50, 212-24.
Kunce, Mitch; Jason F. Shogren (2008), “Efficient Decentralized Fiscal and Environmental Policy: A Dual Purpose Henry George Tax,” Ecological Economics, 65, 569-73.
Lockwood Ben (2004), “Competition in Unit vs. Ad Valorem Tax,” International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 763-72.
Markusen, James R., Edward R. Morey and Nancy Olewiler (1995), “Competition in Regional Environmental Policies When Plant Locations Are Endogenous,” Journal of Public Economics, 56, 55-77.
Oates, Wallance E. and Robert. M. Schwab (1988), “Economic Competition among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?,” Journal of Public Economics, 35, 333-54.
Rauscher, Michael (1995), “Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting Industries,” International Tax and Public Finance, 2, 229-44.
Tiebout Charles. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-24
Woods, Neal D. (2006) ,“Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis,” Social Science Quarterly, 87, 174-89.
Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszowski (1986), “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods,” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 296¬¬-315
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
98255001
99
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098255001
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 賴育邦zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Lai, Yu Bongen_US
dc.contributor.author (作者) 廖于瑩zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) Liao, Yu Yingen_US
dc.creator (作者) 廖于瑩zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Liao, Yu Yingen_US
dc.date (日期) 2010en_US
dc.date.accessioned 5-十月-2011 14:52:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 5-十月-2011 14:52:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-十月-2011 14:52:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0098255001en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/51393-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 98255001zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 99zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 隨著人類的經濟活動發展造成環境的污染,近年來,人們開始注重環境的保護,並試著在經濟發展和環境保護之間取得平衡,本文便以此想法結合地區之間的租稅競爭,進而研究地方政府之間在環境政策的競爭是否會造成環境品質的向下沉淪 (race to the bottom)。本文中的地方政府利用對製造污染的廠商課徵資本稅(本文以從量稅和從價稅為例,但資本稅稅率為外生條件)以做為公共財的財源,同時管制廠商所排放的污染量。
本文主要得到了三個結論:(1) 地方政府之間競爭的結果將會造成環境政策的向下沉淪;(2) 在單位稅額相同的情況下,地方政府選擇以從量稅或從價稅課徵資本稅,並不影響環境政策向下沉淪的程度,以及 (3) 影響環境政策向下沉淪的因素主要取決於該地方政府面臨的競爭對手數量,競爭的轄區愈多,環境政策向下沉淪的程度愈甚。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) As the development of economy, the environment becomes much polluted. In recent years, environment protection has become an important issue, and people have tried to strike a balance between the development of economy and environment protection. In this thesis, we combine this idea and tax competition among jurisdictions, and discuss the issue that whether the tax competition among jurisdictions leads to “the race of bottom.” In this environmental quality, the local governments levy tax on the capital of polluting industries, with either unit tax or ad valorem tax and with fixed tax rate, and use the tax revenues to finance public goods. Each government also imposes a cap on firms’ emissions.

I obtain three main results:
(1) The competition between local governments will lead to the race to the bottom in environment policy.
(2) Given the same revenue per unit of tax, both the unit tax and the ad valorem tax lead to the same environmental policy.
(3) The level of race to the bottom in environment policy depends on the number of the competitors to the local government. As the number of jurisdictions increases, the more the level of race to the bottom in the environment policy.

Key words: environment policy, capital tax, tax competition
en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機及目的 1
第二節 研究方法 3
第三節 本文架構 3
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第一節 環境聯邦制 5
第二節 從量稅與從價稅的比較 7
第三節 資本稅和環境政策的交互影響 7
第四節 綜合整理 8
第三章 模型設定 10
第一節 基本經濟環境 10
第二節 地方政府之最適環境政策:以從量方式課徵資本稅 13
第三節 地方政府之最適環境政策:以從價方式課徵資本稅 17
第四章 歸納與整理 21
第一節 從量稅與從價稅的比較 21
第二節 極少的轄區數目 22
第三節 轄區數目趨於無限大 24
第四節 綜合整理與比較 26
第五章 結論 28
附錄 30
參考文獻 32
zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098255001en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 環境政策zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資本稅zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅競爭zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) environment policyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) capital taxen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) tax competitionen_US
dc.title (題名) 資本稅對地方環境政策之影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The effect of capital taxation on local environmental policyen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hoyt, William H. (1991), “Property Taxation, Nash Equilibrium, and Market Power,” Journal of Urban Economics, 30, 123-31zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kunce, Mitch and Jason F. Shogren (2005), “On Interjurisdictional Competition and Environmental Federalism” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50, 212-24.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kunce, Mitch; Jason F. Shogren (2008), “Efficient Decentralized Fiscal and Environmental Policy: A Dual Purpose Henry George Tax,” Ecological Economics, 65, 569-73.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Lockwood Ben (2004), “Competition in Unit vs. Ad Valorem Tax,” International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 763-72.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Markusen, James R., Edward R. Morey and Nancy Olewiler (1995), “Competition in Regional Environmental Policies When Plant Locations Are Endogenous,” Journal of Public Economics, 56, 55-77.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Oates, Wallance E. and Robert. M. Schwab (1988), “Economic Competition among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?,” Journal of Public Economics, 35, 333-54.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Rauscher, Michael (1995), “Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting Industries,” International Tax and Public Finance, 2, 229-44.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Tiebout Charles. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-24zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Woods, Neal D. (2006) ,“Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis,” Social Science Quarterly, 87, 174-89.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszowski (1986), “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods,” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 296¬¬-315zh_TW