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題名 表象與意識結構：克里果與佛教的意識理論比較
Representation and the structure of consciousness: A comparison of Kriegel’s and Buddhist theory of consciousness
作者 張陌耘
貢獻者 林鎮國
張陌耘
關鍵詞 克里果
表象
意識
成唯識論
日期 2011
上傳時間 17-四月-2012 09:14:15 (UTC+8)
摘要 本論文探討克里果(Uriah Kriegel)與佛教《成唯識論》關於表象與意識結構之理論及相關議題與爭點。
參考文獻 專書：
Blackmore, S. (2004). Consciousness: An Introduction. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press.
Block, N., O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere, eds. (1997). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Braddon-Mitchell, D. and F. Jackson (2006). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brook, A. (1994). Kant and the Mind. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.
Cummins, R. (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown.
Fodor, J. A. (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Sussex, Eng.: Harvester Press.
Gallagher, S. and D. Zahavi (2008). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. London: Routledge.
Kim, J. (2006). Philosophy of Mind, 2nd edition. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kriegel, U. and K. Williford, eds. (2006). Self-epresentational Approaches to Consciousness. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T., ed. (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Petitot, J., F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud, and J. Roy, eds. (1999). Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Rosenthal, D. M. (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press.
Sokolowski, R. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.
von Eckardt, B. (1993). What is Cognitive Science? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Williams, P., ed. (2005). Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies. Vol. V. London: Routledge.
Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
Zelazo, P. D., M. Moscovitch, and E. Thompson, eds. (2007). The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.
釋演培 (1989)。《成唯識論講記》。臺北市：天華。
霍韜晦 (1980)。《安慧三十唯識釋原典譯註》。香港：中文大學。
吳汝鈞 (2000)。《佛教的概念與方法》(修訂版)。臺北市：臺灣商務。
吳汝鈞 (2002)。《唯識現象學(一)：世親與護法》。臺北市：臺灣學生。
吳汝鈞 (2006)。《佛學研究方法論》(三版)。臺北市：臺灣學生。
張澄基 (1973)。《佛學今詮》。臺北市：慧炬。
倪梁康 (2002)。《自识与反思: 近现代西方哲学的基本问题》。北京市：商務印書館。
倪梁康[注釋] (2005)。《新譯八識規矩頌》。臺北市：三民。
羅時憲[删注] (1992-93)。《成唯識論述記删注》。香港九龍：佛教法相學會。
井上玄真(著)；白湖旡言(譯) (2011)。《唯識三十論講話》(再版)。臺北市：新文豐。
橫山紘一(著)；許洋山(譯) (2002)。《唯識思想入門》。臺北市：東大。
期刊／論文：
Arnold, D. (2005). Is Svasaṃvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruction Following Śāntarakṣita. Asian Philosophy 15: 77-111.
Block, N. (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4: 52-79. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).
Block, N. (1999). Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness.
Philosophical Topics 26 (1): 39-70.
Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4: 31-52. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).
Johnston, M. (1989). Dispositional Theories of Value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63: 139-174.
Kellner, B. (2011). Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Journal of Indian Philosophy 39: 411–426.
Kern, I. (1988). The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 19: 282-295.
Kern, I. (1992). Object, Objective Phenomenon and Objectivating Act According to the ‘Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi’ of Xuanzang. In D.P. Chattopadhyaya, L. Embree, and J. Mohanty, eds., Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
MacKenzie, M. (2004). Self-Awareness: Issues in Classical Indian and Contemporary Western Philosophy. (doctoral dissertation).
MacKenzie, M. (2007). The Illumination of Consciousness: Approaches to Self-Awareness in the Indian and Western Traditions. Philosophy East & West 57: 40-62.
MacKenzie, M. (2008). Self-Awareness without a Self: Buddhism and the Reflexivity of Awareness. Asian Philosophy 18 (3): 245 – 266.
McGinn, C. (1988). Consciousness and Content. Proceedings of the British Academy 74: 219-239. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).
Paul, L. A. (2002). Logical Parts. Noûs 36: 578-596.
Shoemaker, S.(1982). The Inverted Spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79 (July): 357-381. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).
Tye, M. (2007) Philosophical Problems of Consciousness. In M. Velmans and S. Schneider, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
梁益堉 (2007)。“Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character”(概念論與現象特性)。《國立臺灣大學哲學論評》第34期：129-174。
姚治華 (2006)。論陳那的自證說。《現象學與人文科學》3期：51-83 (余振邦正文中譯)。
陳一標 (2003)。唯識學「行相」(AkAra)之研究。「第一屆印度學學術研討會」會議論文。
倪梁康 (2006)。唯識學中「自證分」的基本意涵。《現象學與人文科學》3期：85-110。
倪梁康。最終意識與阿賴耶識──對現象學與唯識學所理解的深層心識結構的
比較研究。
倪梁康。客體化行為與非客體化行為的奠基關係問題──從唯識學和現象學的
角度看“識”與“智”的關係。
耿寧 (1994)。從現象學的角度看唯識三世。中國文哲研究通訊第四卷第一期：6-14。
何宗興。陳那自證理論的分析與闡釋。
http://www.plm.org.hk/e_book/xz-1255.pdf
趙東明 (2006)。陳那「自證」理論探析──兼論《成唯識論》及窺基《成唯
識論述記》的觀點。圓光佛學學報第十期。
釋仁宥。陳那「自證」理論之初探。「台灣哲學學會2008年學術研討會」會議論文。
佛教原典：
會本：《成唯識論》、述記、三種述。(2005)。佛陀教育基金會。
--護法造 玄奘譯《成唯識論》
--窺基《成唯識論述記》
--窺基《成唯識論掌中樞要》
--慧沼《成唯識論了義燈》
--智周《成唯識論演秘》
Hattori, M. (1968). Dignāga, on Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga`s Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學研究所
96154002
100
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096154002
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 林鎮國zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) 張陌耘zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 張陌耘zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2011en_US
dc.date.accessioned 17-四月-2012 09:14:15 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 17-四月-2012 09:14:15 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 17-四月-2012 09:14:15 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0096154002en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/52758-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 哲學研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 96154002zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 100zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文探討克里果(Uriah Kriegel)與佛教《成唯識論》關於表象與意識結構之理論及相關議題與爭點。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論1
第1.1 節 對本文研究旨趣之說明1
第1.2節 本論文之研究大綱3
第二章 表象概念與相關議題之分析8
第2.1 節 引言8
第2.2 節 所謂「有意識的」一詞之意義與使用8
第2.3 節 心理表象與表象主義12
2.3.1 能表象與所表象12
2.3.2 表象內容與意向性內容14
2.3.3 關於「影像」之問題17
2.3.4 實體化的謬誤18
2.3.5 表象主義19
第2.4 節 關於「內省」21
2.4.1 經驗透明性與自反覺察之衝突21
2.4.2 泰與麥肯易之論點22
2.4.3 麥辛格的論點25
第2.5 節 經驗的透明性30
2.5.1 透明玻璃板之比喻30
2.5.2 克里果論「光幻視」等例32
2.5.3 麥肯易的觀點33
第2.6 節 「顛倒地球」思想實驗之檢討35
2.6.1 顛倒地球之場景概述35
2.6.2 有關長期意向性內容改變之疑慮36
2.6.3 「顛倒地球」之雙胞胎版本39
第2.7 節 「呈現模式」的表象主義40
2.7.1 弗雷格式的表象主義40
2.7.2 麥肯易的模式表象主義42
2.7.3 對克里果之「反應-取決的」表象主義之詮釋43
第2.8 節 「移動光譜」與「反應-取決的」表象主義44
2.8.1 移動光譜之現象44
2.8.2 關於「反應-取決的特性」45
2.8.3 對「反應-取決的」表象理論之檢討48
2.8.4 比較麥肯易模式的表象主義與克里果反應-取決的表象主義50
2.8.5 對反應-取決的表象主義之再修正51
第2.9 節 唯識學派的表象主義與影像問題55
2.9.1 關於本節研究方法之聲明55
2.9.2 容納經量部「外境實在論」而展開的唯識理論56
2.9.3 對法稱觀點之詮釋與比較58
2.9.4 「自證」：對克里果理論之再反省62
2.9.5 比較法稱與克里果論「識之結構」64
2.9.6 唯表象論與間接實在論65
2.9.7 對陳那觀點之詮釋與比較67
2.9.8 對安慧觀點之詮釋與比較70
第2.10 節 結語76
第三章 克里果的自身表象理論77
第3.1 節 引言77
第3.2 節 意識經驗之現象學的結構77
3.2.1 現象經驗之結構的幾個基本面相77
3.2.2 周邊的內在覺察之現象學81
3.2.3 關於經驗的透明性84
3.2.4 後退問題與自身表象91
第3.3 節 意識經驗之本體論的結構95
3.3.1 邏輯的部分性95
3.3.2間接的(自身)表象98
第3.4 節 關於「直接性」之問題102
3.4.1 所謂「直接性」102
3.4.2 羅森索的論點103
3.4.3 自身表象論點104
第3.5 節 結語106
第四章 成唯識論之識的四分結構108
第4.1 節 引言108
第4.2 節 《成唯識論》之識的結構108
4.2.1 相分與見分108
4.2.2 自證分117
4.2.3 所量、能量、與量果123
4.2.4 內外與能所127
4.2.5 《成論》與克里果理論之「四分結構」的比較132
第4.3 節 結語137
第五章 結論138
第5.1 節 關於本文第二章之議題138
5.1.1 影像138
5.1.2 表象內容與意向性內容139
5.1.3 內省與經驗的透明性139
5.1.4 「呈現模式」的表象主義140
5.1.5 唯識理論之影像問題141
第5.2 節 關於本文第三章之議題141
第5.3 節 關於本文第四章之議題142
第5.4 節 結語143
參考文獻144		zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096154002en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 克里果zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 表象zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 意識zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 成唯識論zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 表象與意識結構：克里果與佛教的意識理論比較zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Representation and the structure of consciousness: A comparison of Kriegel’s and Buddhist theory of consciousnessen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 專書：zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Blackmore, S. (2004). Consciousness: An Introduction. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Block, N., O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere, eds. (1997). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Braddon-Mitchell, D. and F. Jackson (2006). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Brook, A. (1994). Kant and the Mind. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Cummins, R. (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Fodor, J. A. (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Sussex, Eng.: Harvester Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Gallagher, S. and D. Zahavi (2008). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. London: Routledge.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kim, J. (2006). Philosophy of Mind, 2nd edition. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kriegel, U. and K. Williford, eds. (2006). Self-epresentational Approaches to Consciousness. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Metzinger, T., ed. (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Metzinger, T. (2003). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Petitot, J., F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud, and J. Roy, eds. (1999). Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Rosenthal, D. M. (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Sokolowski, R. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) von Eckardt, B. (1993). What is Cognitive Science? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Williams, P., ed. (2005). Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies. Vol. V. London: Routledge.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Zelazo, P. D., M. Moscovitch, and E. Thompson, eds. (2007). The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 釋演培 (1989)。《成唯識論講記》。臺北市：天華。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 霍韜晦 (1980)。《安慧三十唯識釋原典譯註》。香港：中文大學。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 吳汝鈞 (2000)。《佛教的概念與方法》(修訂版)。臺北市：臺灣商務。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 吳汝鈞 (2002)。《唯識現象學(一)：世親與護法》。臺北市：臺灣學生。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 吳汝鈞 (2006)。《佛學研究方法論》(三版)。臺北市：臺灣學生。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 張澄基 (1973)。《佛學今詮》。臺北市：慧炬。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 倪梁康 (2002)。《自识与反思: 近现代西方哲学的基本问题》。北京市：商務印書館。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 倪梁康[注釋] (2005)。《新譯八識規矩頌》。臺北市：三民。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 羅時憲[删注] (1992-93)。《成唯識論述記删注》。香港九龍：佛教法相學會。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 井上玄真(著)；白湖旡言(譯) (2011)。《唯識三十論講話》(再版)。臺北市：新文豐。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 橫山紘一(著)；許洋山(譯) (2002)。《唯識思想入門》。臺北市：東大。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 期刊／論文：zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Arnold, D. (2005). Is Svasaṃvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruction Following Śāntarakṣita. Asian Philosophy 15: 77-111.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Block, N. (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4: 52-79. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Block, N. (1999). Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Philosophical Topics 26 (1): 39-70.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4: 31-52. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Johnston, M. (1989). Dispositional Theories of Value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63: 139-174.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kellner, B. (2011). Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Journal of Indian Philosophy 39: 411–426.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kern, I. (1988). The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 19: 282-295.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kern, I. (1992). Object, Objective Phenomenon and Objectivating Act According to the ‘Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi’ of Xuanzang. In D.P. Chattopadhyaya, L. Embree, and J. Mohanty, eds., Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.zh_TW
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