| dc.contributor | 國立政治大學會計學系 | en_US |
| dc.contributor | 行政院國家科學委員會 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 梁嘉紋 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2008 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 26-Jun-2012 14:57:23 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 26-Jun-2012 14:57:23 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 26-Jun-2012 14:57:23 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53235 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 高階主管獎酬中常見的財務性績效衡量指標除了會計盈餘外，還包含營收、現金流 量、和股票價格等。本研究目的在探討高階主管獎酬中財務績效衡量指標的選擇，亦即 根據這些指標本質上的差異，探討高階主管獎酬契約在什麼情況下，會使用或輔以會計 盈餘以外的其他財務績效衡量指標（即營收、現金流量、或股價）。此外，並根據樣本 公司2000 年及2005 年使用之財務績效指標探討是否恩隆相關事件及沙賓法案 (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)的通過會影響獎酬契約中績效衡量指標的選擇。 為收集研究所需之績效衡量指標及公司治理相關資料，本研究需要大量地逐筆閱讀 約3,500 筆的公司委託書(proxy statements)及其他來源的資料以建構本研究所需之資料 庫，計劃第一年將先收集2000 年委託書中的資訊,待2000 年績效衡量指標搜集完成後， 即可先行測試第一個研究議題，即探討營收績效指標的使用與公司成長機會的關連性， 同時並繼續收集2005 年委託書中的資訊。第二年除了完成2005 年績效衡量指標的資料 收集外，並將衡量盈餘品質與收集相關的公司治理指標，以探討現金流量績效指標的使 用是否與公司的應計項目品質(accrual quality)及經理人對盈餘數字的影響力有關，及探 討以股票價格為績效衡量指標是否與盈餘雜訊(noise in earnings)或股票報酬率雜訊 (noise in stock returns)有關。計畫第三年將以第一年及第二年的研究為基礎，全面性地探 討沙賓法案的通過及其相關事件是否影響財務績效衡量指標的使用。過去相關的研究多 以獎酬對績效的廻歸係數來推論各項績效衡量指標在獎酬契約中的權重，本研究藉由收 集委託書中明確說明的績效衡量指標可更直接地探討獎酬契約設計相關的議題，並有助 於吾人對高階主管獎酬契約的瞭解。 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This study aims to provide insight into the factors that affect the value of earnings as a performance measure by comparing the characteristics of earnings to three other frequently used financial performance measures: sales, cash flows, and stock price. Based on the differences in the measures, we develop and test predictions of the conditions under which those financial performance measures will be used to supplement, or replace earnings-based measures in executive incentive contracts. In addition, we use the performance measure selection model to investigate whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the events surrounding the passage of the Act, altered the design of incentive contracts by changing the perceived noise in earnings as a measure of performance. To conduct this study, extensive manual data collection is required to obtain the performance measures data and the corporate governance data needed from proxy statements and other sources. During the first year, we plan to collect and go through 1,792 firms’ 2000 proxy statements and construct a performance measure database. With this dataset on hand, we’ll test our first set of hypotheses on the use of sales-based performance measures. In the meantime, we’ll continue on going through year 2005 proxy statements. During the second year, in addition to finishing the data collection of the performance measure data for both 2000 and 2005, we’ll work on measuring accrual quality and collecting corporate governance variables for testing our second and third set of hypotheses on the use of cash flow measures and stock price measures. Building upon the research findings in the first two years, we’ll conduct a set of comprehensive analyses in the third year to investigate whether the design of incentive contracts altered around the events surrounding the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. By directly comparing the attributes of specific performance measures and examining changes in performance measures over time, our study provides insights into the factors that affect the role of earnings as a measure of performance. In addition, the investigation of changes in CEO incentive contracts enhances our understanding on the dynamic nature of incentive contracts. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 基礎研究 | en_US |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 學術補助 | en_US |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 研究期間:9708~ 9807 | en_US |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 研究經費:333仟元 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 高階主管獎酬;績效衡量指標;公司治理;盈餘品質 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | executive compensation; financial performance measures; corporate governance;accrual quality | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 高階主管獎酬與財務績效衡量指標之研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | The Choice of Financial Performance Measures in Executive Incentive Plans | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | en |
