Publications-Periodical Articles
Article View/Open
Publication Export
-
Google ScholarTM
NCCU Library
Citation Infomation
Related Publications in TAIR
題名 No Communal and First-Person Errors: A Critique of Brandom’s Objectivity Proof
無社群與第一人稱錯誤作者 林從一
Lin, Chung-I貢獻者 政大哲學系 關鍵詞 布蘭登;客觀性;推論語意學;語用語意學
Brandom;objectivity;inferential semantics;pragmatic semantics日期 2008-09 上傳時間 21-Aug-2012 14:38:06 (UTC+8) 摘要 布藍登的《說明白》(Making It Explicit)主張一種實用主義的語意理論(pragmatic semantics)，他認為他的理論所而臨最大的挑戰，是呈現出他的理論不會違反以下這個客觀性原則：我們的態度所關於的對象是超越我們的態度的。布藍登書中總其成的一章是第八章，在該章中，他直接面對那個挑戰，他試圖證明他的理論不會有以下的後果：(P)［(S)（S宣稱P）→P］（名為「無社羣錯誤條件句」，NO Communal Error Condition）。在本文中，我論證布藍登的論證是失敗的，同時我也將證明「無社羣錯誤條件句」以及布藍登所謂的「無第一人稱錯誤條件句」（No Communal Error Condition, (P) ［（我宣稱P）→P］）在適度且微幅的修正下，將可從他的實用主義的語意理論中導出。 Brandom recognizes one of the most serious conceptual challenges facing the pragmatic semantics advocated his Making It Explicit is the need to accommodate the objectivity conviction that our attitudes are answering to things that transcend our attitudes. And he meets the challenge head-on by processing a proof in his climactic chapter eight to demonstrate that his account does not force upon itself the undesirable consequence that (p)[(S) (S claims that p)→p], dubbed the No Communal Error Condition. In this paper, Ⅰ shall argue that Brandom`s proof fails, and, moreover, I prove that both the No Communal Error Condition and what Brandom calls No First-Person Error Condition, (p) [(I claim that p)→p]), with minor modifications, will result from his pragmatic account. 關聯 國立政治大學哲學學報, 20, 102-122 資料類型 article dc.contributor 政大哲學系 en dc.creator (作者) 林從一 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lin, Chung-I en dc.date (日期) 2008-09 - dc.date.accessioned 21-Aug-2012 14:38:06 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 21-Aug-2012 14:38:06 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 21-Aug-2012 14:38:06 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53362 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) 布藍登的《說明白》(Making It Explicit)主張一種實用主義的語意理論(pragmatic semantics)，他認為他的理論所而臨最大的挑戰，是呈現出他的理論不會違反以下這個客觀性原則：我們的態度所關於的對象是超越我們的態度的。布藍登書中總其成的一章是第八章，在該章中，他直接面對那個挑戰，他試圖證明他的理論不會有以下的後果：(P)［(S)（S宣稱P）→P］（名為「無社羣錯誤條件句」，NO Communal Error Condition）。在本文中，我論證布藍登的論證是失敗的，同時我也將證明「無社羣錯誤條件句」以及布藍登所謂的「無第一人稱錯誤條件句」（No Communal Error Condition, (P) ［（我宣稱P）→P］）在適度且微幅的修正下，將可從他的實用主義的語意理論中導出。 Brandom recognizes one of the most serious conceptual challenges facing the pragmatic semantics advocated his Making It Explicit is the need to accommodate the objectivity conviction that our attitudes are answering to things that transcend our attitudes. And he meets the challenge head-on by processing a proof in his climactic chapter eight to demonstrate that his account does not force upon itself the undesirable consequence that (p)[(S) (S claims that p)→p], dubbed the No Communal Error Condition. In this paper, Ⅰ shall argue that Brandom`s proof fails, and, moreover, I prove that both the No Communal Error Condition and what Brandom calls No First-Person Error Condition, (p) [(I claim that p)→p]), with minor modifications, will result from his pragmatic account. en dc.format.extent 194 bytes - dc.format.mimetype text/html - dc.language zh_TW en dc.language.iso en_US - dc.relation (關聯) 國立政治大學哲學學報, 20, 102-122 en dc.subject (關鍵詞) 布蘭登;客觀性;推論語意學;語用語意學 en dc.subject (關鍵詞) Brandom;objectivity;inferential semantics;pragmatic semantics en dc.title (題名) No Communal and First-Person Errors: A Critique of Brandom’s Objectivity Proof en dc.title (題名) 無社群與第一人稱錯誤 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) article en
