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題名 以土地拍賣樣本測試投標者投標行為
其他題名 Evidence on the Endogenous Entry of Bidders in Land Auctions
作者 姜堯民
貢獻者 國立政治大學財務管理學系
行政院國家科學委員會
關鍵詞 土地拍賣;進入決策;投標人數
日期 2011
上傳時間 22-Oct-2012 11:11:07 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究以台灣的國有土地拍賣資料來來測試 Sherman(2005)的資訊蒐集成本模型。本人 曾利用此台灣初次上市競拍資料寫過兩篇文章:” Endogenous entry and partial adjustment in IPO auctions: Are institutional investors better informed?”及”Do Investors Learn from Experience: Learning to Fail? Evidence from Frequent IPO Investors”,分別被 Review of Financial Studies 接受。本次研究將利用我利用在台北市及台北縣的國有土地 拍賣資料來測試 Sherman(2005)的資訊蒐集成本模型。我的初步結果顯示:投標台北市 土地的投標者因為競爭較激烈,比較會蒐集資訊,而且投標行為較理性,較符合理論 的預期。而相對地,投標台北縣土地的投標者較不蒐集資訊,投標行為也較不理性。 希望藉由此研究發掘與文獻不同的解釋,做出貢獻。
I use land auction data in Taipei City and in Taipei County to test Sherman’s (2005) information production theory. Results show that bidders in Taipei City and those in Taipei County have different bidding behavior. I find that bids in Taipei City’s land auctions are generally consistent with the predictions of auction theory for informed bidders. They tend to expend resources to collect information and shave their bids optimally. However, bids in Taipei County exhibit uninformed and overbidding behavior.
關聯 基礎研究
學術補助
研究期間:10008~ 10107
研究經費:795仟元
資料類型 report
dc.contributor 國立政治大學財務管理學系en_US
dc.contributor 行政院國家科學委員會en_US
dc.creator (作者) 姜堯民zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2011en_US
dc.date.accessioned 22-Oct-2012 11:11:07 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 22-Oct-2012 11:11:07 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-Oct-2012 11:11:07 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53827-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究以台灣的國有土地拍賣資料來來測試 Sherman(2005)的資訊蒐集成本模型。本人 曾利用此台灣初次上市競拍資料寫過兩篇文章:” Endogenous entry and partial adjustment in IPO auctions: Are institutional investors better informed?”及”Do Investors Learn from Experience: Learning to Fail? Evidence from Frequent IPO Investors”,分別被 Review of Financial Studies 接受。本次研究將利用我利用在台北市及台北縣的國有土地 拍賣資料來測試 Sherman(2005)的資訊蒐集成本模型。我的初步結果顯示:投標台北市 土地的投標者因為競爭較激烈,比較會蒐集資訊,而且投標行為較理性,較符合理論 的預期。而相對地,投標台北縣土地的投標者較不蒐集資訊,投標行為也較不理性。 希望藉由此研究發掘與文獻不同的解釋,做出貢獻。en_US
dc.description.abstract (摘要) I use land auction data in Taipei City and in Taipei County to test Sherman’s (2005) information production theory. Results show that bidders in Taipei City and those in Taipei County have different bidding behavior. I find that bids in Taipei City’s land auctions are generally consistent with the predictions of auction theory for informed bidders. They tend to expend resources to collect information and shave their bids optimally. However, bids in Taipei County exhibit uninformed and overbidding behavior.en_US
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 基礎研究en_US
dc.relation (關聯) 學術補助en_US
dc.relation (關聯) 研究期間:10008~ 10107en_US
dc.relation (關聯) 研究經費:795仟元en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 土地拍賣;進入決策;投標人數en_US
dc.title (題名) 以土地拍賣樣本測試投標者投標行為zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Evidence on the Endogenous Entry of Bidders in Land Auctionsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) reporten