| dc.contributor | 政治大學風險管理與保險系 | en_US |
| dc.contributor | 行政院國家科學委員會 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 陳彩稚 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2000 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 22-Oct-2012 15:43:19 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 22-Oct-2012 15:43:19 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 22-Oct-2012 15:43:19 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53847 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | To mitigate the liability insurance crisis, this paper proposes a remedy through a mixed system of private insurance and public fund. The mixed system is consistent with the concept of decoupling liability. Under this system, the expected total cost for the firm to engate in risky activity must be greater than expected loss payment of an accident so that the incentive of safety care can be maintained. The insurance premium is lowered so to be affordable by the insured. The monetary compensation paid by the insurer to the victim is reduced which mitigates social inflation of liability damages award. The public fund is collected from the penalty of firms that cause the accidents. part of the fund is applied to risk management research so that the overall safety level of the society can be improved, which is nonmoneytary compensation to the consumers (victims). Part of the fund serves as a subsidy for insurer`s solvency. The insurer`s incentive to supply liability insurance is raised through a subsidy of buffer fund. | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 應用研究 | en_US |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 學術補助 | en_US |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 研究期間:8808 ~ 8907 | en_US |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 研究經費:384仟元 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 責任保險;道德危險;侵權責任;損害補償;不確定性 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Liability insurance;Moral hazard;Tort law;Loss settlement;Ambiguity | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 責任保險之道德危險及其補救方法 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | Moral Hazard in Liability Insurance and the Remedy | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | en |
